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Preface to the Dutch edition 
The field research in Chile upon which the greater part of this book is based, was 
carried out between June 1969 and September 1970. From the Netherlands Organization 
for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO) I received a scholarship which covered 
my research and travelling expenses, while the Agricultural University of Wageningen 
granted me leave to spend over a year in Chile. I am exceedingly grateful to both 
organizations for the opportunity thus offered me, but accept sole responsibility for the 
manner in which I availed of it. 
In Chile I received hospitality from the Institute de Capacitación e Investigación en 
Reforma Agraria, established in Santiago. This organization was of particular help in 
providing me with introductions. I am grateful to Solon Baraclough and David Alaluf for 
their readiness to smooth my path with a note or a telephone call. In addition I had 
frequent contact with a number of members of the scientific staff. I am particularly 
grateful to Hugo Zemelman, Sergio Gomez and Emilio Klein for their many services, 
large and small. There is no room to mention here all the CORA and INDAP officials 
who gave up their time so freely to an interchange of ideas, introduced me to farming com-
munities and allowed me to accompany them on their field trips. An exception must be made 
for Julio Manriquez and Alejandro Ruiz Lamas, who became my friends. 
Since my research entailed visits to a large number of places, I got to know many 
peasants and peasant leaders. Although the exact nature of my intentions may not 
always have been clear to them, I was treated everywhere with great courtesy and help-
fulness. My intentions have now become fact in the form of a book. I hope that by cor-
rectly interpreting their thoughts, actions and aspirations I have redeemed at least part of 
the debt I owe them. 
The research was carried out during the last years of President Frei's government and 
the book written during the three years that President Allende was in power. After it was 
finished the army seized power in Chile. Since the book is not intended as a description of 
Chilean affairs but rather as an attempt at sociological theorizing on peasants who 
organize and on the vicissitudes of their organizations, I do not believe that the altered 
situation in Chile since 1970 has affected its validity. It does sadden me though that it 
should appear at a time when those to whom it was addressed, albeit obliquely, whose 
idealism I frequently countered with my more pragmatic approach, have lost their jobs or 
been obliged to leave Chile. The fact that I do not always share their opinions does not 
mean that I reject their aspirations. On the contrary, this book is intended as a contribu-
tion towards achieving those objectives. Our discussion was rudely interrupted by out-
siders, but will surely be continued at another time and in another place. 
Wageningen, September 1973 
Preface to the English edition 
Thanks to a further grant from ZWO, the Dutch text, after some minor revisions, has 
been translated into English. I am grateful to Rudi van Lier, Emanuel de Kadt and Dick 
Papousek for their critical reading of the Dutch edition of the book. Some of the 
blemishes they pointed out have been eliminated. Others I have left in, for the reader's 
sake, or for my own. I owe gratitude to Mrs Mary Foran for the care with which she 
translated the book, and to Ineke Smeets for the construction of an index. 
Leiden, June 1975 
Chapter 1 Problem aed theoretical framework 
This book deals with the sociological aspects of the mobilization of and solidarity 
among peasants. Although most of the data were gathered in Chile, I believe that my con-
clusions possess a wider validity. Unlike other authors, who reserve the term peasants for 
independent small agrarian producers, I understand by this term all those more or less 
poor people who earn their living in agriculture. This would include those who work on 
the land solely for payment in money1.1 shall call these people peasants and, whenever it. 
becomes necessary to distinguish between categories, speak of smallholders (that is, in-
dependent producers, whether they own the land they work, rent it, or sharecrop it)and, 
agricultural labourers (either permanent or temporary). 
Some people might regard a sociological study of the political mobilization of 
peasants, of their co-operation and solidarity, as a fairly unimportant and specialized 
exploration of one fraction of the stupendous development problem which confronts the 
countries of the Third World. Such an impression, however, would be incorrect For a 
time it was thought that development would have to consist chiefly of rapid industrializa-
tion. Now, however, the view is growing that the solution to the immense problems of 
poverty, unemployment, low agricultural production, low rates of internal savings, in 
short, of underdevelopment, must be sought in the first instance in the rural areas, in the 
agricultural sector. It may be said of the majority of developing countries that in the 
course of the next twenty years, their future will be decided in the countryside and by 
these peasants. It will prove of crucial importance to determine what they want and what 
they do not, what is capable of arousing their enthusiasm and what is not, with whom 
they associate and are willing to co-operate and with whom they are not 
The mobilization and solidarity which are the subject of this book occur within a par-
ticular structural and cultural context, namely that of an underdeveloped country in 
Latin America. I do not intend here to deal exhaustively with the problem of un-
derdevelopment. It wil, however, be necessary to touch upon it insofar as the thinking on 
this problem has influenced the central theme of this study and its theoretical framework. 
This is all the more essential since my theoretical framework differs from that of many 
other rural sociological and anthropological studies with regard to agricultural develop-
ment Until recently these studies concentrated mainly on the peasants' resistance to 
change, their conservatism, their apathy, in short upon the obstacles to development 
arising from their culture2. 
Traditional was understood as synonymous with being opposed to change. Elsewhere 
(Galjart, 197 la) I have postulated that such a focus must inevitably lead to an emphasis 
on the transfer of knowledge and the elimination of cultural opposition, and a neglect of 
those obstacles to change which are rooted in the social and economic structure. The 
focus itself results from the uncritical export to the underdeveloped countries of both the 
concepts (tradition and modernity) and the approach (research on the level of the single 
village community) which had characterized sociological research into agricultural 
development in the industrial countries. This focus was understandable in those countries 
where the provision of credit and price policies had minimized the braking effect of alack 
of capital upon agricultural development (and in so doing increased the importance of 
other brakes, such as the cultural). In addition, expansion in other sectors of the economy 
had cushioned and obscured the results of agricultural development, the disappearance 
from farming first of the farmers' sons and the paid agricultural workers and later of the 
farm owners who had no one to succeed them. These farmers vanished from the farming 
scene. However, this frame of reference cannot be applied in the underdeveloped coun-
tries since it leads to the neglect of what is precisely the most important factor in 
agricultural development, namely the agrarian structure. 
One important characteristic of an underdeveloped country is that the problem of 
development is regarded as central by the government, the political parties and large sec-
tors of the population. This is indeed the automatic result of the general desire for a higher 
standard of living. It also means that the political struggle in these countries is largely 
dominated by the various views of and attitudes toward the problem of development. 
In the course of the past fifteen years, thinking on this problem has changed in Latin 
America. Explanations of underdevelopment in terms of values and attitudes which 
people hold have come under attack for being too partial if not erroneous. 
Also, it has become evident that industrialization, aimed at the domestic market and 
intended as a substitute for imports, could not prevent economic stagnation. Although it 
is impossible yet to speak of a consensus, certain schematic trends of thought have 
emerged, all implying similar essential changes in social structure. 
One trend sees the problem of underdevelopment as a consequence of dependence on 
and exploitation by the developed capitalist countries. Since this state of affairs is 
perpetrated by the ruling classes, which benefit from it, radical structural changes cannot be 
but the outcome of a socialist revolution. The entire productive organization of society, in-
cluding that of agriculture, should become socialist if the country is to put itself on the road 
to development. 
A second school of thought prefers to explain the development problem in Latin 
America as arising from the economic structure which has grown up through the years 
within these countries. During the crisis of the thirties most countries began a programme 
of industrialization to replace imports of non-durable consumer goods. The constant lack 
of foreign currency later led to further industrialization to save on imports of durable con-
sumer goods. The market for these was very small in view of the very unequal income dis-
tribution. Although this process could make more progress in the larger countries than in 
the small, it everywhere led to a worsening of the terms of exchange for agrarian 
products : industry had to make its profit from high prices, and not from a large turnover, 
which simply wasn't there. Yet the agrarian stagnation which results from the un-
favourable terms of exchange and the unchanged income distribution cannot but hamper 
industrial growth. Evers & Vossenaar (1971) show that in Latin America, unlike other 
developing countries, the influence of population growth on industrial expansion exceeds 
that of a growth in income. This is due to the highly unequal income distribution. They 
therefore conclude that further expansion will only be possible via structural changes: an 
end to stagnation in agriculture and the redistribution of incomes throughout society. 
Why the seemingly apathetic acceptance by agriculture óf this relatively worsening 
position? It seems to me that the reasons are twofold. Insofar as smallholders still prac-
tise subsistence farming, they escape this process in part3. In addition the large landowner 
is often able to make his tenants, share-croppers or workers absorb part at least of the 
consequences of agriculture's unfavourable position. 
Whereas these two trends of thought are not very explicit about the precise productive 
organization that is to result from agrarian reform, in Chile in the sixties ideas with regard to 
this problem were developed by catholic groupings who wished above all to end the socially 
marginal position of the peasant population and create a society consistent with human 
dignity. They rejected the absolute power of the state, so evident in the European socialist 
countries (cf. Silva & Chonchol, 1969) and preferred instead communal enterprises, the fu-
sion of labour and capital in the same persons. We see thus that, starting from different 
positions, various observers came to regard the social structure and notably the mode of 
ownership of the means of production in the countryside as a problem. 
The tasks assigned to a reformed agriculture are both economic (the creation of an in-
ternal market, an increase in production so as to cut down on the import of food and 
create more job opportunities) and social, particularly in Chile (equality and incorpora-
tion in the national polity). Land reforms carried out in Bolivia and Mexico had shown 
that the division of the land into family farms as desired by the peasants, had diminished 
their poverty and marginality only slightly and had left many peasants out in the cold. 
This brief outline shows that the problem of peasant mobilization and solidarity cannot 
be viewed exclusively in terms of the desires, aims and insights of the peasants 
themselves. It must also be viewed within the larger framework of the national develop-
ment effort and the political struggle for consensus regarding this effort. This is not only 
because what the peasants want and do will influence these efforts, but also because the 
political leaders and movements in their turn will seek to influence the peasants' 
aspirations and actions. The last two chapters of this book will examine in some detail the 
extent to which these two 'intentions' converged or diverged in Chile. Now, however, we 
shall deal with those theories on individual and local group level which served as guide-lines 
to my study. 
It has been an implicit assumption of this study and one of which I only became really 
aware as I collated my data, that peasants view their interests primarily in local terms, 
that is to say in terms of the social structure and the distribution of resources as they are 
found in their local community. I am now convinced that this assumption is correct and 
hope that my results will convince the reader as well. 
A hypothesis developed by Röling (1970) concerning the reasons motivating in-
dividual peasants to change, provides a suitable starting point for elaborating a theory 
based on this assumption. Röling defines development as the increasing possibility of the 
individual to control his own environment. He postulates that a peasant, noting a 
difference between the situation he experiences and the situation which he covets, (not as 
a gratuitous, wishful dream, but measured against the situation which he sees others 
enjoying), will first of all wish to eliminate this difference by altering his own experienced 
situation in such a way as to bring about the one desired. He will then try to discover how 
this may be done, and will do his best to put into practice the knowledge gained. This 
voluntaristic model does not, of course, describe what actually happens. Only too aften 
the peasants are incapable of following a planned course of action. Röling does not preoc-
cupy himself overmuch with why this is so, but postulates that a permanent difference 
between conditions experienced and desired gives rise to frustration which the peasants 
attempt either to suppress or to overcome by various reactions. We shall return to these 
reactions which are thought to give rise to particular cultural patterns. The fact to be 
stressed here is that Röling's theory makes it possible to seek the obstacles to innovation 
and agrarian development primarily in circumstances outside the individual peasant, 
notably in the social structure and in the distribution of land. Moreover, a theory which 
attributes cultural resistance to development not to tradition but to frustration arising 
from previous attempts to achieve development, chimes much better with the fact that 
new opportunities in traditional peasant cultures are often rapidly seized upon and 
exploited. In an earlier study of Brazil (Galjart, 1968) I found no indication that the 
peasants resisted the introduction of new techniques or crops. The entire theory of the 
traditional stick-in-the-mud peasants in non-western countries is, if not inaccurate, at. 
least based upon assumptions which are usually too simplistic for the circumstances. 
What is the actual situation of a peasant in Latin America on the local community 
level? In answering this question I shall introduce a second assumption which seems to 
me correct but for which we have as yet no proof. This is that the peasant's chance of sur-
vival and development possibilities are determined by the (local) distribution of what is 
for him the most important resource, namely land. In a later model, to be dealt with in 
detail in Chapter 3 (see p. 22) the assumption is made that once this resource is closed, the 
rivalry for land between households - or other groups - can result in three types of divi-
sion, or, to usé Röling's terms, three different experienced situations. These are: 
a. The distribution of land among the households displays a fairly high measure of 
equality. 
b. The distribution of land among the households is unequal, but the great majority has 
access to land. 
c. The land is in the hands of one or a few individuals. The remaining households have no 
land of their own, or hardly any although they may have the use of land belonging to the 
monopolist. 
In situation (a), all the households dispose of a roughly equal quantity of land. 
Examples of situation (a) may be found in the settlements of European colonists in 
Southern Brazil, in most of the modern colonization and irrigation projects and in some 
farming communities, whether they be Indian or not. The Indian communities included in 
this category are those to which no one can lay any claim of domain and which have not 
been deprived of land to any extent. Examples of situation (b) are the communities of in-
dependent peasants to be found in all Latin American countries. Here economic differen-
tiation can admittedly be found but not to the extent that the land may be said to belong to 
only a handful of individuals. 
Examples of situation (c) are the communities or local groups which either rent or 
sharecrop, or work for wages on land belonging to one or a couple of owners ;the popula-
tion of haciendas or plantations. I also include under (c) those communities of peasants -
usually Indian - who, while possessing a certain amount of land, which they work 
themselves, have, in the course of the centuries, lost the larger part of their land to the sur-
rounding haciendas which (enclose the territory belonging to the community. In category 
(c) thus we find not-only independent producers (minifundia) but tenant fanners, share-
croppers and wage- workeits. In some cases the group displays a considerable amount of 
cohesion, but according as they have less access to land, either as owners or tenants, it 
tends to fragment. 
My research in Chile dealt with peasants in situation (b) and groups of agricultural 
labourers on large enterprises who found themselves in category (c). 
It is clear that peasants, depending upon the situation in which they find themselves 
and upon the specific manner in which they are involved in the process of production, 
may have both similar and varying interests. Their interests are similar in that they are 
poor in a society, and often in a local community in which wealth, income, and to a cer-
tain extent power, are concentrated in the hands of a fairly restricted élite. In such cir-
cumstances how can the peasant gain more control over his surroundings? 
1. As an individual he can try, by his own efforts, to join the élite, that is to say acquire 
the attributes of the élite. In practice this implies migration, an attempt to improve his 
education and to exploit the possibilities in agricultural enterprise, insofar as these exist. 
As we have observed a great deal of earlier rural sociological research has concerned 
itself chiefly with this possibility of development. 
2. He can, as an individual, attempt to improve his situation by means of patronage. 
Patronage is, in principle, a dyadic relationship between people of unequal social stan-
ding, whereby the party possessing the higher status dispenses economic advantages to 
the party of the lower. In exchange the advantaged party rewards his patron with' 
/prestige, political support and other services4. 
3. He can, by co-operating with his social equals, attempt to improve his lot and theirs at 
the same time. So long as this attempt does not prove a flash in the pan, it will usually find 
expression in some organization which promotes the peasants' interests. 
In my Brazilian research (Galjart, 1968) I found, among peasants in situation (b), 
attempts at 1 and 2 but only abortive attempts at 3.1 even came to the conclusion that the 
active solicitation for patronage explained why solidarity between social equals was so 
weak in Brazil. 
It is my opinion, however, that only co-operation can help relieve the poverty of 
smallholders and agricultural labourers. For the latter (situation (c)) this seems self-
evident: it is their association in a trade union which provides them with the necessary 
'countervailing power' to insist on higher wages and better living conditions. Their in-
terests and those of their employers Le. the landed proprietors, are to a large extent in con-
flict3. Regarding the smallholders in situations (a) and (b) the position is different in that 
they have no direct local opponents with the exception, perhaps, of merchants. They are 
menaced by a complex of phenomena, such as unfavourable terms of exchange, the in-
crease in socio-economic inequality which accompanies the development of farming 
units into family businesses, and employment opportunities hi other sectors of the economy 
which are insufficient to absorb the expected exodus from agriculture. For that matter the 
limited capacity of industry and the service sector to absorb any surplus labour affects all 
categories of the agrarian population. Publications issued by FAO (1969) and ILO 
(1971) predict that in many developing countries agriculture will have to provide work 
for not less but more people in the coming decades. Agricultural development after the 
West European model based on family units and with the less successful, superfluous 
smallholders and agricultural labourers drifting from the land would condemn the 
majority of Latin American peasants to permanent and even increasing poverty. This can 
only be prevented by their working together and so achieving advantages of scale to 
which they could not aspire as individuals. In this way they could also assert their 
'countervailing power' on the markets and thus nibble away to some extent at the large 
trade margins. In all probability too a greater equality of income will have to be created 
by the collectivization of some or all of the means of production. In West European coun-
tries such as the Netherlands, the shrinkage of job opportunities in agriculture and the 
growth of socio-economic inequality among farmers has not been arrested by an exten-
sive network of service co-operatives (Weerdenburg, 1970, p. 6 f.)6. 
The question of what sociological factors influence co-operation among peasants may 
be divided up into a number of subsidiary points. 
Firstly, what sociological factors influence the mobilization process which leads 
peasants to set up associations for their mutual advantage and to enter into other new co-
operative links? In Chapter 3 we shall develop a theory regarding those factors which, on 
the level of society and local community influence the mobilization of agricultural 
labourers into syndicates. In Chapter 4 this theory is tested to some extent against quan-
titative data relating to Chilean communities, while Chapter 5 develops a theory with 
regard to the mobilization into co-operatives of peasants who find themselves in 
situations (a) and (b). 
A second question concerns the individual differences between those who are 
mobilized and those who are not (or, to put it another way, members and non-members). 
In Chapter 6 hypotheses are developed and tested regarding the differences between 
members and non-members of syndicates on the one hand and of co-operatives on the 
other. 
The data are derived chiefly from a survey. In Chapter 8 (leaving Chapter 7 aside for 
the moment) we inquire into those factors which influence solidarity among peasants in 
their new associations. We have already suggested that co-operation, even though born 
of the participants' expectation of individual economic advantage, cannot succeed 
without a certain readiness to sacrifice on the peasants' part. Solidarity as an attitude 
becomes increasingly important according as more sacrifices are required of the peasants 
than mere participation in associations. Since this was the case in Chile and since -
should I prove correct in my prediction that in the future a certain degree of social and 
economic equality will be created among peasants in other developing countries through 
the collectivization of the means of production- government agricultural policy in other 
countries will perhaps come to be determined by what rural sociologists understand by 
solidarity, it seems to me important to dissect this concept theoretically with the aid of 
data gathered during my research. In countries where the government attaches impor-
tance to a certain social equality, it is often the sociologists who are asked what measures 
the peasants will accept to achieve this equality and what measures they will not. In such 
a situation solidarity is a key concept and sociologists who have not kept abreast of their 
subject are inclined to proffer rash recommendations which not only fail to advance 
equality but may well result in the peasant having to endure a lower than necessary stan-
dard of living. 
8 
Our research was carried out within a very well defined context: the Chilean central 
valley between August 1969 and August 1970. This context influenced the research and 
even the approach to the problem. In 1965 the Frei government had embarked on a 
programme of land reform which included the organization of the small fanners and 
agricultural labourers. This reform consisted in the acquisition, under various pretexts, of 
enterprises larger than 80 hectares of irrigated land or that amount of land which might be 
considered the local equivalent. After the expropriation, these enterprises were run by the 
workers living (and working) on them at the time under the supervision of the government 
body CORA (Corporation de Reforma Agraria) which was responsible for carrying out 
the land reform. For the first three years, as laid down by the land reform law, the enter-
prise, now called asentamiento, would be organized along communal lines. After this the 
peasants would be allowed to choose whether they wished to retain this communal enter-
prise or break it up into family units which, though united in a co-operative, would be 
otherwise independent. They could also opt for a mixed form, a communal farm in which 
houses and gardens would be private property. In any case the peasants themselves 
would exercise control, without the intervention of CORA. 
For the agricultural workers INDAP (Institute de Desarrollo Agropecuario), another 
government body, founded syndicates, as for that matter did other groups, whether 
catholic or socialist-communist orientated. The syndicates were regarded as militant 
organizations to promote the workers' interests. They would also serve as a preparation 
or training school for the self government which would come with the expropriation of the 
large estates. Syndicates were established in a community and had to number at least a 
hundred members; sub-sections, known as committees, could be started up in a par-
ticular enterprise as soon as there were six members. Where one farm was unable to 
provide six members, one committee was allowed to take in several enterprises. After 
some time the syndicates united on the provincial level in a federation. A number of 
federations could, in their turn, proceed to the setting up of a national confederation. 
Finally, at the outset, the independent smallholders were encouraged by INDAP to 
unite in local committees at neighbourhood level. These were intended chiefly to serve as 
channels for the various forms of credit provided by INDAP. When, after two years, the 
committees proved too small to develop into viable co-operatives, the setting up of 
municipal co-operatives was encouraged, each comprising a number of the original com-
mittees. The committee remained in existence as a local but no longer independent sub-
division whose members met regularly. Representatives of the various committees had to 
maintain contact with the executive of the co-operative. Since in many localities INDAP 
started to provide credit only via the co-operative, the peasants were to some extent 
obliged to join. In many localities too, but again by no means everywhere, INDAP ad-
vanced capital credit only to communal groups which had developed through co-option 
and which had decided to co-operate in production - usually chickens or pigs. 
We see therefore that on the asentamientos at least and in the farming co-operatives, 
not alone was affiliation required but acceptance of and participation in communal 
production as well. Government policy displayed a certain preference for this form of 
production, certainly insofar as the smallholders and asentados were concerned. The 
political parties to the left of the Christian-Democrats showed the same preference. In 
these circumstances solidarity implied the acceptance of the communal form of produc-
tion and, naturally, of those values which government policy desired the peasants to prac-
tice: social equality, participation in community affairs and national policy, and 
economic development7. 
In Chapter 7 we shall discuss which factors influence participation, dealing principally 
with the differences between leaders and members of associations. 
I conclude this chapter with a warning. Strictly speaking the results of this study are 
valid only for those groups of Chilean peasants whom I researched. However, as is 
already apparent from the title of this book, I believe myself that the results in general will 
prove to have a much wider validity. This fact notwithstanding, the reader would be well 
advised to refrain from attempting to apply these results indiscriminately to all small 
farmers in Latin America. This study confirms a number of hypotheses formulated for 
Chile, but for the rest of Latin America hypotheses they must remain. 
Notes 
1 In a study which deals with the role played by peasants in Chilean society, it will not do to 
exclude in advance a section of the agrarian working population, the agricultural labourers. 
This is all the more true since their number is so large. Yet there are also theoretical reasons for 
including the agricultural labourers among the peasants. The first is that a person can run a 
small farm of his own and at the same time work for somebody else. The second is that it seems 
to me nonsensical to regard an agricultural labourer as a non-peasant, while then proceeding to 
classify him among the peasants as part owner of an expropriated hacienda. 
2 Even in a recent book like that of Rogers (1969) the most important obstacles to social change 
are still localized in the 'subculture of peasantry'. 
3 Scott (1972) shows for central Chile that more than 75 % of his respondents (smallholders) use 
more than half of their total production to supply their own needs. 
4 The literature on patronage is very extensive. See for instance, Boissevain (1966) and 
Mühlmann & Llaryora (1968) on patronage in Europe; Foster (1963) and Hutchinson (1966) 
on this phenomenon in Latin American countries. 
5 I shall refrain for the moment from going into other possible consequences of a wage conflict, 
such as a decreasing demand for labour in agriculture due to accelerated mechanization, a 
changeover to less labour intensive crops, etc. 
6 It may perhaps be useful to point out that the view that agricultural labourers and peasant 
farmers need to co-operate is not necessarily theirs, but mine. This is particularly true of the 
assertion that peasants must also achieve a certain co-operation in production if growing socio-
economic differentiation among them and the trickling away of the poorest and least successful 
towards the towns, is to be prevented. In many countries the enforcement of co-operation in 
production has led in the beginning to a lower aggregate production (which is more justly 
divided). Ultimately the opinion that a certain social equality must be created in agriculture is 
based not only on the conviction that this is possible without a noticeable decrease in the total 
production, but also upon a value. 
I shall adhere to this value but also believe that a too radical leveling out, notably the elimina-
tion of a direct link between reward and achievement, is harmful to production and is therefore 
undesirable. 
7 Some may doubt whether the authorities were really in earnest about the realization of these 
values. Government policy certainly varied according to time and place, and it is also certain 
that the most fervent supporters of the realization of the above-mentioned values came to 
doubt the seriousness of the government's intentions after a couple of years. As a result of this 
many left the government and the party (the first to go being Jacques Chonchol, then vice-
president of INDAP). 
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It is also certain that within both the Christian-democratic party and the government, in-
fluence was brought to tear by people who certainly did not desire socialization, while the 
claims of sectors other than the peasants upon scanty government funds led to a shortage in the 
funds necessary for the reform of the agrarian structure (cf. Chonchol, 1970). 
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Chapter 2 Research methods and the researcher's values 
2.1 The preliminary investigation 
So that the reader may judge for himself what value to put on my data and conclusions 
it is useful to examine in some depth the way in which the research was carried out. 
Various phases were involved and my approach to each depended upon how I viewed the 
problem. The problem has, for a very long time, been: what are we to understand by 
solidarity. The problem originated in Brazil where I stayed from the middle of 1962 to the 
middle of 1965. Plans for researching solidarity were already being considered then, and 
I even got so far as to hold a series of discussions on that theme with my colleague and 
friend, Carlos Alberto de Medina. I also began to peruse the literature on the subject and 
have continued with this study by fits and starts on my return to the Netherlands, despite 
the claims of other work. At that time I saw solidarity as the attitude of which co-
operation was the perceptible result. This may have been because I had concluded in 
Itaguai (Galjart, 1968) that the colonists did not co-operate because they had no sense of 
solidarity. The books I read did not focus upon any specific problem but consisted of 
practically everything I could lay my hands upon, there on the spot, which dealt with 
aspects of co-operation and with cohesion. Although I drew up a plan of research in the 
summer of 1968 and sent it in in order to be able to apply for research funds, I still felt 
confused. This confusion sprang in large measure from the inclination to view solidarity 
as a quality which a person either showed in all relationships or in none. Only very 
gradually I came to understand that the concept could be applied only in relation to a 
definite group. The plan of research was particularly concerned with tracking down the 
differences - in structural and personality traits - between peasants who collaborated 
with others and those who did not. Shortly before my departure for Chile someone 
observed, quite correctly, that co-operation need not necessarily be based on solidarity, 
but could also for example spring from self-interest. 
When, therefore, I arrived in Chile in June 1969, I had as it were two problems: 
solidarity and co-operation. The latter, no matter how motivated, was perhaps the more 
important for the development of the rural areas. Particularly important was co-
operation in the modern peasant organizations, the syndicates and co-operatives, in other 
words the affiliation and degree of participation in those associations. The choice of con-
cerning myself particularly with those newly founded organizations seemed an obvious 
one but it strongly influenced my method of work. There seemed httle sense in staying for 
any length of time in a small preasant community; one could shadow a peasant for weeks 
on end without noticing once that he was a member of an organization. Another argu-
ment against research in only a small number of local communities, say two or three, was 
the fact that both the syndicates and the co-operatives were organized on municipality 
level, a unit wnich comprised several local communities, sometimes more than twenty. 
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Every large agricultural enterprise and every concentration of peasants constituted such 
a local community. I doubted whether it was worthwhile to devote much time to a 
thorough study of three such units, apart altogether from the fact that it would be difficult 
to obtain permission from the owner of a large estate to come in and do a prolonged study 
of a phenomenon which could, in itself, hardly be expected to appeal to him. And, strictly 
speaking, on the local community level I would not even be able to obtain an overall view 
of the entire co-operative or syndicate. For these reasons I decided to visit a much greater 
number of places for a shorter time and, besides interviewing leaders and members of the 
organizations, to be particularly assiduous in attending meetings. These meetings were 
the occasions above all others when co-operation might become visible in the behaviour 
of the peasants and when, I hoped, in dealing with the agenda, any difficulties they had 
might be revealed. This attending meetings as an observer at every level of the 
organizations turned out very well for me. My presence was apparently not resented: 
people were not inhibited by the outsider. In addition this method did indeed provide me 
with considerable data which would have been much more difficult to acquire by 
questioning. Now it was possible to ask concrete questions at the end of the meeting, if 
there was anything I didn't understand. Naturally I was unable to ferret out thé local 
background of every incident or case, but to compensate for this I gained a good impres-
sion of the extent to which certain problems, attitudes and incidents occurred generally. 
As Glaser and Strauss have written (1967), the researcher's insight into a particular, 
recurrent phenomenon, grows to the point of surfeit where he believes that henceforth he 
can safely take it for granted. In this way I have visited and attended meetings of 
organizations in the municipalities of La Serena (province of Coquimbo), Puente Alto, 
Melipilla, San Antonio (province of Santiago), San Vicente de Tagua-Tagua (province of 
O'Higgins), Chepica (province of Colchagua) and, more fleetingly, have made contact 
with various co-operatives in the provinces of Cautin, Llanquihue and Chiloe. 
The choice of these places and organizations was partly pragmatic and partly based on 
theoretical sampling (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The choice was pragmatic insofar 
as it was backed up by good introductions and the possibility of obtaining these: 
whenever I arrived anywhere for the first time I always made sure to be equipped with a 
good introduction. The choice was theoretical insofar as it was based upon information 
concerning local circumstances or problems. In La Serena, for example, it was the per-
sonality of the young syndicate leader which greatly influenced my choice; in the 
province of Santiago the contrast between the poor, dry coastal region where the 
peasants proved easy to organize, according to my INDAP informants, and the region 
bordering on the big city where organization was said to be difficult. San Vicente was an 
area in which co-operatives in various stages of development were to be found, and 
where, in comparison with other regions, there existed a fairly close link between co-
operative and syndicate. The local syndicate was, moreover, large and fairly strong. 
Chepica was one of the few co-operatives containing production groups who had land at 
their disposal. For that matter the entire province of Colchagua was interesting since it 
seemed that precisely here the peasants were deliberately engaged in bringing about a 
radical alteration of the agrarian structure. In Cautin, finally, I was particularly interested 
in the Mapuche reductions and the way in which the problem of the minifundia was being 
tackled at local level by the relevant government authorities. 
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2.2 The surveys 
During the preliminary research I worked constantly at drawing up and refining 
hypotheses concerning affiliation and participation, for it was soon obvious that the 
presidential elections of September 1970 would cast their shadow so far before as to 
make it advisable to hold the surveys at a time when political passions would not yet have 
flared so high that every action was regarded as a political gambit. February, the last 
month of the holidays, appeared eminently suitable. Accordingly I began in December to 
work on the construction of a questionnaire, the appointment of interviewers and the 
selection of a sample. 
For two reasons I decided against a random sample. Such a sample is only meaningful 
if one desires to generalize about the population from which it is taken. In explanatory 
and testing research, however, one frequently really generalizes about populations which 
are not limited in space and time (Philipsen, 1969, p. 19). This being so it seems better to 
chose cases in which the diversity of the universe finds expression. The population about 
which I wished to generalize, the peasants who might be members of a co-operative in 
Latin America, or even Chile, was so enormous that drawing a random sample would 
have entailed insurmountable difficulties. The same held good for the agricultural 
workers who might be members of a syndicate. In addition, I wanted to compare 
members with non-members who were working and living in the same natural cir-
cumstances or - in the case of the syndicates - dealt with the same owners. It seemed 
therefore a fairly obvious move to take members and non-members from the same com-
munity or the same enterprise. I thus interviewed 274 peasant producers, members and 
non-members of co-operatives, from the following seven communities: Cuncumen and 
Lo Abarca (Santiago province, Cuncumen Co-operative), Los Silos de Pirque, San José 
de la Estrella and Los Canas (Santiago province, Brisas de Maipo Co-operative); 
Auquinco and Quinahue (Colchagua province, Chepica Co-operative). All the members 
in these communities were interviewed and one third of the non-member peasants - after 
I had obtained a list of the latter from those familiar with the local situation. These seven 
communities represent the contrast between the non-irrigated costal region and the 
irrigated central valley; between agriculture in really rural areas and farming carried on 
beneath the smoke of a city. They also show co-operatives in various stages of develop-
ment and of varying viability. Cuncumen was one of the few co-operatives to be doing 
well economically and which could also avail of good management. Brisas de Maipo was 
much less well conducted, being scarcely active, but it had received a large sum of capital 
credit from INDAP for a horticultural marketing project. As I have said already, 
Chepica was one of the few co-operatives to have as members communal production 
groups with land at their disposal. 
In addition a total of 210 members and non-members of peasant syndicates were inter-
viewed in nine enterprises. These were San Manuel (Syndicate Melipilla); Los Toros, El 
Penon and Zeralda (Syndicate Puente Alto); Vina Vieja, Vinâ de Tagua - Tagua, 
Pumaiten, Idahue Norte and Los Mayos (Syndicate San Vicente de Tagua - Tagua). The 
first two communities mentioned are situated in the province of Santiago; San Vicente lies 
in the province of O'Higgins. 
In all these farming enterprises a considerable section of the workers was not or was no 
longer organized. These farms were generally among the most prosperous; irrigation was 
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practised on «11 of them, but crop patterns differed. San Manuel grew wheat and kept 
dairy cows; the enterprises in Puente Alto went in for viniculture while those in San 
Vicente had fruit and tillage in addition to the vines. All three syndicates belonged to 
those founded by INDAP and were members of the confederation El Triunfo 
Campesino, at that period the largest in Chile. All three were also fairly efficient. On the 
enterprises mentioned all members were interviewed and half of those non-members who 
were in permanent employment. The respondents may thus be regarded as populations of 
which different sectors are compared (with each other). Although I shall approach my con-
clusions with caution, I am of the opinion, an opinion reinforced by die results of the 
anthropological research, that they are much more widely applicable. 
The survey passed off well. There were practically no refusals-less than J%. It did ad-
mittedly prove difficult on some occasions to determine whether a person complied with 
the terms for being a respondent, notably whether a member of a co-operative could still 
be regarded as a farmer. In extremely doubtful cases I later removed the respondent; the 
number of such people amounted to about ten. On the conclusion of the survey the 
questionnaires were coded but not immediately punched and run off. I wished to get back 
as quickly as possible to the field research. 
2.3 The anthropological field research 
After the survey I took a closer look at one place, Cuncumen, to see how the co-
operative fitted into the social structure. The intention was to gain some idea of what I 
had missed by the method I had employed hitherto - the gathering of incidents, par-
ticularly at meetings. 
A second problem-was that of solidarity in associations. Although it had become clear 
that the most important motive for affiliation was the hope of improving one's own per-
sonal, economic lot, it was equally clear that, given the co-operatives' lack of means and 
the divisions among the small farmers and the agricultural workers, the peasant move-
ment could not get off the ground without a large measure of solidarity among a number 
of members at least. 
I had in the meantime come to view solidarity not as a quality which a person either 
possessed or did not, but as an attitude which he displayed towards one group and not, or 
to a lesser extent, towards another. I was therefore primarily interested not in who felt 
solidarity towards their syndicate or co-operative and who did not, but in how that 
solidarity grew or could be made to grow. 
The best way of discovering this might perhaps be to try oneself to induce this solidari-
ty. Since this was impossible I selected various approaches, namely: 
- attending, as a participant observer, courses which were intended to increase solidarity; 
- interviews with peasant leaders and others who might be regarded as working in one way 
or another to increase solidarity; 
- seeking out the differences between associative groups some of which appeared 
solidary and some of which did not (in this connection I concentrated on produc-
tion groups, i.e. aseatamientos and groups provided with credit by INDAP). I also 
coached two of my students during a five month stay in asentamientos in Aconcagua 
province where they investigated the acceptance of this communal enterprise and its 
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functioning in practice. I was able to use their notes on these assentamientos for this book 
(they have since been published in de Ranitz & de Ranitz, 1972); 
- analyzing those incidents relating to solidarity which were provided by the meetings I 
continued to attend. 
Before the end of my stay in Chile I wrote a first version of what, in this book, is the last 
chapter. This in itself proved a useful exercise; the concept of solidarity is so complicated 
that it helps to be obliged from time to time to marshal one's thoughts on paper. 
In the third place, I spent the last months examining the factors which played a role in 
the structures and institutions surrounding the local community. These factors seemed of 
particular importance with regard to the co-operatives which were too weak financially to 
develop entirely under their own steam. The small farmers accepted the co-operative if it 
seemed economically successful and embarked on viable projects. I therefore paid par-
ticular attention to the expertise of the peasant leaders and of INDAP. I examined chiefly 
the leaders of the federation of Colchagua- the organizational zeal and consciousness of 
leaders appeared less advanced in other provinces, even though federations existed 
everywhere. Concerning INDAP I investigated several places where large projects were 
in train. Within this framework - but also in order to see whether affiliation and solidarity 
were perhaps influenced by other factors - 1 devoted the last month of my stay to a trip 
south, where I visited various associations on the island of Chiloë and in the provinces of 
Llanquihue and Cautin. 
I relinquished my original plan to hold a second survey to find out what structural fac-
tors at local community level determined the degree of affiliation. This was because the 
political situation rendered further surveys inadvisable and also because the technical 
execution would have proved difficult and time-consuming. Instead, I collected data, for 
each community, on the degree of organization of the agricultural workers into syn-
dicates, on the extent to which CORA had taken over enterprises and on the agrarian 
structure as revealed in the agricultural census of March 1965. After my return to the 
Netherlands these data were arranged and transferred to punch cards. 
During the anthropological part of my research I proceeded with great caution. I did 
not want to run the risk of being accused of espionage, either by the right or by the 
extreme left. This caution led me to confine myself to one of the three national con-
federations of syndicates, namely El Triunfo Campesino, the confederation with which 
the government body which usually introduced me - INDAP - had the most dealings. I 
did not approach the other two; the communist - socialist confederation - Ranquil -
because I only obtained sufficiently good introductions at a late stage and even then had 
the feeling that it would cost me too much time to gain the confidence necessary if I were 
to do what I wished to do, and the Catholic confederation - Libertad - 1 avoided because 
it was rumoured to work with American, even CIA money and I did not wish to lay 
myself open to gossip from leftist quarters. What now were the consequences of this 
voluntary limitation which on hindsight might be said to have sprung from an excessive 
degree of caution? Regarding the behaviour of the peasants I think that it had hardly any 
consequences at all. Many of my informants assured me that there was no difference 
between the confederations at the level of the members. I should have liked to learn a little 
more about the way in which Ranquil in particular set about indoctrinating its members. 
How did it manage to reconcile the apparently democratic election of local leaders with 
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the discipline which was at the same time demanded of these leaders? However, this gap 
did not affect the validity of what I did manage to discover. 
2.4 My own values 
A person's frame of reference determines to a large extent what he sees and how he in-
terprets what he sees. Certainly now that in recent years the opinion is being voiced, that 
a great deal of social-scientific research which purports to be objective is in reality based 
upon a particular ideology - often conservative - it would seem sensible to try to set out 
my values explicitly here. The reader will then be in a better position to judge the contents 
of this book. 
This is by no means a confession. Suffice it ta say that certain experiences during my 
adolescence have inspired me with an aversion to propaganda and dogmatism, from 
whatever side. I have never been a member of a church or a political party. With regard to 
the churches, it is my conviction - which I will not elaborate - that they stifle man's 
religious feeling, that is to say his ability to construct a personal relationship with nature 
and with God. The very nature of the association with its inherent social control over the 
content of what one believes makes this unavoidable. As regards politics, I was fairly con-
servative when I went to Chile. This was not, I think, because I had any economic in-
terests; my main interest, as an intellectual, is the freedom to publish my opinion. In 
Europe those countries in which the socialist revolution has taken place, have a bad 
reputation on this point. I was repelled by the lack of intellectual freedom, the double talk 
aimed at intellectual infants which streamed out of the Eastern European countries before 
the Czechoslovakian spring of 1968, by the dogmatism and the glorification of Marx 
expressed by many of those who, in the west, call themselves Marxists. All this, seemed to 
me to be irretrievably bound.up with socialism as such. I find myself completely in agree-
ment with the opinion of Deutscher, Coletti and many others - whom I only began to 
read after my return from Chile - that the Marxism which gained power in Russia has ac-
tively contributed to blocking the progress of socialism elsewhere in Europe. 
Even in Brazil, where I worked from 1962-1965, in surroundings where I encountered 
few leftist colleagues, I found the 'left' rather hollow, with the exception of a couple of 
extremely intelligent people such as Caio Prado. Marxist theory seemed to suggest that 
the revolution (the real, not the bourgeois one) was imminent, while proving rather useless 
at analysis. At the end of their books many authors had conjured up ten classes or more 
instead of only two. It was with a certain wry pleasure that I tried to show, in 'Class and 
following in rural Brazil' that the peasants also availed of patronage in their mobilization 
or, to put it in Marxist terms, their class struggle (Galjart, 1964). This article has come 
under criticism from several colleagues (Huizer, 1965; Quijano, 1967). I believe now that 
I did wrong, in my impatience with the terms class and class struggle, which carried 
teleological nuances that helped to conceal from others the patronage mechanism in the 
peasant movement, to deny, not the existence of a conflict, but its character as a class 
struggle. Yet I believe too that I was acutely aware of reality at that time. I came to 
realize, during this 'conservative' period in Brazil, that peasants can only achieve com-
munal development through co-operation, and that patronage was an obstacle to this co-
operation. I took with me from Brazil part of the problem which I was later to investigate 
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in Chile: upon what does solidarity among peasants depend? 
In 1965 I returned to the Netherlands and a year later took up a position with the 
Department of Rural Sociology of the non-western regions in the Agricultural Universi-
ty. I mention this, because my contact with the students who, a short while later, revived 
their confrontation activities was important to me. I noticed that I could relate to them on 
an equal footing, and I was glad of this. Their politics were leftist, sometimes dogmatical-
ly so, but they were not politicians who had to keep up their position regardless. Contact 
with them has made me more 'leftist' on the one hand and on the other strengthened my 
impatience with and aversion to dogmatism. The world is grey and I think that it is es-
pecially important that idealists should realize this. 
Chile proved to be not automatically comparable with Brazil. It was further developed, 
economically, but at the same time the limit of development offered by capitalism seemed 
to have been more or less attained. I made friends, especially in the circles of the leftist 
Christian-Democrats, the Mapu, who at this time had already broken away. I saw that 
they were serious-minded, worked hard and retained their critical faculties even with 
regard to their political allies on the left. This latter was extremely important, for in Chile 
too the left was vociferously dogmatic and believed its own propaganda and half truths. 
Important too was the fact that I saw the ideal in action and how some peasants reacted 
to it and gave of their utmost. I heard tales of the past, of the injustice done to them or 
their forefathers by some uncaring landed proprietor. I was disturbed by the lack of sen-
sitivity, the absence of any fellow feeling for their poorer compatriots among the 
members of the élite with whom I came into contact in Santiago. In addition I saw that 
Chile was left with little choice: an agrarian development like that in Western Europe with 
a constant exodus of the less successful peasants towards other sectors of the economy 
was impossible there since the job opportunities were lacking. If agriculture was given the 
function of keeping people on the land a certain measure of equality would have to be 
created, and a redistribution of the land into family enterprises seemed less 
recommendable. 
Thus, both intellectually and emotionally, I veered towards the left during my stay in 
Chile. How far? To some of my Chilean friends, to whom I then expressed my fear that in 
Chile too a dogmatic and authoritarian government by civil servants would succeed any 
eventual revolution, I am probably a half 'momio'; to Dutch friends, themselves half 
momios, I must appear as an extreme leftist, hairy sociologist. I do not really feel at home 
in either camp and count among my friends people who are prepared to see the person 
behind the ideology. 
Perhaps though, this position is a valuable one after all. I hope to put it to use by acting 
as interpreter: here in the West I can explain the reasons behind the swerve to the left in 
underdeveloped countries; in those countries I may perhaps serve as a scientific con-
science. It seems to me that the basis of all plans must be as objective an analysis of reali-
ty as possible. For this reason a scientific worker who acts as a restraining influence upon 
his colleagues who may be carried away by their ideological enthusiasm, may prove help-
ful. I know that a doubter like myself does not bring about a revolution, but to the 
necessary fanatics in the Third World I should like to say: have your revolution but when 
it is over learn to listen even to the doubters. No account is taken in this book, written 
between 1970 and 1973, of the Chilean attempts to achieve a socialist society. The im-
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plicit dialogue is with the government of the Unidad Popular, not with the men who now 
hold power. The dialogue deals with the organization of peasants into co-operatives and 
the degree to which certati socialist convictions, for example those relating to the 'new 
man', may lead to that organization being set up in a manner which in my opinion would 
be undesirable if the hoped for goals are to be attained. 
' The military coup of September 1973 has, for the time being, detracted from the 
relevance of my arguments, at least so far as Chile is concerned. This does not mean, 
however, that the book has been overtaken by events. What peasants want, what they do, 
why they band together and co-operate, and why they do not, all these are questions 
which remain relevant for the whole of the Third World, and a sociologist who attempts 
to answer some of them rémains relevant too. Indeed it seems to me that the tragic course 
of events in Chile proves how difficult it is, in terms of national mobilization and the 
reaching of a consensus, to create a somewhat more just and human society. It is 
therefore still useful to know how peasants view such an attempt, even though they may 
seem less influential than other categories. 
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Chapter 3 The mobilization of peasants in Latin America: 
Approach to a theory 
3.1 Definition and brief description 
Mobilization is the process whereby social units - whether individuals or groups - are 
led to expend an amount, and sometimes a large amount, of the resources at their dis-
posal: time, money, energy, enthusiasm, in order to attain a goal which they share with 
other units. Mobilization is thus the transfer, towards a new destination, by individuals or 
groups of resources previously used for their own ends. This transfer usually occurs fairly 
suddenly. Mobilization will take place when individuals are unable to bring about a 
desired situation by their own efforts. They are then confronted with the choice, either of 
attempting to do so together or of abandoning hope entirely. 
In this chapter we shall discuss the obstacles to mobilization which peasants encounter 
in the social structure and in their own culture. We shall also deal with the conditions un-
der which this mobilization may occur. In a later chapter, devoted to solidarity, we shall 
discuss the problems arising after mobilization, with reference to the permanent alloca-
tion of resources in favour of the new structures of collaboration. 
Our definition implies that mobilization is a concept which must only be used for a par-
ticular goal or set of similar goals (cf. Etzioni, 1968, p. 420). In other words it is only 
when social units turn their efforts to the same goal that they can be said to be undergoing 
the same mobilization process. It appears from the literature and from the results of my 
own research which will be dealt with in the following chapters, that peasants mobilize 
primarily for reasons of self-interest. To put it in somewhat more general terms, they 
mobilize in the prospect of local objectives. They wish to achieve a desired situation for 
themselves, for their own locality. This is so both because peasants' interests are of a 
local-territorial nature and because mobilization assumes contact and interaction. 
I shall begin therefore by analyzing, in model form, the extent to which Latin American 
peasants share, or do not share, the same interests. After this my argument will focus 
upon those peasants having a local opponent or opponents. The obstacles to and con-
ditions for the mobilization of these peasants can be distinguished in a sketch like the one 
given below. 
STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES 
CULTURAL OBSTACLES 
local 
community 
national 
society 
Sections 
3 + 5 
Section 6 
Section 4 
Section 4 
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The squares contain the numbers of the sections of this chapter in which the relevant 
problems are dealt with. 
Whether a group of peasants will attempt to and succeed in vanquishing a local oppo-
nent depends upon a large number of factors. At the present time it will be true to say that 
almost everywhere there is a considerable degree of economic and political incorporation 
of local communities into larger (regional and national) economic and political systems. 
This being so, the peasants' local opponent has economic and political allies to fall back 
on, including in the last instance, the State which can, and usually will, protect him with 
all the powers at its disposal. This in its turn means that a purely local peasant mobiliza-
tion has little chance of success. Only mobilization on a national or regional scale 
whereby the peasants too seek allies in other economic and political sectors is likely to 
succeed. We shall thus be obliged to include in our discussion those structural and 
cultural changes which lead, on a national level, to a weakening of the position of the 
landed proprietors and a strengthening of that of the peasants. 
It will be noted that the aggregation of interests which occurs when peasants mobilize 
at the national level leads to a fairly vague definition of objectives. Generally speaking it 
will be the State again which defines in detail the future picture of agrarian productive 
organization. Another factor which plays an important role in determining the success of 
mobilization on the local level, is the extent to which the peasants are able to rid 
themselves mentally of (the need for) a particularistic relationship with a patron. In 
situations of inequality, patronage is an almost ubiquitous redistribution mechanism 
which turns peasants into competitors and keeps them divided. 
A fourth factor is entirely inherent in peasant culture, and derives from certain values 
and attitudes developed in a situation of oppression lasting many generations. These can 
make co-operation exceedingly difficult. 
3.2 Kinds of local interests: a model 
We shall begin by determining to what extent Latin-American peasants (campesinos) 
share the same aims1. For, after all, the term campesinos covers categories which have a 
different access to the means of production. It is possible to distinguish at least five such 
categories. In the first place there are the small owners and 'squatters' who have more or 
less independent possession of land upon which they run family farms which may or may 
not be large enough to supply their own needs. Secondly there are the tenants and 
sharecroppers who lease land from others against some form of payment but retain a 
degree of independence on how it is farmed. Thirdly, we have the colonos or inquilinos, 
peasants who spend the greater part of their time working for a landowner and receive in 
exchange, whether or not in addition to wages, the use of a small piece of land on which to 
grow food for themselves and their families. Fourthly, there are the permanent wage-
labourers who work full-time for other people and are paid in cash, and fifthly, the tem-
porary workers who are also paid in cash but are only employed for a certain period. 
A first distinction of these categories is necessary, but not yet sufficient for an un-
derstanding of the mobilization process. It is necessary because, as will be come clear 
later on, these categories do not have exactly similar interests and may thus aspire to 
different goals. Usually they do not join the same organizations. In Brazil, during 
Goulart's time, the famous Ligas Camponesas directed by Juliào, focussed their attention 
21 
•a 
•a 
3 
E S 
o 
o 
CS 
.5 
u 
e 
CO 
o. 
73 
"O, 
c 
3 
S 
O CB S 
till 
3-1 tn cd "O 
• S i l - ! 2 
S S »•« 
o « £ S 
o 5 2 o 
- £ .13 
c « > „ X S 
Ü rv > Ö 2 « 
s S i * *§ 
•a & £ £ g 
Ï Ë 
•5 £ 
v o 
"° S 
•O u 
o sa 
00 S 
u 
B 03 
4-« CO 
.S3 C 
CA H O u « -3 
£"9 'S 
• a » e 
3 *> o 
*- O e S 
J3 
O 
£ 
a 
o 
g'S 
SB 
oo o Si e 
c 
Il 11^  
3 u " 3 -g -a 
•a co s x> •;• c 
o u s o o- eu 
£.-C S E o S 
A i a.a. 
CA 
sp's 
.s « 
=3 -c 
eu CJ 
> 2 Ja S 
. 3 . <* , ï= -S 
. . f e u ..Ja t* S " cl» 
ó 2 
S3 
eu Cd » .2 -C 
o xï <rt>*^ 3 rt *-" *r 
5 « S 3 J ! c a 
H « S 
• T3 Q tn fi ^ -
CL> 
.s o/a-ë s 
5 . ï 8 5 ! 
0C O C 
?i 
S Ja 
e ° 
vi 
f fi o. a-o 
>> BJ>a 
w t l o 
* M l « CO 
*3 « • " 
2 co > _ 
g cel 5 . . S" e 
S3 x> xs » e 5--U-
•a -e c o -a oo.« u 
g3! S : S P | S P | a 
4j «1 
ai 
S3 M) e 
f. =a .s S -S 
p . « g 3 w 
>> no ü g a c 
Œ U «i 5 -M ö in b« > a co 
S « § - 2 
I I 
3£ 
O T 3 
co o 
o 
S o-à-o - £ . s 8-8 2 
.5 a .o D, a . èo e2 «fi 
73 
'8-, 
g S 
CD 
c ° S 
3 S o fi 
s !'!>3 
JCS 2 3 oo S E c 
g 'S 73 1 S ä g oo S -3 S E Ja -c S 
e S Ë 
. 3 co O 
C U g 
o i j £ oo "TU 
»"'iï Z. eu . 9 S 
i 8 1 ï i -S 
> a s 2 <2 § 
1 J3 §E 'S. 
sa. s " •» 
•a 73 , S i; 
E . , o -A a. fi 
co eu ^ =3 JT" 2 
» S>2 3 £ 2.2 
I l - i I I ? 
O éa cd ( M « es 
.s 
TJ 
CS 
co 
eu 
J3 .S 
p. es 3 
>>Hle 
X fi s 
U 
C 
o co 
•S 9 
% 
•s 2 ~ 3 aï 
O O. c8 .H XI fi 
g .2 -S .tt 3 O 
oo fi 'S 13 ^ S 
2 S S r r S £ 
X! c*. 
u ' 
-
s b ? t 
w CM . . 2 s ^ 
•S tu J « j t ) 
£ *> y S S. 1> r 
3^ "J3 +3 o eu *3 
_ O 
•= ^ .S .2 » 
K g ° >>3 8 
•s.« & 8 fi -a -c g 
oq S -S .2 -S LT -6 S 
u 
et) 
H 
o 
a 
3 732 g 
S s 2 •« 
h • S o . î î S ^ S 
Ü5 T J 
S • a o . s g f s l 
22 
\ ' 
Hëi'ill If Hf*i<fl 11 
a-a 
3 e ti 
g I S3 
"N I I 1 - 1 S3; 
Il'ililIUirl 
•SI TB € -3 * -i S. 1 § 
» a a c, ..-a § g S S g S •â ,'| 1 § 8I8J.& I<g.llâg's-is8 
a s &.r 
I ^ 
s- g g.a * » | i g 
ifsi§ji£8>l 
'gfejllji 
i l -s I« 
ai g i l § 
=
 5
 - B g S. * . . c s s » . . ; s nriîi'i 
I « 11 S j 
8 %&& S 5.2 0<2 M O O S 
ilS£lB|1{§6g,liil»S 
O 8 73 3.^ o J £ O s u » o 'S o o 
23 
, *_^_^ 
primarily on the first two categories (Moraes, 1970, p. 467); it was more usual for the 
workers to become members of rural syndicates. In Chile, during the time of Frei's 
government, by far the majority of rural trade union members belonged to the third and 
fourth categories; the temporary workers were scarcely organized at all. 
However, another distinction must be made, based on the local distribution of the main 
resource, land, in the community or territorial unit in which the peasants are located. 
Upon this distribution depends the likelihood of the peasants' having a local opponent, a 
local conflict of interests. As Coser (1956, p. 34 and 90) has pointed out, the existence of 
a negative reference group is important for the formation of new groups. Conflict with a 
negative reference group will promote the internal cohesion of the peasants. A macro-
sociological view which postulates that a conflict exists for the country as a whole, but 
which does not examine local conditions is in my mind too loose to explain the mobiliza-
tion process. It is precisely the instigation of a local action, the existence of a local con-
flict, which often leads to full-scale mobilization, and this action depends upon the 
existence of local opponents. The macro viewpoint tends to assume a unity among 
peasants which is at best problematic and certainly cannot be taken for granted. On the 
other hand it does suggest, and rightly so, that ultimately a certain community of interests 
exists and that therefore the peasants will strive after unity. 
By way of hypothesis, I assume that certain attitudes, values and mechanisms are 
linked with the local distribution of the means of production which has often existed un-
changed for a very long time2. The possible distributions with their associated cultural 
elements are given in the model on pages 22-23. The basis is, as we have said, the local 
distribution of land. The model also contains assumptions regarding the mechanisms and 
values which help to preserve this distribution, once achieved, and regarding the interests 
and objectives at which the peasants will aim once mobilized. It must be stressed here that 
the model comprises ideal types and not descriptions. In reality elements from various 
ideal types can be found in one concrete locality. Minifundistas of type A may for exam-
ple work as labourers upon the surrounding farms, giving rise to type C. The 
sharecroppers in C may form a separate ethnic group with strong mutual solidarity, so 
that the situation comes to resemble that of type A from a cultural point of view. Tenant 
farmers and sharecroppers may be found in B and even workers on the somewhat larger 
enterprises; it is, moreover, possible that as time goes by the distribution in B becomes 
more unequal, giving rise to a situation which has a great deal in common with C. In cer-
tain cases a large enterprise may be organized in such a way as to contain both 
sharecroppers and wage workers. Yet even though the reality is often difficult to classify, 
it seems to me that the model I employ may serve to bring a certain degree of conceptual 
order into the chaos of appearances. 
One important distinction suggested by the model is that between situations in which 
one may speak of a local monopolization of land and thus of a clear conflict of interests 
(C) and situations in which this is not, or hardly the case (A and B). In C the mobilization 
of the dependent peasants will be aimed at the landed proprietors. Doubtful cases may 
also occur. Situation A may sometimes arise between the large estates, for instance in the 
higher sections of a catchment area, in the form of communities of small, independent 
peasants, ta which the surrounding landed proprietors do not belong. If one examines the 
river basin as a whole the distribution of the land is very unequal, but locally, within such 
a community, the distribution may be comparatively fair. It is my hypothesis that a 
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cultural pattern develops which is determined both by the relative local equality and by 
the inequality existing in the wider area3. 
The difference between one Indian peasant community possessing a reasonable 
acreage although surrounded on all sides by haciendas (situation A) and another Indian 
community which has too little land since it has lost part of it to the surrounding hacien-
das (situation C) is one of degree. In such a situation the course taken by mobilization will 
depend in the first place upon whether or not peasants include the land owned by the sur-
rounding enterprises in their assessment of the local distribution. In other words, are 
these surrounding landed proprietors for them a negative reference group of land 
usurpers or do they leave them entirely out of their calculations? In the first case there is a 
conflict of interests within this type A community, while in the second case there is not. 
Indian communities of type A are seldom unaware that the surrounding landed 
proprietors have appropriated land which formerly belonged to them; they thus indeed -
regard them as opponents. Sometimes too we can speak of a conflict Of interests when the 
inhabitants of a community of type A or B also work for part of the year as labourers or 
colonos upon a neighbouring enterprise (cf. Cotler, 1970, p. 60). 
We shall now discuss in particular the mobilization of peasants against the landed 
proprietors, that is, situation C and, where relevant, A included in C. It is in such 
situations that the inequality, the social injustice is the most glaring. In these situations 
too mobilization most clearly assumes the character of a fierce political struggle -
sometimes even carried on by force of arms. It is the outcome of this struggle which 
promises to have the most far-reaching consequences for the future development of Latin 
America, both rural and urban. Nevertheless we must point out that situations such as 
those we call C are not the only ones to occur. Millions of peasants live in situations 
which more closely resemble A or B. Mobilization against the landed proprietors ig-
nores, in part at least, the interests of the peasants in such situations4. 
At a later stage, when the peasants in situations A and B have become more politicized 
and class conscious, and base their activities upon a view of the agrarian structure in a 
much larger area, their mobilization too may turn against a propertied class. In the first 
instance, however, their aim will be to defend those interests dear to them as independent 
producers. 
3.3 Local, structural obstacles to mobilization 
The model assumes that in C there is not a lone question of a conflict between those 
who monopolized the land and those who have little or none, but also of mechanisms in-
tended to preserve the existing distribution and of cultural patterns which indicate an 
adaptation to this situation. The mechanisms referred to here are coercion andpatronage. 
Coercion shows itself in: low wages, long hours of work, oral contracts for short periods, 
payment in coupons which can only be exchanged for goods in the store actually located 
on the hacienda, in the obligation to provide extra services which are often not paid for, in 
the obligation to sell agricultural produce through the owner, in dishonest practices with 
weights and measures, in the control exercised over the social contacts of peasants living 
on die property, and in the reprisals taken against those who were in any way rebellious. 
In some countries and at certain periods the owner had at his disposal a troop of armed 
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henchmen whose task was not only to protect him against his equals but also to keep 
'order' on his property. Since the introduction of formal, democratic election processes in 
the Latin-American countries the landed proprietors have tried in every possible way to 
persuade those peasants who are dependent upon them to cast their vote for the can-
didate of their (the landlord's) choice. Here too, if it proved necessary, that is to say if 
other means seemed likely to prove ineffective, coercion was used in the form of threats 
and reprisals (cf. Petras & Zeitlin, 1970, p. 510). 
A much more subtle mechanism which helped to maintain the existing distribution was 
patronage. Patronage is an institutionalized relationship based upon an agreement, 
usually informal, between two persons (or parties) who differ in the degree to which they 
can influence the allocation of goods and services. The agreement implies that the one 
with the most influence, the patron, will use it in favour of the other party, the client, who 
will perform various services in return. According to Weber (1925, p. 681 ff.) the seed of 
this structural principle must be sought in the Oikos, the patrimonial property upon 
which a lord had power over the other members of a household, whether related to him or 
not. It is generally known that land in Latin America was usually given out in very large 
parcels; those who received land in this manner were sometimes able to avail at the same 
time of certain services from Indians living on the land or in the neighbourhood. 
Sometimes they had to see to the supply of workers themselves. The methods employed, 
such as slavery, debt bondage or the extreme monopolizing of the land by a few owners 
(cf. Pearse, 1970, p. 17), all led equally to the agrarian workers becoming extremely 
dependent upon the owner. In other words the agrarian structure which Weber regarded 
as the breeding ground of patronage existed in many places in Latin America. Patronage 
relationships, however, are also encountered between people who do not live on the same 
property, but who differ in status. Our model assumes that patronage will occur whenever 
an unequal distribution of land can be said to exist within an agrarian community. This 
hypothesis is based on the view that in such cases patronage can fulfil a useful function 
for both parties. The favour of the higher-ranking party, the surrender of goods or of the 
disposal of future goods, is 'exchanged' for the service of the lower ranking party which 
consists in acknowledging the prestige and legitimate authority of the other. A somewhat 
greater economic equality is obtained at the expense of greater social and political in-
equality. The higher-ranking person can use his legitimated power to promote, either 
directly or indirectly, his appropriation of economic goods. 
One important aspect of patronage is that it is not a relationship which springs up 
automatically between a rich landowner and a poor peasant. Its inception depends upon 
the quality of the personal relationship between the two participants; it also assumes per-
sonal loyalty on the part of one towards the other. The person in the lower position places 
himself under the protection of the person in the higher. Usually the initiative for em-
barking upon the relationship comes from the lower placed person; in most cases he has 
more to gain than the other. For someone who already enjoys the prestige of a number of 
dependents, the increase in prestige which he gains by accepting a new client is slight. The 
fact that the initiative usually comes from the person of lower status has been directly 
observed (Galjart, 1968, p. 86; Hutchinson, 1966; Williams, 1969, p. 88) but it is also ap-
parent from the tendency which occurs in differentiated communities to acquire persons 
of higher status as ritual co-parents, potential patrons (see Mintz & Wolf, 1967, p. 195). 
Although it is true that patronage has yet another, latent, function which may benefit the 
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patron, Huîzer's suggestion (1970, p. 22 and 188) that it is the patron who seeks to es-
tablish the patronage relationship must be regarded as incorrect.' 
This latent function of* patronage, one that is very important with regard to mobiliza-
tion, is that it keeps the dependent peasants divided. They are rivals for a patron's 
favours. In an earlier piece of research undertaken in Brazil (Galjart, 1968, pi 86) I 
viewed the lack of horizontal solidarity among peasants of equal social status as forming 
part of their tendency to seek patronage relationships. Cotler (1969, p. 65) indicated the 
same phenomenon for Peru when he called the pattern of social relationships of depen-
dent peasants a 'triangle without a base'. Even though patronage certainly does not affect 
all, or even a majority of the potential clients - the peasants and labourers on a property -
and even though only a few profit by a good relationship with the patron, this does not 
detract from the cultural influence of the institution. It helps to keep those individuals who 
seek patronage apart from the majority and thus harms their solidarity. In this way it 
fulfils for the patron a useful role of divide and conquer and achieves this so effectively 
precisely because it does, on occasion, offer a person of lower status the possibility of ver-
tical mobility. One frequently finds that the supervisory - and better paid - personnel on 
the large agricultural enterprises originate from the category of agricultural workers. 
Certainly it is only a small percentage of the agrarian population which can better itself in 
this manner, but equally certain is the fact that their example helps to keep alive a belief in 
the effectiveness of patronage in much wider circles. 
The increasing, almost obligatory openness of the local agrarian community or the 
hacienda, the growing influence of the central government and state institutions upon 
local events has not led automatically to the disappearance of patronage. On the con-
trary, the mechanism has been strengthened rather by the introduction of elections and of 
suffrage. The patron, belonging as he did to the local élite which enjoyed power and 
prestige, could, if he wished, take on another function. He could become the intermediary 
between the central government apparatus and the local community. He could do this 
either by entering politics himself, or by initiating patronage relationships with influential 
persons in the comprehensive systems. The function of 'broker' has already been 
described by many authors (including Wolf, 1956; Dandier, 1969; Pascal, 1968). This 
function need not necessarily be fulfilled by a landed proprietor, since the precondition is 
not ownership of land but the possession of relations and contacts with strategically 
placed persons in the outside world. 
In any case it is a fact that the introduction of formal democratic political procedures 
has not curtailed the power of the landed proprietor. For a long period it has served rather 
to increase it. The client or potential client, the dependent peasant was put in a position to 
perform a valuable service for the patron, that of voting for the patron's candidate. In ac-
tual fact it was a long time before the peasant himself realized the true value of this ser-
vice. Coercion and patronage both made it possible for the patron to dispose of the votes 
of those peasants dependent on him5. The result was that the owners of large estates were 
able to retain a considerable degree of political power for a long time, even where, from 
the national point of view, they were becoming less important as an economic force. In 
some countries they still do. A good example of this is what happened in Chile in 1939 (cf. 
Affonso et al, 1970,1, Chap. 1). In spite of an election victory by the candidate of the 
popular front who had the support of the communist and socialist parties, the radical par-
ty was able to make its participation in the coalition government dependent upon the 
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promise that the government would not tolerate syndicates of agricultural worker?. 
Despite the rise of political parties drawing their electorate principally from the urban 
proletariat and being also interested in the peasants' votes, the landed proprietors 
dominated these to such an extent that it was a long time before the parties got a foothold 
at all. Indeed, in some countries they have not managed to do so yet. The political power 
of these large property owners means that the State, with its machinery of repression, is 
on their side when it comes to frustrating the peasants' concrete attempts to mobilize. 
They are also able to have reforms of the agrarian structure postponed even where laws 
have been enacted to this purpose despite their opposition. 
From what we have said thus far it becomes clear that even though the peasants 
mobilize to bring about a local redistribution of income or resources, the degree to which 
the local community and, notably, their opponents, the landed proprietors, are incor-
porated in the national political system, means that they have more to cope with than 
merely local opposition. Although the breaking down of the patronage relationship 
between landed proprietor and peasant remains one of the conditions for success of these 
attempts at mobilization, it is not the most important. This continues to be the smashing 
or at least the neutralizing of the landed proprietors' political power at national level. 
Several authors have suggested that reforms of the agrarian structure and the mobiliza-
tion of the peasants only got under way after the large estate owners had already lost 
some of their power (cf. Moraes, 1970, p. 467 ff.; Chonchol, 1970, p. 33 ff.; Craig Jr., 
1969, p. 292). 
Before returning to the local level in order to determine under what conditions a 
weakening of patronage might be expected, we shall deal with the power of the landed 
proprietors within the national political and economic systems. Even there their power 
does not last for ever, although it has existed for centuries. The tragedy is, however, that 
the peasants themselves can contribute very little towards creating the conditions under 
which this power can be curtailed. 
3.4 Structural and cultural conditions for peasant mobilization on the national level 
It is true to say of most Latin American countries that for centuries the power of the 
landed proprietors has been chiefly local. In the absence of a strong central authority, the 
boundaries of their territory were at the same time the boundaries of a political unit which 
was to all intents and purposes independent. The greatest potential enemy of the landed 
proprietor was often another landed proprietor and there were frequent conflicts between 
them about land or other matters. This was tied up with the fact that the hacienda, no 
matter how large, was always potentially capable of further expansion (see Wolf & 
Hansen, 1966, p. 171). Local or regional alliances were also formed when it became 
necessary to promote a particular interest. 
The landowners only began to act as a national interest group when the central 
authority became strong enough to start laying down the law to them on certain points. 
Their power within the national system was based upon three factors. In the first place 
there was their economic importance. In many countries they were the chief producers of 
export products and since a large part of the state income was derived from an export 
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levy, they were also the most important tax payers. But even apart from this levy, the fact 
remained that the agrarian product accounted for a considerable share of the total 
national product and that the landed proprietors therefore earned a large part of the 
national income. 
In the second place their power was political and based upon their domination of peo-
ple. This applied not only to the dependent peasants on their own estates but also to those 
of smaller landowners in the neighbourhood and to the relatives, servants and other 
members of the household of all these people. Both during the time of the regional 
caudillos who fought among themselves to decide who would control the positions of cen-
tral authority and later, when democratic elections took over the function of ousting the 
government in office, those who held the peasants' loyalty, held power. Although some of 
the caudillos were not of the landed proprietor class, many of them were, and in almost 
every Latin American country, until well into the twentieth century, the large landowners 
furnished many prominent politicians. In addition the power of the large landowners 
found expression in their control of a number of political parties, some of them extremely 
large, which succeded for a long time in blocking changes in rural areas through the ac-
tions of their parliamentary delegates. They managed, for instance, to hold up the exten-
sion to the rural areas of labour legislation. In this way too they were able to mobilize the 
armed power of the state for their own ends if by any chance some movement of revolt 
did break out. In such cases the police and the army were none too gentle in restoring 
order. 
Their third power base was the actual interest group, the lobby, often called 
something like 'national society of agriculture'. Such a society strove not only to promote 
certain government measures which would be advantageous to its members, but also 
analyzed the possible consequences for agriculture of other measures and bills. If its 
analysis proved negative, it initiated resistance, often successfully. McBride (1970, p. 
169) describes how the Chilean Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, in a communication 
to the members of 1924, states that not alone has it put a stop to the radical movement 
among the workers but it has also prevented the construction of a railway over the Andes 
in the south of Chile which would have made it possible to import cattle on the hoof from 
Argentina and thus would have weakened the competitive position of cattle farmers living 
in southern Chile. 
What factors have contributed or can contribute to a weakening of the power position 
of the large landowners or to neutralizing their power? 
In my opinion the first to be mentioned must be the gradual growth of industry over the 
past forty years. This is based chiefly on import replacement and must therefore find an 
internal outlet in order to continue in existence. This leads one immediately to a basic 
contradiction; it is in the interests of industry, or at least of the producers of ordinary con-
sumer goods, to have a farming population which earns enough to be able to buy its 
products. Industrialization in itself creates two new interest groups, the industrialists and 
the workers. Other processes of change, such as urbanization, the rise of a bureaucratic 
government apparatus and the emergence of middle classes to man the service sector, 
which may in part occur autonomously but which may also be caused by industrializa-
tion, also lead to the appearance of new interest groups. All this means, ipso facto, that 
the national product is no longer earned solely in agriculture, by the large landowners. 
29 
The basic conflict between industry and the surplus appropriation by the lane 'and-
owners remained for a long time submerged. It has, nonetheless, given rise to adaptations 
in the price relationships between industrial goods and agricultural produce which are 
disadvantageous to agriculture (cf. Evers & Vossenaar, 1971). In order to avoid a direct 
confrontation, industrialists and landowners have arrived at a sort of compromise; the 
absence of a home market is compensated for by high prices for industrial goods and 
stringent import restrictions. Ultimately, however, this has weakened the position of the 
landowners nonetheless. Deprived of incentives, agriculture was unable either to increase 
production and productivity to any great extent or to offer the peasants an existence more 
consistent with human dignity.This state of affairs was sometimes acknowledged by the 
landowners: in Chile it was one of the arguments with which the SNA tried to shift the 
blame from its members (Gomez, 1969, p. 83 ff). However, in a situation where for years 
arguments have been employed with the object of preventing, postponing or watering 
down reforms, no one pays attention any more to the truth content of an argument. 
Industrialization thus has led in more than one way to a weakening of the economic 
power of the landowners. That this weakening favours peasant mobilization seems 
beyond dispute. When mobilization began in Chile in 1965, the agrarian population still 
formed at most 30% of the total. In addition the agriculturalists, that is to say, the lan-
downers, had been discredited in the eyes of a broad section of the public (Chonchol, 
19 70, p. 5 6) by the fact that agriculture, which before the second world war had provided 
a foreign exchange surplus of some 40 million dollars, was so incapable of satisfying the 
demand for food in the sixties that an annual food import of 150 million dollars was 
necessary. 
One might assume that the emergence of new interest groups which are beginning to 
take part in the political process and help to influence the allocation of public resources, 
will affect the political power of the landowners. This is indeed so, in a certain sense, but 
the process may at best be called devious. Insofar as one can speak of a democratically 
elected government, this can no longer be formed entirely by parties dominated by the 
landowners. It will have to be a coalition government. We have already seen, however, 
that even in these circumstances the landowners manage to preserve the status quo in the 
countryside for quite a long time by forming alliances or entering into agreements with 
other interest groups. They managed to preserve it for so surprisingly long in fact that it 
has given rise to a theory of political development having special reference to Latin 
America. 
Anderson (1964) has postulated that, in the Latin American countries, every newly 
emerging interest group has to prove its power capability. This is then followed by admis-
sion to the political arena, provided that the sitting power groups are convinced that the 
newcomer will keep to the rules of the game. And, one of the main rules is that they will 
not eliminate any of the traditional power groups. Each group continues to participate. 
This 'theory' which is nothing else but an ideal typical description of what actually seems 
to take place in a number of countries implies that new groups, which often started out 
with very revolutionary ideas and slogans, are in a certain sense absorbed. They connive 
with the others to keep the system functioning and themselves become members of the 
élite. Several authors in fact (including Fais Borda, 1968, p. 67) speak of a workers' 
aristocracy. This 'theory' is important in relation to the peasants in that they are one of 
the few remaining collectivities which still have to prove their 'power capability' and 
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thereby find themselves opposed to a system of interests which is already to a large extent 
differentiated. 
In a certain sense all the other power groups will have to give way a little when the 
peasants finally begin to participate. Conversely, this also means that, despite all slogans 
to the contrary, the peasants cannot count on the urban workers as convinced political 
allies. However, this situation will not last indefinitely. Developments such as the exten-
sion of the franchise to illiterates6, a considerable increase in the number of literates (who 
are entitled to vote) and reforms in the election procedures which will ensure that voting is 
really secret (and thus impossible for the owners to check up on) and fraud impossible, 
make it an attractive proposition for those parties not controlled or influenced by lan-
downers, to seek voters in the rural areas. In this way a power ratio may finally emerge on 
the national level, within a coalition for example, such that a government will be reluctant 
to use repressive measures against the peasants, even if requested to do so by the landed 
proprietors and their allies in parliament7. 
It is also possible, however, that the large landowners will find political allies in those 
parties dominated by industrial interest groups and the middle classes. This can happen 
when the groups which champion agrarian reform also threaten the non-agrarian 
ownership of the means of production. 
There can be no doubt that the State's reluctance to employ repressive measures is es-
sential to peasant mobilization. The history of many Latin American countries is full of 
examples of dispersed jacqueries, vanished organizations, ill-fated actions on the part of 
the peasants. On the other hand it is frequently possible to detect government neutrality 
or even good-will underlying successful peasant actions. According to Craig Jr. (1969, p. 
286), the more open policy of the Prado government in Peru towards new trade unions 
stimulated the setting up of the first of these organizations in the Convention valley. Syn-
dicalization later received a welcome stimulus from a recommendation favouring the 
peasants which was made by a research commission of the Ministry of Labour, sent to 
the valley to investigate a conflict (idem, p. 288). Arroyo and Gomez (1969) have 
gathered data for Chile which show the enormous consequences resulting from the corn-
Table 2. Number of conflicts in agricultural enterprises (Chile) 
Occupation of enterprises by 
Year C.W.C.1 Strikes Workers Mapuche 
1 
1 
2 
1 
6 
4 
2 
2 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
60 
12 
21 
10 
31 
395 
526 
1167 
1852 
3 
7 
44 
5 
39 
142 
586 
693 
647 
— 
1 
— 
— 
— 
7 
14 
7 
24 
1. Collective wage contracts 
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ing to power of the Frei government i.e. a government well disposed towards trade un-
ionism. This was so even in the early years when the legislation remained unchanged, 
being merely differently applied. Whereas before 1964 there were only about 20 rural 
syndicates in existence, this number had grown to 201 by 1966 and to 394 by 1970. Table 
2, derived from the same authors, shows that the number of actions also increased by 
leaps and bounds during the period of Frei's government. 
Peasant organizations themselves developed a number of tactics aimed at neutralizing 
the power of the landed proprietors and increasing the government's reluctance to use 
repressive measures. Firstly, in many countries they came to realize that local 
organizations, acting alone, always lose a conflict. Even though their action usually 
remains local, the organizations are in a stronger position if they unite in an umbrella 
movement; their solidarity not only makes repression more difficult, but also more risky 
for a government which ultimately depends upon winning elections. 
In the second place one often finds (cf. Huizer, 1970) that the peasants start out by 
making demands which amount merely to the application of an already existing law; 
demands for the payment of a legal minimum wage, demands for the enforcement of the 
legally prescribed hours of work, demands for the abolition of contractual obligations 
declared invalid by law. Such tactics also make it more difficult for the government to act 
repressively. 
Thirdly the peasants - and later their organizations - seek allies among other popula-
tion groups or else accept invitations to join alliances made to them by other groups or 
persons. This scouting round for allies is evident in the first place from the fact that many 
of the leaders of peasant organizations were not peasants themselves but had a higher 
standing in the community as lawyers, priests or urban intellectuals. The name of the 
lawyer Francisco Juliào is linked with the famous Ligas Camponesas from Goulart's 
period. In that same period the priests Crespo and Lage were well known leaders of the 
syndical movement in north-eastern Brazil. Hugo Blanco, the man who helped organize 
the peasants in the Convención Valley in Peru was a student of agriculture; Emilio Loren-
zini, who organized the first big strike of Chilean agricultural workers in 1953, was a 
jurist and son of one of the local notables; Juan Cifuentes, who did the same thing a year 
later in a neighbouring community, 'came from a family which had produced a long line 
of bishops and ministers of state' (Landsberger, 1969, p. 223). 
Through their higher social-economic status - and sometimes by virtue of family ties 
with local notables - they are less easily 'got at' by the local landowners. The latter are 
not quite sure what hornet's nest they may be stirring up if they try to take reprisals 
against them, for they prefer to aim their reprisals at the local leaders of peasant 
organizations. Even as late as 1965 it was difficult, in Chile, say Affonso et al. (1970II, p. 
236), to find peasants who were prepared to occupy any leading position in the syn-
dicates. It is not surprising therefore that it is sometimes necessary to have an alliance 
beforehand to get any local peasant organization going at all. In a large number of cases 
the first impetus towards a local association must come from an outsider. Such an 
organiser may be some socially aware person, like a priest or a student, or someone con-
nected with a leftist political grouping, or even a civil servant (Chile); this depends on the 
political circumstances. 
The aim of such a mobilizer is frequently not merely to organize the peasants so as to 
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be able to demand better living conditions. If he has political affiliations he will also be 
eager to gain support for his party or group; if he has a particular social ideal in mind, he 
will try to whip up the peasants' enthusiasm for it so that they will demand the necessary 
changes; if he himself has political ambitions he will want to win voters. Certainly, if the 
mobilizer is affiliated to an important party any alliance he sets in motion will serve 
several functions. It protects the peasants and serves as a channel for communication and 
negotiation with the national level on which decisions regarding the solution of conflicts 
are taken. For the government is not important merely as the possible tool of the landed 
proprietors. Even when it ceases to fulfil this role so obviously, it must still solve conflicts, 
take decisions regarding the allocation of resources and legalize any new measures. The 
government remains important to the peasants and so accordingly do good relations with 
this government and the channels of communication via which they may argue their case. 
For the political party any alliance with the peasants is intended to bind them to it8. The 
APRA in Peru, the MNR in Bolivia, A.D. in Venezuela, PRI in Mexico, FRAP and PDC 
in Chile were all familiar with such 'tied' peasant organizations. However, although in 
one case (Mexico) the peasants, once 'tied', received hardly any help from their party and 
in the other (Venezuela) it is doubtful whether, after a very promising start, the party now 
pays much attention to the peasants at all, there seem to be cases in which the party con-
tinued to support the peasant organizations (Peru, Chile). One seems justified in 
assuming that the support the peasants receive is directly related to the importance of 
their political support for those groups or organizations which hold power within the 
state or, conversely, to the threat which their opposition might pose to these power élites. 
In any case, such an alliance, which sometimes assumes the character of a client 
relationship, is one more example of the importance for the peasants of linking up with 
other groups. 
One cultural factor which helps to weaken the power of the landed proprietors is 
ideological. It concerns the emergence, first among the urban intellectuals, and later 
among other population groups, of a set of related ideas and concepts which detract from 
the prestige of the hacendados. 
The actual origin of these ideas seems to be connected with a question which began 
once again to pre-occupy Latin American intellectuals during the twenties. They started 
to ask themselves why their countries were under-developed. Previous generations had 
usually sought the answer in a supposed racial inferiority of the Indian or, as the case 
might be, black section of the population. Gradually, however, the stereotypes of the 
stupid, apathetic peasant, devoid of any culture of his own and incapable of creating one, 
became unacceptable (Quijano, 1965, p. 57). People began to regard the position of the 
dependent peasant, existing on the very edge of, or below, the subsistence level, as being 
contrary to all justice. In the first instance this led to an unfavourable view of the agrarian 
sector, which was considered traditional, clinging to out-of-date techniques and methods 
and to a social order in which the enterprising peasant was given no opportunity. At a 
later stage, during the fifties, people also began to attribute the stagnation in the economic 
development of society as a whole to the excessively stratified social structure obtaining 
in rural areas. This was seen as an obstacle not only to agrarian development, but also to 
industrial growth since it was accompanied by a lop-sided distribution of income which 
led to the absence of a large home market. To crown it all, the rich sections of the popula-
tion, which included the large landowners, did not even fulfil those obligations entrusted 
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to them earlier by the economists. In other words they neither saved nor invested. A 
luxurious life style and the flight of capital prevented this. It would lead us too far astray 
to examine these ideas in any more detail; suffice it is to say that they did and do exist and 
are expressed more and more frequently by very serious and respectable organizations 
such as the Economic Commission for Latin America (see Cepal, 1969, p. 28 ff.)9. 
These ideas, theories and facts led in their turn to divisions within what, for con-
venience sake, we will call the ruling élites and within the actual landed proprietor 
category. The more far-seeing, progressive and enterprising individuals and groups 
within these élites realized that it would be impossible to preserve the status quo in the 
rural areas much longer and that a timely attempt at reform could prevent later 
revolutionary outbursts. The United States too urged reforms in 1961. This at least 
resulted in most Latin American countries adopting some laws relating to land reform, 
although none of them seems to have been in much of a hurry to put these laws into 
execution. In some of the countries themselves several élite groups were prepared to drop 
the landed proprietors in order to save interests to which they attached more weight. It 
also hapened that the more progressive and productive land owners were quite prepared 
to accept a type of land reform which would spare them while penalizing their unproduc-
tive colleagues (Bourricaud, 1967, p. 297). Indeed the Chilean government deliberately 
made use of this differentiation between productive and unproductive estates in order to 
sow discord among the large landowners (McCoy, 1969, p. 19). 
One other result, has been that young people, especially students, were stimulated to 
activism. In various countries and at different periods they surged into the countryside 
bent on organizing the peasants, making them aware of their condition and spurring them 
to action. Their activities met with considerable success in some places (cf. Home, 1971); 
elsewhere, where they embarked upon a guerilla struggle against the government and its 
army in the hope of carrying the peasants along with them, their effect remained slight. 
In conclusion it may be stated that the peasants themselves can exercise only a 
minimal influence upon the creation of those conditions necessary to neutralize the power 
of the landed proprietors at the national level. Even when voting in elections and in 
seeking political allies, they depend upon the existence of parties, groups and persons 
willing to help them. 
Now that we have reviewed at the national level the processes necessary for a 
successful mobilization of the peasants let us return to the local level. There we shall dis-
cuss what circumstances may contribute to a weakening of the patronage relationship 
between owner and peasants. 
3.5 Factors leading to a weakening of the patronage relationship 
That patronage relationships hamper peasant mobilization became very clear during 
our anthropological research in Chile. It was not infrequntly said of completely un-
organized enterprises of any size that the owner 'bribed' his peasants. He found out what 
minimum wage the syndicate was demanding and then offered slightly more himself on 
the condition - either tacit or openly expressed - that the peasants should not organize. 
Under what circumstances now does this relationship between owner and peasant 
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become more contractual and specific, embracing fewer facets of life? 
In general we may expect this to happen whenever economic and agrarian develop-
ment takes place within a district. There are several reasons for this. Economic develop-
ment implies increasing differentiation and specialization of roles in economic life. This 
creates alternative outlets for the peasants, enabling them to break the link with the 
patron through individual migration. The very fact that such alternatives exist will 
already lessen their dependence. The incorporation of the local community into the 
national economic, political and cultural systems which is characteristic of development 
also results in the peasants making contact with authorities and dispensers of assistance 
other than the landowner alone, the regional representatives of various government 
bodies for instance. Even if these persons must still be approached through channels, 
people other than the owner will possess the necessary contacts. 
In a diagram derived from Coder (1969, p. 72) we might convey the accompanying 
change in the patronage relationships of the peasants as the transition from Fig. A to Fig. 
B. Brokerage occurs alongside feudal patronage (Blok, 1969). 
f i g . A / \ \ ^ /J^^S<r / \ " 9 . B. 
In a somewhat later stage of development the neighbourhood begins to offer the 
peasants all kinds of possible new roles such as parent of school-going children, market 
seller, adopter of some novelty, sportsman. Alberti ( 1970), working on a theory advanced 
by Young, analyzed three Peruvian farming communities and concluded that in these 
changed circumstances the peasants resent their complete dependence more than before 
and that, since this feeling is shared, solidarity among them grows. 
Agrarian development on the farms themselves also leads to a differentiation and 
specialization of roles. The patron becomes dependent upon the special skills of some 
workers; his relationship with them becomes more impersonal, more contractual. It has 
been established that in several countries - Peru, Brazil, Chile - agrarian development 
leads to the traditional method of payment i.e. receiving the use of land, being replaced by 
payment in cash (cf. Cotler and Portocarrero, 1970, p. 133; Ramirez, 1969, p. 56). This 
phenomenon too renders the relationship more contractual. It often happens that the 
worker who receives payment partly or entirely in the form of land has a higher standard 
of living than his colleague who receives only money. On the farming enterprises in which 
both categories occur the first regards himself as the more privileged, which also means the 
more dependent upon the owner's favour. 
Insofar as development also implies a higher income for the peasants, as was the case 
for example in the valley of La Convención in Peru, it also allows them a greater degree of 
independence from the landowners. In the valley the sharecroppers had earned so much 
from the coffee they grew on their land that they were able together, per hacienda, to 
enlist the services of a lawyer in order to lodge a complaint with the Ministry of Labour. 
. Later they were even in a position to boycot the owners, that is, to refuse to work for them 
any longer either for money or any other inducement. It seems, however, that develop-
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ment of this sort, which arouses such expectations, must either be halted or menaces 
leaving them a prey to frustration, before a more radical mobilization of the peasants oc-
curs (cf. Huizer, 1970, p. 185 ff.; Craig Jr., 1969, p. 285; and Lamond Tullis, 1970)10. 
Factors closely connected with development are the proximity of an urban centre and 
the presence of educational'facilities. The urban centre helps to make the peasants aware 
of alternative opinions and possibilities of behaviour - a role which may nowadays be 
fulfilled to some extent by the transistor radio - and makes it easier for the mobilizers to 
reach them. Education can, in theory, increase their chances of detaching themselves 
from the patron individually and open their eyes to the existence of alternatives. Other 
factors which may be expected to contribute to a weakening of the patronage relationship 
relate to the individual farm or ranch. These are: 
- The size of the enterprise. The larger the number of workers, the more difficult it is for 
the owner to embark upon a relationship of patronage with the majority. There is an in-
creased likelihood that a considerable number will not feel any personal link with the owner 
at all. 
In Chile it was often the smaller farms with only two or three workmen besides the 
owner, which were not syndicalized. Quijano (1965, p. 47) points out that the peasant un-
ions in the Peruvian Sierra usually emerged where the population was dense and there 
were practically no medium-sized enterprises. 
- Owner absenteeism. Even where the owner's replacement is an administrator and not 
an overseer who has risen from the ranks of the workers, he usually does not have the 
owner's liberty to dispense favours which cost money. He cannot thus maintain the 
patronage relationships. Moreover, it seems as though the administrators tend to exploit 
their position in order to grow rich as quickly as possible, to the disadvantage both of the 
owner and the workers. At least I frequently got this impression both in Brazil and later in 
Chile. Whenever the peasants' conversation came round to an administrator, it was 
remarkable how often they held a more unfavourable opinion of this man than of the 
owner himself. 
- The rapid succession of owners. Patronage is a personal relationship and needs time 
in order to develop; the worker has first to prove that he is worthy of the landowner's 
trust. It would seem an obvious assumption - but this is a hypothesis which could only be 
illustrated by a few examples - that the sale of a farm, or its being inherited by another 
member of the family, would weaken the patronage relationships between peasants and 
owner. 
Alongside factors relating to conditions in a particular region or enterprise one might 
also mention a number of others involving the experiences or characteristics of the 
peasants themselves. It may be assumed, for instance, that peasants with a couple of 
years experience of working in the towns or in the mines will be less inclined to an un-
critical acceptance of patronage relationships with the owner of the agricultural enter-
prise on which they later find themselves working. Several authors mention the fact that 
in particular the leaders of peasant movements have undergone this kind of experience, 
which might be called re-socializing (Huizer, 1970, p. 181; Alberti, 1970, p. 187; Craig 
Jr., 1969, p. 268; Affonso et al., 1970, 2, p. 227). 
In areas with an Indian population partial or complete participation in the Latin culture 
and structure also forms part of this re-socializing experience (cf. Quijano, 1965, p. 59 f.). 
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The same effect might be expected of migration within agriculture itself as occurs when 
temporary agricultural labourers travel from one farm to another. Gilhodes (1970, p. 
449) says that in Colombia it was largely from the landless wandering mass of 
agricultural workers that the participants in the armed conflicts, collectively called la 
violencia, emerged. On the basis of their ecological analysis of the results of the Chilean 
presidential elections of 1958 and 1964 Petras and Zeitlin (1970, p. 515) suggest that it 
will be the migratory seasonal workers, the afuerinos, who will be more inclined to 
perceive the common interests they share with other peasants and workers and to accept 
radical political explanations for their common situation. 
Finally we must mention the possible role of a particular event which increases the 
peasants' frustration. These would include attempts on the part of the owners to alter 
conditions of work to their own advantage, the cancellation of favours previously granted 
or attempts to drive the peasants from their land (cf. Alberti, 1970, p. 211). It is not only 
their increasing frustration but also the fact that the peasants can hold no one but the lan-
downer responsible for this frustration which makes them ripe for mobilization. 
In this section we have mentioned a number of concrete factors which in our view con-
tribute to a weakening of the patronage relationship. In the following chapter we shall 
examine, in the light of quantitive data relating to Chilean rural municipalities, what con-
firmation we can find for the series of hypotheses developed here. 
We shall now turn to a discussion of the cultural obstacles to mobilization and the con-
ditions under which these may be removed. 
3.6 Obstacles to mobilization present in the local culture and their possible removal 
From the model presented earlier it may be deduced that also cultural obstacles to 
mobilization may exist. The model in fact postulates that there will be a connection 
between the local distribution of land and the occurrence of a number of culture patterns 
other than patronage. While patronage is, in a certain sense, an implicit acceptance of the 
inequality which lies behind it, some quite different reactions to this inequality exist. 
Röling (1970) assumes that peasants who are unable to carry through an innovation for 
whatever reason may try to work out their frustration in various ways. In agreement with 
Merton he mentions rebellion, escapism, ritualism and conformism and adds the creation 
of controlling forces. We may regard the century-long inability of the majority of the 
Latin American agrarian population to better their position in life as the impossibility to 
create a particular desired situation. We may then expect that this population group will 
have to work out the consequent frustrations in some way or another. It makes sense to 
regard what Huizer (1970) calls 'the culture of repression' as inbuilt adaptations to this 
frustration. 
The literature dealing with Latin American peasant cultures contains descriptions of 
elements which would fit very nicely into one of Röling's rubrics. The widespread 
drunkenness, for instance, could be classed under escapism as could the apparent 
laziness, the apathy, the lack of foresight. There is also the belief, so widespread in Brazil, 
in the 'golpe', the stroke of good luck needed to succeed. This would come under the crea-
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tion of controlling forces. Under ritualism one might mention the striving after satisfac-
tion of ritual obligations instead of wealth as described by van Zantwijk (1965, p. 166 f.) 
writing of an Indian village in Mexico. Rebellion would cover not only the countless 
jacqueries which have occurred in Mexico, Peru and other countries but also the emergence 
of what has been called social banditry11. 
There can be little doubt that the kinds of adaptation to frustration mentioned by 
Röling occur frequently in the rural areas of Latin America. However, only a few of the 
authors who describe any of these forms of cultural adaptation give sufficient information 
concerning the local distribution of land to be able to 'place' the various cultural patterns 
in our model. Then again, other cultural traits such as the peasants' mistrustfulness, which 
has been remarked upon by many, seem not to fit very well into any of Röling's 
categories. Williams too (1969) in a research conducted with Peruvian peasants, has 
attempted to detect psychosocial characteristics which might have resulted from their 
being dominated for generations by the landed proprietors12. He mentions the tendency 
to avoid taking decisions; to approach the outside world with rough and ready 
dichotomic concepts such as friend and enemy, ignoring, as it were, the more subtle 
nuances in attitude; a lack of tolerance for vagueness and ambiguity; an orientation 
towards present or past but not towards the future over which the peasant has no control, 
fatalism, in other words; and the active solicitation of patronage. 
All these examples, to which may be added the envy and social control already men-
tioned, indicate that the agrarian structure in Latin America has led in many parts to the 
formation of more or less stable cultural patterns which will influence the success of any 
eventual attempts at mobilization and even the acceptance of new social structures. We 
still know little about the way in which cultural patterns change. It would be mistaken to 
think, however, that even where a cultural trait has originated as a result of a particular 
structure, the cultural pattern in question will automatically disappear with any later 
structural change. It is also certain that the mobilization of the peasants will itself have to 
overcome the resistance of such dysfunctional culture patterns. 
What factors may help to neutralize and overcome cultural obstacles such as the 
mutual mistrust, the lack of solidarity, the tendency to interpret a person's actions in 
terms of self-interest, to regard the non-related other as a rival in the struggle to grasp at 
least a share of life's limited opportunities? Insofar as the peasants still form a certain 
community and do not live completely atomistically within a geographical area, the 
threat from outside is an important factor in promoting solidarity. This threat may come 
from a traditionally negative reference group from which the peasants differ radically. In 
such cases the community will often preserve a certain show of unity no matter how 
divided it may be on the inside. This mixture of inward division and the presentation of a 
united front towards outsiders is not infrequently found in Indian communities. The 
peasants may also be made aware of the existence of a threat by a particular event, disad-
vantageous to them all, or by the stimulating effect of messages emanating from external 
agents. 
The campaign against adult illiteracy was used in Brazil at the beginning of the sixties 
(cf. de Kadt, 1970) and later in other countries, to help promote this awareness by using 
texts which explained, in terms of power and class, the situation in which the peasants 
found themselves. In the San Miguel Valley in the Peruvian Andes, eleven of the eighteen 
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Indian communities, son* lying inside and some outside a large hacienda, united in a 
federation when taxation on their land was instituted (Diaz, 1970). On the fundo Pullally 
in Chile a similar event, which was to everyone's disadvantage, was the refusal of the 
patron to rebuild at his expense houses which had been partially destroyed by an 
earthquake. This led to the sharecroppers and the overseers, with their higher incomes, 
becoming members of the syndicate (de Ranitz and de Ranitz, 1972). 
One other factor which promotes solidarity is the project, the aiming towards some 
particular goal which can be achieved within a measurable space of time. According to 
Etzioni (1968, p. 403) mobilization often begins with a project and it is easy to see why. 
Not only does it embody a common goal, the attainment of which is to the advantage of 
all, but it exemplifies that such goals really exist. It pan be carried out within a limited 
period of time and thus postpones the difficult question of'what is our ultimate goal?'. In 
addition, the project puts only a temporary demand upon the resources Of those 
mobilized. As a socializing process, however, the project may lead to the peasants 
placing part of their resources permanently at the organization's disposal when they see 
that they are not being duped by some crafty leader. In farming communities such a 
project may be one that does not immediately lead to a conflict of interests with the 
landed proprietor, for example the building of schools and other community amenities. 
All three of the peasant organizations studied by Alberti (1970) began in this manner, and 
the same is true of the celebrated first Liga Camponesa in Brazil. Yet even newly formed 
conflict organizations not infrequently begin with a project. They aim at a concrete goal 
and attempt to achieve it; the enforcement of a particular law, the abolition of a hated 
obligation, a higher wage, shorter working hours. 
The most important factor in overcoming cultural obstacles, however, is the presence 
of a leader with outstanding qualities, both instrumental and human. Huizer (1970, 
p. 192 f.) and also Lamond Tullis (1970, p. 225) speak of a charismatic leader. Why is such 
a leader with exceptional qualities necessary? In order to consider how peasants might 
improve their situation, it is first of all essential to possess more insight into this situation, 
its causes and component, interdependent elements than is usual among peasants. The 
patronage relationship, for instance, must be seen for what it is. At the same time it is 
necessary to draw up concrete aims which are, in theory, attainable, and to supervise the 
action this entails; the project must be planned. In addition it is essential that the action 
should be well organized, that no objectives be set and no actions undertaken which far 
exceed the capabilities of the peasants. To know exactly what one wishes to aim at implies 
a fairly considerable ability to evaluate the situation and the possibilities, including the 
possibilities of success and defeat at higher levels of decision. In the light of this we not 
surprisingly found that leaders often possess more non-agrarian experience, and more 
education, than their followers. 
The personal qualities of the leaders are also of the utmost importance. In many cases 
(in our terms: in situation C and in situation A surrounded by large estates) the peasant 
community is often riddled with suspicion and envy. The only strong relationships are 
those with members of the family and a few privileged others, either friends or com-
padres. These latter relationships are, moreover, dyadic: they always involve two persons 
and no more. In such circumstances norms exist at most for traditional forms of co-
operation - organizing festivities, helping each other on the land - but not for behaviour 
within an organization with a particular objective. In other cases, on large farms for in-
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stance, where there is much coming and going, one can scarcely speak of a community 
but more of a collection of individual families loosely related on the basis of varying 
criteria. In communities of this sort, the personality of the leader must be such that he 
gains the confidence of the majority of the peasants. He must in fact be someone with 
whom they would be willing to enter upon a dyadic relationship. Until the first success 
has been gained - and the economic motive for joining the organization becomes realistic 
- the leader must inspire sufficient confidence to unite the peasants and keep them united. 
He must not be corrupt and he must be able to convince the members of his good faith (for, 
apart from reprisals, the landed proprietors also attempt to neutralize the influence of the 
peasant leaders by bribing them, with promotion, an extra piece of land or something 
similar. Sometimes, it must be admitted, they are successful). He must, of course, possess 
authority; people must be prepared to do for the organization what he asks, not because 
they are complying with some norm or other regulating the behaviour of an organization 
member, for this norm frequently does not yet exist, but because it is he who asks. There 
is, however, a norm which governs acceptable behaviour towards one's partner in a 
dyadic relationship13. This, for the rest, implies that it is difficult for such a leader to 
extricate himself later; he has become accustomed to being the centre of things. 
All we have said thus far proves that leaders are of crucial importance for the embryo 
organization. The more so when we recollect the importance, mentioned earlier, of con-
tacts with possible allies on the national level. To a large extent, these will be his contacts. 
3.7 Class awareness and the aims of mobilization 
In concluding our attempt at a theory of mobilization, we must devote some words to 
the dawning awareness, among the peasants, of their common interests, to their class 
consciousness and to the objectives which they hope to achieve. 
We have already pointed out that the various categories of peasants share the same in-
terests only to a certain extent. This is all the more true since.they tend to think in terms of 
the concrete, local situation as it affects them. At the same time we have observed that the 
presence of a local opponent helps to make them aware that they have interests in 
common. 
We shall have occasion, in a later chapter dealing with solidarity - in other words, with 
the permanent allocation of individual resources in favour of the peasant organizations -
to delve somewhat more deeply into the concept of class. The term is used in various 
meanings but we are usually referring to the collectivity of those who have no power, no 
possessions, a low income and few possibilities of development. It seems to me that this 
concept when applied to peasants, will describe a reality which for them exists only on the 
local level, and this for the reasons we have already given. Their means of production are 
of a local-territorial nature and their economic incorporation into a larger system is still 
far from complete. This also holds good for very many farms which sell most of their 
produce on the market and where the owner is in fact completely incorporated into the 
larger system. On the basis of the exploitation of the small - Indian - peasant, Frank 
(1967, ch. II) assumed that, contrary to what some earlier observers had asserted, they 
were indeed integrated into a larger economic system. This may very well correspond 
with an ideal notion, held by the same people, whereby getting rid of exploitation also im-
plies an abolition of integration, the return to a reasonably prosperous isolated farming 
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community, one not bound up in a long chain of inter-dependencies14. Peasants are often 
very much aware of the conflict of interests which arises between agriculturalists and-
urbajj consumers concerning the price of farm products. This makes them take a sceptical 
view of exhortations which would seerrt to suggest that they and the industrial proletariat 
form one class. 
The terms in which the majority of peasants view the solution to their problems - a 
redistribution of land to individual farmers and government support for agriculture - are 
undeniably not class terms, but those of a local group. They do not aim to solve the 
problems of poverty as such, nor even of most of the poor. At best they are interested in 
the local poor. It is precisely this which lends that solution a slight air of unreality at the 
present time, certainly if the authorities engaged in pressing through the land reforms are 
preoccupied with the fate of all the poor. Such an administration can hardly permit itself 
to leave a large section of the poor peasants and agricultural workers out in the cold. 
Hobsbawm (1971, p. 11) has pointed out that the peasants' class programmes and 
slogans stand little chance of being put into practice, a fact which I myself had noted also 
(Galjart, 1971b). 
This leaves two possibilities: either the peasants are mobilized for a programme which 
will not greatly appeal to them in the first instance, a programme in which the collectiviza-
tion of agriculture occupies a prominent place, or they are mobilized for a much vaguer 
programme with which they can identify, a programme which promises land 'to those 
who till it' but does not specify how it will be distributed. Mobilization is more easily ac-
complished in the second case, although it seems possible for opponents to sow uncer-
tainty among the peasants regarding the concrete outcome of a land reform, quoting 
examples derived from other societies. 
Inherent in the second case, however, is the possibility that, once the land reforms have 
been carried out, the peasants may be gripped by disappointment and suspicion. In such 
cases the majority may then turn their backs again on the regime which introduced 
collectivization. 
Our conclusion must be tragic. Unless the peasants mobilize, a more equitable dis-
tribution of land, income and power seems unlikely to materialize. Yet most of the small 
producers, and a large section of the agricultural workers, mobilize for the sake of an 
ideal - a piece of land they can call their own - which seems likely, under present cir-
cumstances, to remain only an ideal. 
Notes 
1 Not all the authors on this subject have made the attempt; the term campesino which is so 
handily rendered by peasant and suggests that we are dealing with one and the same category 
of the agrarian active population (i.e. those who earn their living through agriculture) may 
take the blame for this. Powell (1970) and Huizer (1970), for instance, speak of peasants tout 
court; the latter does not even define the term peasants. 
2 It may be that a local élite monopolizes not so much the land as other desirable resources such 
as access to the market or to the government institutions. Such a monopoly may also lead to 
cultural patterns amdng the peasants such as those set out in the model. 
3 In the literature dealing with the cultures of Indian fanning communities -not infrequently to 
be found in situation C - mention is often made of levelling mechanisms. In a survey - which 
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for the rest does not state clearly to which of the situations we have distinguished here it refers 
- Erasmus (1968, p. 67) mentions terms like 'jealousy pattern', 'institutionalized envy' and 
'invidious sanction' used by researchers to describe their results. 
4 It was in order to draw attention to this that Queiroz (1963) called the small owners and 
squatters a forgotten category. 
5 One of the most striking examples of this is the telegram reproduced in Vilaça and Cavalcanti 
(1965) and dated October 6th 1942. It was sent to a local police chief and landed proprietor in 
the state of Pernambuco, Brazil and read: 'We request you to reserve all the votes of Bom 
Conselho for Barros Barreto. Sincerely.' 
6 This is not yet so in many countries with the result that half of the agrarian population does 
not vote and is thus uninteresting for the existing parties. 
7 The argument in favour of such a request has become a standard formula: 'communist 
agitators coming from outside the area and who have no connection with agriculture,...' 
8 A small, leftist, militant grouping is often unable to fulfil either function, since — cf. Anderson 
- it menaces the other power contenders to such an extent that it is not allowed to participate 
in decision making. I imagine that this is why such groups, even after initial successes, often 
do not find any permanent support among the peasants (cf. Galjart, 1969). 
9 It is not surprising that in particular the internal relationships in rural areas have led to 
sociological theories in terms of dichotomous, conflicting classes. Examples of this are the 
theoretical concepts such as colonialismo interno, advanced by Gonzales Casanova, and 
(exploiting) metropolis and (exploited) periphery thought up by Frank. Although these 
theories, as Nickel (1971) attempts to show, are too loose to cover the entire reality, and suffer 
from the use of concepts which cannot be operationalized, at least they have the merit that no 
one, who studies development from a sociological point of view, can afford to ignore the 
problems they evoke. 
10 The factors mentioned here also occur in Lamond Tullis' ( 19 70) study of Peru. Unfortunately 
I did not manage to get hold of it until after I had written this chapter. 
Tullis imitates Young (1966) in working with three concepts which he calls Capacity, Op-
portunity and Solidarity. Capacity is the measure in which a community is aware of new 
possibilities of behaviour in order to realize its own goals. Opportunity is the objective 
possibility possessed by this community of putting this new knowledge into practice. Solidari-
ty is the measure in which the community possesses one value pattern and desires to realize it. 
Tullis postulates that as capacity grows, while opportunity grows more slowly or not at all, 
solidarity - which may then assume the form of a movement - increases. He calls the dis-
crepancy between capacity and opportunity 'structural bind'. 
In my terms: as familiarity with other alternatives increases (through the introduction of 
modern agricultural methods, education, travel, experiences in the city, proximity of the city) 
capacity grows. Opportunity increases with the decline of the power of the large landowners 
on a national level, and because peasants find allies on that level. However, the local attempt to 
preserve the status quo means that opportunity does not keep pace with capacity. In the resul-
tant state of structural bind a movement of solidarity will emerge. Tullis too recognizes the 
need for charismatic leadership. 
The terms in which Tullis couches his theory are at the same time more general and more 
vague than mine. The fact that they are more general is an advantage. The presence of a local 
opponent is indeed a very important example of what Tullis calls a structural bind, but it is not 
the only one. Adverse local conditions may also cause a structural bind and, correspondingly 
an attempt on the part of the community to surmount it. 
11 In imitation of Hobsbawm this social banditry is indeed regarded as the first, albeit more or 
less individual, sign of protest; Quijano (1967) views it as the precursor of the later peasant 
movements. In order to prevent the romanticizing of the bandit it is well to remember what 
Blok (1967) has pointed out in a soberly written article; he stresses that in the long run the 
bandit also finds his victims among the poor agrarian population in which he causes internal 
divisions. Blok bases his criticism upon European data but he might just as easily have 
utilized the history of the celebrated Brazilian bandit, Lampiäo. 
12 Earlier attempts in this direction have been made by researchers into the national character; 
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13 
14 
Moog, for instance, for'Brazil (1954), Salazar Bondy for Peru (1969). The culture of poverty 
conceived by Lewis who worked principally in Mexico also deserves a mention in this context. 
This view bears a relationship to what has been found elsewhere (Scheidhnger, 1958, p. 59), 
namely that 'in groups with an autocratic kind of leadership, the leader tends to replace the in-
dividual's superego. He assumes the role of a new inner authority and the tie to him is the 
basic cohesive force'. 
Compare the interesting study of Mitrany (1961) which shows that the peasant movements 
and political parties, which flourished in Eastern Europe in the period between thetwo world 
wars, were in fact guided by similar ideals. 
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Chapter 4 Mobilization in Chile: testing part of the theory 
4.1 Introduction 
The theory presented in the preceding chapter was based upon conclusions arrived at 
by myself and other researchers and derived from data which was more often than not 
qualitative and collected anthropologically. In this chapter I shall attempt to test a 
number of hypotheses for Chile on the basis of quantitative data. As indicator for 
mobilization I chose the degree of organization of agricultural workers in peasant syn-
dicates. This is calculated for each community by expressing the number of those 
organized1 in the three large confederations of syndicates, El Triunfo Campesino, 
Ranquil and Libertad, as a percentage of the total agricultural wage labour force men-
tioned in the most recent agricultural census, that of March 1965. The following 
categories were included under wage labour: supervisory personnel, share cropper-
inquilinos and inquilinos, permanent workers and the two categories of temporary 
labourers distinguished by the census. Out of the data found in the agricultural census in-
dicators could be constructed for a part only of the variables and factors which were 
assumed in the previous chapter to influence the emergence and growth of peasant 
movements. In some cases the validity or reliability of an indicator is doubtful. 
As the census unit was the municipality (comuna), we will be dealing exclusively with 
indicators for those independent variables which, we postulated, were important on the 
local level. Thus we have three indicators for the degree of agricultural development (the 
presence of irrigation, the use of artificial fertilizer, and the number of hectares per trac-
tor); one indicator for owner absenteeism and consequent weakening of the patronage 
relationship (the occurrence of administrators), one indicator for the proximity of a large 
city (common boundaries with that city), a number of indicators for the presence of large 
agricultural enterprises in the comuna, one indicator for the degree of urbanization and 
and a number of indicators for the relative weight of the various status categories of 
farmers and workers and thus, perhaps, for the consequences of differences in status. All 
these indicators were calculated per comuna, usually in the form of percentages2. Other 
variables not mentioned in the previous chapter were also calculated. These concern prin-
cipally the distribution of land, the significance of particular crops, the occurrence of 
property (in contrast to other forms of tenure) and the occurrence of land reform in the 
comuna up to August 19703. 
4.2 Analysis of the differences between comunas with and without syndicates 
Not only were the correlation coefficients between the degree of organization and the 
characteristics mentioned calculated, but also the average value of the characteristics in 
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different categories of comuna. The average values showing degree of organization are 
given in Table 3. 
At first sight the table seems to show that the degree of organization in comunas 
located near one of the three large cities i.e. Santiago, Valparaiso and Concepción is no 
higher than that in the remaining, more rural comunas. There seem to be two reasons for 
this surprising fact. In the first place it appears that a relatively larger number of those 
Table 3. Average percentage organized wage labourers and average percentage members of the 
confederations El Triunfo Campesino, Ranquil and Libertad against die total of those organized, 
per comuna 
Chile: 264 comunas 
% organized of total wage labour in agriculture 29 
% members of El Triunfo of total organized 44 
% members of Ranquil of total organized 22 
% members of Libertad of total organized 13 
Comunas possessing an agricultural workers ' syndicate: 212 comunas 
% organized of total wage labour in agriculture 37 
% members of El Triunfo of total organized 54 
% members of Ranquil of total organized 27 
% members of Libertad of total organized 16 
Comunas situated close to one of the three large cities: 30 comunas* 
% organized of total wage labour in agriculture 28 
% members of El Triunfo of total organized 18 
% members Ranquil of total organized 29 
% members Libertad of total organized 13 
Remaining rural comunas: 234 comunas 
% organized of total wage labour in agriculture 29 
% members El Triunfo of total organized 47 
% members Ranquil of total organized 21 
% members Libertad of total organized 13 
Comunas where 50% or more of the population lives on the farms: 121 comunas 
% organized of total wage labour in agriculture 28 
% members of El Triunfo of total organized 45 
% members Ranquil of total organized 21 
% members Libertad of total organized 11 
1 Santiago, Valparaiso and Concepcion were regarded as large cities. Comunas situated close 
to these cities are characterized by having a common boundary with one of them. 
Table 4. Geographical position of comunas with and without 
agricultural workers' syndicates 
Close to large city Not close to large city 
Syndicate 19 193 
No syndicate 11 41 
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comunas located close to the cities, do not possess a syndicate at all. This is shown in 
Table 4. If we leave aside for the moment the 52 comunas without a syndicate, it appears 
that the degree of organization is indeed higher in the comunas located near the large 
cities than elsewhere, namely 44 % as against 36 %. Although we must return to the ques-
tion of why relatively more comunas without syndicates occur close to cities, the 
hypothesis that the degree of organization is higher closer to the cities does seem to be 
correct. 
The second reason why this hypothesis is not immediately confirmed by Table 3 is the 
deviant behaviour of the confederation El Triunfo Campesino. This confederation con-
sisted largely of syndicates set up by INDAP during the Frei government (INDAP was 
one of the two government bodies involved with agrarian reform). El Triunfo appears to 
be more important in the rural areas than close to the large cities. Mobilization under 
government guidance turned out differently therefore from the mobilization led by non-
official persons or groups - INDAP evidently paid particular attention to comunas as yet 
unorganized, those far from the cities and where agriculture was less developed. El Triun-
fo, as it were, filled in the blank spaces on the map. This is obvious from the following fact, 
as well as from the averages in Table 3. If we examine the 212 comunas in which syn-
dicates occur, the percentage of those organized who are members of El Triunfo -in con-
trast to the picture presented by Ranquil and Libertad - appears to correlate negatively 
(R = —0.28) with the overall degree of organization. In other words, the more organized 
workers in a comuna who belong to El Triunfo, the lower the total percentage of 
organized wage labourers. El Triunfo is chiefly important in places where there is little 
organization. El Triunfo also occurs more frequently as the sole organization in a com-
una. This happens 74 times, whereas it occurs with a Ranquil syndicate only in 24 com-
unas and with a Libertad syndicate only in 11. 
The deviant behaviour of El Triunfo clearly demonstrates the importance of the 
government role in peasant mobilization and organization. Everywhere throughout the 
country INDAP had small so-called area-offices each provided with a number of 
promoters whose only task was to help organize the agricultural workers on the estates. 
These people evidently took the opportunity of setting up syndicates in places where 
these could not automatically be expected according to the hypotheses mentioned in the 
previous chapter. Does this now mean that these hypotheses are related more to 
promoters who have to come out from a town and are often dependent upon public 
transport than to the actual situation of the peasants? Probably not entirely so. INDAP 
was a government body and each of its offices was linked by telephone with the provincial 
and national head offices. It was easier for El Triunfo to mobilize allies than it was for the 
other two confederations. Moreover it will appear that, despite the deviant behaviour of 
El Triunfo, i.e. the government influence upon the process, many of the hypotheses were 
nonetheless confirmed. 
Table 5 provides us with more information concerning the differences between those 
comunas which have a syndicate and those which do not. The first that meets the eye is 
the importance of the proximity of a large city. The confederations Ranquil and Libertad, 
but particularly Ranquil, have their most important bases close to the aforementioned 
three large cities. However, the proximity of a large city appears also to specify 
the relationship between degree of organization and certain characteristics of the 
agrarian structure. For example, in the countryside, the comuna without a syndicate is 
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Table 5. Averages of characteristics of the agrarian structure for organized and non-organized 
comunas 
Variable 
( 1 ) Organized in syndicates of wage labeur' (%) 
(2) Members of El Triunfo of total organized (%) 
(3) Members of Ranquil of total organized (%) 
(4) Members ofLibertad of total organized (%) 
(9) Producers and unpaid relatives of working population2 (%) 
(10) Sharecroppers-inquilinos and inquilinos of working 
population (%) 
(11) Sharecroppers-inquilinos and inquilinos of wage 
labour (%) 
( 12) Permanent labourers of working population (%) 
(13) Permanent labourers of wage labour (%) 
(14) Temporary labourers of working population (%) 
(15) Temporary labourers of wage labour (%) 
(18) Farms 0-2 ha of total farms (%) 
(19) Farms2-10haoftotalfarms(%) 
(25) Farms > 1000 ha of total farms > 200 ha (%) 
(26) Land of farms under administrator of total farmland (%) 
(27) Privately owned farms of total farms (%) 
(28) Irrigated land of total area cultivable land (%) 
(29) Farming population of total comuna population (%) 
(31) Artificially fertilized land of total cultivable land (%) 
(42) Number of hectares cultivable land per tractor 
All Chilean 
comunas 
without with 
org. org. 
(N = 52)(N = 
0 37 
0 54 
0 27 
0 16 
73 54 
4 10 
16 23 
7 14 
28 31 
11 19 
48 41 
18 36 
28 27 
26 32 
31 48 
56 42 
19 40 
48 46 
12 27 
387 217 
Comunas near 
the 3 large cities 
without 
org. 
with 
org. 
212)(N=11)(N = 
0 
0 
0 
0 
57 
10 
26 
15 
32 
12 
26 
41 
32 
37 
54 
54 
51 
13 
27 
72 
45 
29 
46 
21 
43 
12 
21 
22 
43 
17 
29 
61 
21 
25 
54 
41 
71 
22 
39 
15 
Comunas not 
near a city 
without with 
org. org. 
19)(N = 41) ( N - l 
0 
0 
0 
0 
77 
3 
, 14 
5 
26 
11 , 
54 
12 
27 
23 
25 
56 
10 
57 
8 
470 
36 
57 
25 
16 
54 
10 
23 
13 
29 
19 
42 
34 
28 
32 
48 
42 
37 
49 
26 
238 
193) 
1 In this and the following tables we understand by wage labour the total of male wage workers in agriculture above 15 
years of age. 
2 In this and the following tables we understand by working population the total male working population in agriculture 
above 15 years of age. 
the most rural (i.e. the percentage of population living on farms is higher there); close to 
the large cities, however, the non-organized comuna is the least rural in this respect 
Another example: in the rural areas it is precisely in the organized comunas that relative-
ly more large farms are found; close to the city the opposite seems to be the case. Table 6 
shows that for all sizes of farming the sign of the relationship between their occurrence 
and the degree of organization diners in the countryside from that in the comunas located 
near a large city. To give one more example: in the countryside the presence of an ad-
ministrator (which serves here as an indicator of owner absenteeism, a factor assumed to 
contribute to the weakening of patronage relationships) is, as we expected, more frequent 
in the syndicalized comunas; close to the city this factor seems unimportant. 
Other variables appear to play a role both in the rural areas and in the comunas close 
to the large cities. In both cases the organized comuna seems to have a more developed 
form of agriculture with more irrigation, more artificial fertilizer and more tractors. The 
difference, however, is more pronounced in the rural areas. 
Both close to the cities and in the more rural areas the organized comunas number, on 
average, more permanent workers among the active agrarian population. Together with 
the inquilinos and the sharecroppers it is they among the wage workers who join syn-
dicates. The occurrence of temporary labourers among the wage workers correlates fair-
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ly negatively with the degree of organization, but in Table 5 this is only evident from the 
averages in the rural areas. Close to the big cities there is yet another difference between 
organized and non-organized comunas which is not immediately apparent from the 
figures. The only category which was included among the wage workers but for which no 
separate percentages were calculated is that of supervisory personnel. Whereas in the 
rural areas and in the organized comunas close to the city this category accounts for 
between 5 and 6% of the wage-earners, it appears to reach about 16% in the non-
organized comunas close to the big cities. The relatively high significance of this 
category, which is generally not affiliated to any syndicate, is better paid than the or-
dinary workers and often regards promotion as a favour granted by the patron on the 
basis of a good personal relationship, helps in my view to explain the absence of a syn-
dicate in these comunas. 
What picture now emerges of the non-organized comunas close to one of the three 
large cities? One of a comuna with a small agricultural population, working for the 
greater part on family farms; a smaller section works on the relatively frequent large 
enterprises which are chiefly devoted to extensive cattle raising. The principal reason why 
the inquilinos and permanent wage workers are not organized is probably their physical 
isolation; small numbers on large cattle-raising estates. A possible supplementary reason 
is that they include a fairly large number of supervisors who are generally not attracted to 
syndicates. Finally INDAP evidently took less trouble to organize the wage earners in 
the vicinity of the large cities; there El Triunfo is less important than Ranquil. 
In the rural areas we obtain a similar picture of the non-organized comunas. Admitted-
ly the agrarian working population there is large, but the majority work on family farms. 
Among the wage workers the important category is that of the temporary labourers, who 
are difficult to organize (and who possibly originate from the small, inadequate minifun-
dia). Agriculture is backward, a factor which apparently accompanies physical isolation; 
the roads are bad. Many owners of large farming enterprises (who are the most inclined 
to appoint administrators to do their work) live on their ranches. This probably en-
courages both patronage and oppression; they oppose syndicalization. 
In general these pictures confirm the hypotheses mentioned in the previous chapter. 
We find for instance the influence of the following factors confirmed: 
- the development of agriculture; 
- the proximity of urban centres; 
- the difference between various categories of the agrarian population, depending upon 
their place in the production process; notably the difference between permanent and tem-
porary agricultural workers; 
- owner absenteeism; 
- the crucial role of the government. 
There proved to be one other important factor. It is partially implied in the first two 
mentioned but we ourselves have not referred to it before. The physical isolation of the 
peasants may explain why some places have a syndicate while others do not. 
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4.3 Correlations of the degree of organization 
For Chile as a whole the comparison between averages of different categories of com-
una, applied above, appeared more fruitful than the analysis of correlation coefficients 
between the degree of organization and the other variables. Table 6 contains a number of 
coefficients for various categories of Chilean comunas. 
The table shows that, for Chile as a whole as well as for the typically rural comunas, 
the degree of organization correlates with the relative significance of the various 
categories of the agrarian population. The more sharecropper-inquilinos, inquilinos and 
permanent labourers among the wage workers, the higher the degree of organization. 
This lessens as the percentage of temporary workers increases. Thus the temporary 
workers are indeed less inclined towards affiliation, or more difficult to organize, than 
those who have a permanent job on the farms. The percentage of extremely large farms 
(larger than 1000 ha) compared with all farms larger than 200 ha also correlates to some 
extent with the degree of organization. 
We have already encountered one reason for the scanty nature of the correlation 
coefficients. Some of the variables interweave and so conceal each other. Moreover, the 
Table 6. Correlation coefficients (Pearson r) between degree of organization and a number of 
characteristics of the agrarian structure, per comuna 
Variable 
(9) Producers and unpaid members of working 
population 
(10) Sharecroppers-inquilinos and inquilinos of 
working population 
(11) Sharecroppers-inquilinos and inquilinos of 
wage labour 
(12) Permanent labourers of working population 
(13) Permanent labourers of wage labour 
(14) Temporary labourers of working population 
(15) Temporary labourers of wage labour 
(18) Farms 0-2 ha of total farms 
(19) Farms 2-10 ha of total farms 
(20) Farms 10-SOna of total farms 
(21) Farms 50-200 ha of total farms 
(22) Farms 200-500 ha of total farms 
(23) Farms >500 ha of total farms 
(24) Farms 200-500 ha of farms >200 ha 
(25) Farms > 1000 ha of farms >200 ha 
(26) Land of farms with administrator of all 
farmland 
(27) Privately owned farms of total number of 
farms 
(28) Irrigated surface of total area cultivable 
land 
(29) Farming population of total in the comuna 
(31) Land treated with artificial fertilizer 
of total cultivable land 
(42) Number of hectares cultivable land per 
tractor 
Chile 
(N = 264) 
-0.12 
0.19 
0.27 
0.22 
0.24 
-0.09 
-0.36 
0.14 
0.03 
-0.12 
-0.04 
-0.05 
0.01 
-0.07 
0.19 
0.14 
-0.15 
0.02 
-0.08 
0.06 
-0.11 
Comunas 
close 
to large 
city 
(N = 30) 
0.04 
-0.01 
-0.11 
0.39 
0.64 
-0.32 
-0.45 
0.14 
—0.48 
0.13 
0.42 
0.28 
-0.04 
0.10 
-0.11 
-0.20 
-fl.03 
-0.26 
0.14 
-0.12 
-0.09 
Remaining 
comunas 
(N=234) 
-0.15 
0.24 
0.35 
0.21 
0.16 
-0.07 
-0.37 
0.15 
0.11 
-0.16 
-0.12 
-0.11 
0.02 
-0.11 
0.24 
0.22 
-0.17 
0.07 
-0.14 
0.12 
-0.14 
Typical 
rural 
comunas 
(N=121) 
-0.29 
0.45 
0.44 
0.30 
0.22 
-0.02 
-0.49 
0.38 
0.03 
-0.29 
-0.21 
-0.25 
-0.06 
-0.10 
0.33 
0.38 
-0.20 
0.23 
-0.25 
0.34 
-0.28 
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influence of certain variables may not be linear but curvilinear. Let us take for example the 
degree of agricultural development. We earlier found confirmation of our hypothesis that 
organization occurs wherever agriculture is more developed. We also discovered, 
however, that this relation did not hold good under all circumstances. From an 
agricultural viewpoint the unorganized comunas close to the three large cities were more 
advanced than the organized comunas in the more rural areas. Something similar occurs 
with regard to the presence of administrators (indicator for owner absenteeism). It was 
our hypothesis that the more administrators there were, the greater the chance of a syn-
dicate. This hypothesis was confirmed for those comunas some distance away from the 
city, but it also appeared that in the non-organized comunas close to a city the percentage 
of administrators is greater than in the organized comunas in the rural areas. 
Since the proximity of a city and the degree of urbanization of the various comunas 
seems to play such an important role that it obscures the link between other variables and 
the occurrence of a syndicate, we have set out separately in Table 6 the correlation 
coefficients between degree of organization and the remaining variables for the typically 
rural comunas. For these comunas the correlations with indicators for the development 
of agriculture, (nos. 28, 31, 42), for economic development (no. 29) and for owner 
absenteeism (no. 26) appear notably stronger than for Chile as a whole and in the direc-
tion we had suggested. For the categories of working population and wage labour the cor-
relations we discovered earlier are confirmed. The more family farms (and people 
working on them: nos. 9, 20, 21) the less organized the wage-workers. The more 
sharecroppers, inquilinos and permanent workers among the agrarian population, the 
more likely they are to be organized in syndicates. The more large farms (no. 25) the 
higher the degree of organization. Here too the presence of temporary labourers within 
the category of wage workers proves to correlate extremely negatively with the degree of 
organization. Our hypotheses are thus confirmed for the typically rural comunas. 
4.4 Multiple regression analysis to explain the degree of organization 
In order to gain more insight into the way in which the variables are connected, we 
have carried out both a multiple and a partial correlation analysis. The results for the 
three categories of comunas which preoccupied us earlier are gathered together in Table 
7. The analysis tabulates the independent variables according to the size of their partial 
correlation coefficient with the dependent variable. This means that the other independent 
variables are kept constant. This partial correlation coefficient is mentioned separately. 
The column 'Fraction explained' indicates the direct contribution of the variable in ques-
tion to explaining the variance of the dependent variable, in our case the degree of 
organization. In column R2 one should only pay attention to the bottom line which in-
dicates what percentage of the variance in the degree of organization is explained by the 
independent variables taken together. It is impossible to assess immediately from the 
column 'Fraction explained' the importance of the total contribution of a variable. A 
variable may contribute little directly but a great deal indirectly. Nor is it true simply to 
say that if variables (A and B for instance) are omitted by the programme because their 
partial correlation coefficient with the dependent variable is very small, then the 
hypothesis which postulated that they were important for the degree of organization is 
entirely incorrect. They may correlate strongly with another variable which has been 
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Table 7. Results of multiple and partial correlation calculations to explain the degree of 
organization in different categories of comuna. R2 is cumulating' squared multiple correlation , 
coefficient 
Variable 
Commas close to one of the 3 large cities 
(N=30) 
(13) Permanent labourers of wage labour 
(31) Artificially fertilized land of total cultivable 
land 
(25) Farms >1000 ha of total farms >200 ha 
(19) Farms2-10haoftotalfarms 
(29) Farming population of total comuna popu-
lation 
(26) Land under administrators of total farm land 
Commas not close to one of the 3 large cities 
(N=234) 
(11) Sharecroppers-inquilinos of wage labour 
(13) Permanent labourers of wage labour 
(19) Farms 2-10 ha of total farms 
(9) Producers and unpaid relatives of work-
ing population 
(25) Farms > 1000 ha oftotal farms >200 ha 
Typical rural comunas(N= 121) 
(15) Temporary labourers of wage labour 
(25) Farms > 1000 ha of total farms >200 ha 
(18) Farms 0-2 ha of total farms 
(29) Farming population of total comuna 
population 
(28) Irrigated surface of total cultivable land 
(31) Artificially fertilized land of total cul-
tivable land 
(22) Farms 200-500 ha of total farms 
R2 
0.40 
Partial 
correlation 
coefficient 
0.73 
0.42 
0.44 
0.55 
0.61 
0.69 
0.12 
0.18 
0.19 
0.25 
0.257 
0.23 
0.27 
0.36 
0.38 
0.39 
0.40 
0.44 
-0.49 
-0.45 
-0.51 
0.31 
0.46 
0.40 
0.27 
0.16 
-0.21 
0.10 
-0.39 
0.19 
0.19 
-0.21 
0.16 
0.15 
-0.24 
Fraction 
explained 
0.35 
0.09 
0.08 
0.11 
0.03 
0.08 
0.14 
0.06 
0.02 
0.03 
0.01 
0.10 
0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
0.04 
retained (for instance Z) and so provide no distinctive contribution. Had Z not been in-
cluded in the analysis, then A and B would occur among the variables retained. All this 
means that our lack of insight into the reasons for the link between the variables which 
define the agrarian structure may mislead us. It is possible that there not only seems to be, 
but must be, a link between let us say, irrigation, the occurrence of large farms, the 
relative preponderance of a particular category of the rural labour force and the presence 
of administrators. However, we have no theory to explain this, so that it is sometimes im-
possible to say why one variable is retained and another not. 
The table shows that in the three categories of comunas different percentages of the 
variance in the degree of organization are explained, namely, 69%, 26%, and 44%. This 
is not necessarily because in the countryside, unlike those areas close to the cities, other 
variables, not included in our research, have a role to play. A simpler explanation would 
be that the more comunas involved in our calculation, the greater the number of divergent 
findings and measurement errors. This is indeed so. It also appears that almost all the 
irregular, unexpected, percentages of the degree of organization concern deviations up-
wards. A lower degree of organization would be expected on the basis of the regression 
coefficients. 
In those comunas situated close to cities the following variables seem to contribute to 
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explain the variance in the degree of mobilization: the relative significance of permanent 
wage workers, owner absenteeism and the rural character. A negative contribution is 
provided by agricultural development, the presence of very large farms and of very small 
ones (probably horticultural). The more there are of these the less the degree of syndical 
organization. 
Less easy to interpret, however, are the negative signs for the partial coefficients of ar-
tificial fertilizer use and large farms. They may indicate either the presence of intensive 
horticulture or of intensive cattle breeding. 
In the other comunas an important factor is, once again, the relative preponderance of 
share-croppers, inquilinos and permanent workers in the totality of wage labour (and, 
negatively, the presence of independent peasants employing members of their own 
family). The occurrence of farms of between 2 and 10 hectares also plays a role, but one 
opposite to that in the 'urban' comunas. This time the relation with the degree of 
organization is positive. 
In the typically agrarian communities the relative significance of the temporary wage 
workers appears to be of great importance, as does both the occurrence of very large 
farms (> 1000 ha) and of very small ones (0-2 ha). Together, these variables may indicate 
the presence of the so-called latifundia-minifundia complex. The degree of urbanization 
also contributes as does the stage of agricultural development indicated by the use of ar-
tificial fertilizer. 
It must be pointed out that the variable making the most important direct contribution 
in the interpretation, the occurrence of temporary workers, must not simply be inter-
preted as meaning that the temporary workers did not wish to organize. It may well be 
that the syndicates, which were legally restricted in their operations to a single comuna, 
were thereby rendered unattractive to this category of worker. Although we run the risk 
of making a category-mistake, this interpretation is in line with that of various other 
authors. 
Despite the fact that only one variable was retained in all three of the calculations the 
data nonetheless show that the composition of the agrarian working population, the oc-
currence of really large farms, the degree of urbanization and the measure of agricultural 
development (indicated by the use of artificial fertilizer) provide the most important clues 
in explaining the variance in the degree of organization. They explain between 30% and 
70%. 
We can leave aside the variables with regard to the composition of the labour force and 
the farm size distribution in order to see more clearly the role played by the remaining 
variables. These relate to the significance of: 
the occurrence of very large farms (Variable 25) 
the occurrence of administrators (Variable 26) 
the occurrence of irrigation (Variable 28) 
the rural nature of the comunas (Variable 29) 
the significance of permanent crops (Variable 30) 
the occurrence of tractors (Variable 31) 
productivity per hectare compared with the rest of the province (Variable 32) 
Using only these variables a multiple correlation analysis was done for different 
categories of comunas with the degree of organization as the variable to be explained. 
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Table 8. Results of multiple and partial correlation calculations with selected independent 
variables to explain the degree of organization of different categories of comuna. R2 is cumulating 
squared multiple correlation coefficient 
Variable 
Allcomunas(N = 264) 
(25) the occurrence of very large farms 
(31) the occurrence of tractors 
(28) the occurrence of irrigation 
Allcomunas(N=256)1 
(25) The occurrence of very large farms 
(31) The occurrence of tractors 
(28) The occurrence of irrigation 
(26) The occurrence of administrators 
R2 
0.03 
0.04 
0.05 
0.06 
0.09 
0.10 
0.11 
(32) Productivity per ha compared with the 
rest of the province 0.13 
Fraction 
explained 
0.04 
0.01 
0.01 
0.04 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
0.21 
0.12 
-0.10 
0.21 
0.15 
-0.13 
0.12 
0.11 
Comunas near a city (N = 30) 
(28) The occurrence of irrigation 
Comunas not near a city (N = 234) 
(25) The occurrence of very large farms 
(31) The occurrence of tractors 
(29) The rural nature of the comunas 
Typical rural comunas (N= 121) 
(25) The occurrence of very large farms 
(29) The rural nature of the comuaas 
(31) The occurrence of tractors 
Typical rural comunas (N = 118)1 
(25) The occurrence of very large farms 
(31) The occurrence of tractors 
(29) The rural nature of the comunas 
0.07 0.07 -0.27 
0.06 
0.07 
0.08 
0.10 
0.20 
0.27 
0.18 
0.35 
0.38 
0.05 
0.01 
0.01 
0.12 
0.06 
0.07 
0.18 
0.14 
0.03 
0.23 
0.10 
-0.11 
0.37 
-0.29 
0.30 
0.48 
0.42 
-0.22 
1 Excluded are those comunas, in which it appears that 100% or more of the wage labourers 
are organized; in other words those comunas in which some of the self-employed have most 
probably also become members of the syndicate. 
The results are given in Table 8. 
This table, which must be considered in conjunction with Table 7, reveals a number of 
facts. It appears that the variables relating to the composition of the working population 
and the distribution of property do indeed provide an important contribution of their own 
in explaining the variance in the degree of organization; the explained percentages in 
Table 8 are significantly lower. This does not mean, however, that the variables relating 
to the modernity of the agricultural methods have no role at all to play; they also, con-
tribute, albeit to a lesser degree. 
It is also evident that the few strongly divergent observation results (i.e. comunas in 
which the wage labour appears 100% organized) detract sharply from the explanatory 
value of the variables. The elimination of only 8 divergent communities out of the 264 
doubled the percentage of variance explained and also restored the explanatory role of a 
couple of the variables which had dropped out when the divergent results were retained. 
Even with the typically rural comunas the effect of removing only three divergent results 
was considerable. 
With regard to the 30 comunas situated close to a city it must be observed that in the 
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first instance the explanatory variables, taken together, explained 28 % of the variation. 
They were, however, successively eliminated as having a (too) low T-value. This proves 
that in these comunas there is a fairly capricious interplay of very many factors. 
The explanatory variables function best in the typically rural comunas. Most impor-
tant are the degree of urbanization, the occurrence of large farms and of tractors. 
4.5 Conclusion 
All in all the statistical processing of the material indicates strongly that the social-
economic development of the comuna itself and of agriculture within the comuna, the ex-
tent of urbanization, the occurrence of very large farms and, occasionally, owner 
absenteeism, influence the degree of organization. Also, the workers for whom it makes 
sense to organize should not be merely a small minority of the agrarian population. Given 
the incomplete nature of the figures and indicators I am inclined to view the quantitative 
results as confirming at least part of the theory presented in the previous chapter. 
The results also have an important bearing upon a very topical question. Does 
agricultural development hinder or promote a structural revolution in the rural areas of 
the developing countries? For Chile it would seem that development encouraged peasant 
mobilization. This, however, may also be partly attributed to the fact that the law gover-
ning syndicalization made it difficult for the temporary workers to organize. It is less easy 
for them to 'get tough' in the couple of months they spend working for an owner. Having 
conceded this much, however, I still believe that population pressure on the land and the 
emergence of a temporary agricultural proletarian work force are not sufficient to ensure 
mobilization. It would seem that this occurs only after a certain stage of development has 
been reached. 
Notes 
1 According to the data published in March 1970 by the Fondo de Educacion y Extension Sin-
dical of the Ministry of Labour. 
2 The comunas situated in the three most northerly provinces, as well as eight comunas 
belonging to the conglomeration Gran Santiago were not taken into consideration since 
agriculture is found there rarely or not at all. The most northern province for our purposes was, 
therefore, Coquimbo. 
3 I am grateful to C. W. M. de Ranitz, H. van de Belt, P. Spijkers and Mineke de Regt for their 
patient and meticulous computation of the data. 
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Chapter 5 Mobilization with no local opponent: the small independent 
peasants and their co-operative 
5.1 Introduction 
In the model reproduced in Chapter 3, peasant communities were distinguished accor-
ding to the local distribution of land. There are peasant communities in Latin America 
where the land is more or less equally divided (situation A) or where, although the alloca-
tion is unequal, the large majority of the population owns some land (situation B). 
In such situations many of the peasants may well be poor, but there is mostly no ques-
tion of a direct, local opponent. In other words their poverty does not simply result from 
another member of the community's directly appropriating whatever surplus they 
produce. 
In such situations too it seems advisable to promote co-operation as soon as the desire 
for better living conditions begins to become general. In other words, the peasants seem 
ripe for mobilization towards the achievement of a shared goal, the improvement of their 
standard of living. The most suitable organization for this purpose is probably the co-
operative, for the main interests of peasants in such situations are those of small but in-
dependent agrarian producers. The co-operative may serve two purposes: provide 
countervailing power on the market for agricultural products and confer advantages of 
scale in purchasing inputs or in utilizing machinery. This would in effect be mobilization 
on the basis of a particular interest, that of the producers, in order to achieve a particular 
form of collaboration, the co-operative. 
It must be made clear from the start that modern forms of co-operation in the field of 
production cannot be introduced without a radical change of values on the part of the in-
dependent peasant producer. At the level of economic development attained by the com-
munities under discussion here, the family is the most important productive and con-
sumer unit, in short the most important social unit for the peasant. His whole life-style 
and methods of work are adapted to that unit. It is thus not surprising that, with this 
frame of reference, these values, he will tend to reject a production structure whjch does 
not start from the family as the principal social unit, but rather from the local peasant 
communty. I shall return to this problem later. I mention this in order to explain why the 
co-operatives to which these peasants belong are nearly always service co-operatives. We 
shall thus confine ourselves for the present to that form of mobilization aimed at setting 
up a service co-operative. Two cases will be distinguished, the spontaneous and the 
induced. 
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5.2 The spontaneous setting up of co-operatives 
At the level of agricultural development where most of the peasants still produce main-
ly for their own consumption, selling only a surplus, co-operation is needed, but not a co-
operative. In such circumstances traditional forms of co-operation may be found, such as 
mutual help when labour is short, or in building a house, or, occasionally, in times of 
sickness. 
It would be mistaken to assume that the survival of such customs automatically im-
plies that the peasants would welcome a co-operative, a formal new association. The need 
for a formal organization like a co-operative only makes itself felt at a higher level of 
agricultural development or among peasants who have already attained that higher level 
on their farms. The course of events in Chile illustrates this quite clearly. In 1970 this 
country possessed two kinds of agricultural co-operatives. One of these, the cooperativa 
agricola whose members consisted mainly of the larger farmers, those with, say, 40,80 or 
150 hectares of irrigated land, was usually founded by the farmers themselves and was 
economically prosperous. The government, however, had usually initiated the other kind, 
the cooperativa campesina, intended for the small farmers, and mostly in a very weak 
economic position. I came across another instance during my research in an agricultural 
settlement in Brazil. After two attempts by a state institution to set up a co-operative had 
failed, it was precisely the larger farmers and aspiring landowners who wished to venture 
a third attempt (Galjart, 1968, p. 105). 
It is hardly surprising to find that the peasants who feel the need for a co-operative are 
those whose farms have attained a certain stage of development. They purchase more 
means of production, they produce greater quantities and thus have more to sell and 
more interest in good market outlets. They are beginning to use machines which could be 
bought by the co-operative and hired out to them. In short, they begin to feel the need for 
an institution which would be advantageous to them in buying, selling and in various 
stages of the production process. These more modern peasants are often those with the 
larger holdings. It may also be, of course, that the spontaneous setting up of a co-
operative is induced after all by the advantages, fiscal and otherwise, promised to co-
operatives by the government in order to promote the movement. Advantages of this sort 
are naturally more interesting for the larger peasant producers. In fact a co-operative 
may sometimes be nothing more than a concealed firm belonging to a handful of large 
producers. 
If the large producers decide to set up a co-operative the (small) peasants in the district 
may join, but their membership will be to some extent marginal. Quantitatively or 
qualitatively, the co-operative provides them with fewer services. Since the organization 
supplies a recognized need, and most of the founders dispose of some capital, a spon-
taneous co-operative like this often succeeds in building up capital, expanding the ser-
vices provided and realizing its aim of providing countervailing power and scale 
advantages. 
5.3 The induced co-operative 
The position is entirely different in those agrarian communities which are as yet com-
paratively undeveloped. As we have pointed out these will be familiar with other forms of 
56 
co-operation, but there wil usually be no need for a co-operative as such. However, this 
need is felt by the government, the planners, or other outsiders who would like to see the 
community develop. We shall deal later with the ideals and expectations, often implicit, 
which frequently motivate such outsiders. Suffice it to say that everywhere in the third 
world the co-operative is seized upon by governments and other developers as an institu-
tion which might contribute to agricultural development. In other words the local co-
operative is usually founded by agencies or individuals who are themselves products of a 
system which embraces the community. At the very least they take the initiative and in-
sistently urge the local population to set up such an association. In 'ideal-typical' terms 
this process of induced mobilization and association displays the following 
characteristics : 
1. A government agency or an individual with local influence (such as the local priest), 
convinced of the great utility of a co-operative discusses the idea with local peasants and, 
once interest has been aroused, seeks local, informal leaders to call the peasants together 
and persuade them to set up a co-operative. 
2. Although, comparing their standard of living with that of the urban middle classes, all 
peasants are poor, there are always local differences. One is poorer than the other and has 
less land. It will therefore be the larger, somewhat better off, more modern and more 
productive peasants who will show the most interest and be the first to join up.1 These 
peasants too will usually be elected to the administrative positions. There are a number of 
explanations for the dominant role they soon begin to play in the induced co-operatives. 
- They are better able to bear the initial sacrifice which membership entails. 
- As we have already observed with regard to the spontaneous co-operatives, it is the 
somewhat larger peasant farmers who will benefit most from the services offered by the 
co-operative. 
- A government inspired co-operative is usually accompanied by the extension of a cer-
tain amount of credit. The somewhat larger, more innovative peasant producers are 
better able to avail of this and are more willing and able to take the risks which inevitably 
accompany the application of new methods. 
- In a later phase, once the co-operative has been started, the allocation of further credit 
is often particularistic in a country where funds are insufficient to extend credit to every 
poor peasant. It is thus very important for every co-operative to have established good 
relationships, or otherwise be able to influence this allocation to the advantage of its own 
members. This is where patronage rears its head, in the form of brokerage. It is precisely 
the larger peasants in the community who possess the largest number or the best channels 
of communication with the allocating government agencies. This fact - and the realiza-
tion among the members that such channels are essential if credit is to be obtained - is 
reason enough for electing precisely these larger peasants to the committee of the co-
operative. 
- Another reason is that the larger peasants also maintain more local patronage 
relationships, have dispensed more favours and are better able to mobilize the members' 
votes. 
- Such peasants often find posts in the committee for the simple reason that - as an 
after-effect of the principles of Rochdale and since the co-operative is usually poor- such 
work is not remunerated. Accordingly committee members must have time to spare, or to 
put it another way, have a sufficiently high income not to have to work all day and every day. 
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3. As we have already pointed out, the co-operative will often concentrate on those ser-
vices which are of most interest to the somewhat larger peasants. This is not only because 
they themselves, as members of the committee, will tend to identify their own problems 
with those of under-developed local agriculture in general. In fact the whole view of 
agricultural development underlying the setting up of such co-operatives is a technical 
one. The solution is sought in increased production and productivity. Generally speaking 
the co-operatives are in a bad position to fulfil one of the services eagerly desired by the 
smaller peasants, namely the provision of cheap consumer goods. Insufficient capital 
prevents them from supplying such goods on credit as the local shopkeeper is able to do. 
Any attempt to provide this service will probably result in financial disaster - assisted by 
the almost ever present inflation. 
4. Those peasants who become members of an induced co-operative are, generally, too 
poor to provide their organization with a working capital of any great size. The co-
operative thus remains dependent upon government credit, which as we have already 
mentioned is extended in a rather particularistic manner and for which patronage 
channels - and leaders possessing such channels - usually remain necessary. 
5. Large loans are not infrequently granted on the basis of projects and plans into which 
too little research has been done. A crop is recommended and sown and does badly. A 
machine is bought and proves to cost far too much to run. A limiting factor which is 
almost always underestimated is the management capacity of the committee members or 
limited staff of the co-operative, or of the peasants themselves. After only a few years the 
book-keeping is in such a muddle that it is impossible to tell whether money is being 
embezzled or not. Naturally this provides much food for suspicion and scandal. The ac-
tivities undertaken by the co-operative are often so badly managed and organized that it 
works at a loss instead of showing the expected profit. The paradoxical situation occurs 
that a person with sufficient qualities to run such an induced co-operative is expected to 
do so for a low salary whereas if he worked for himself he would probably be quite well off 
in a couple of years. (Two of my Chilean informants, officials of INDAP, whom I con-
sidered to be among the best, the most well-intentioned and the most capable of my 
Chilean acquaintances, confessed that when a few years ago the co-operatives they were 
assisting received large government loans 'we simply began to produce. We didn't worry 
about whether our projects would pay or not. We weren't even aware of the problem.' In 
1970, however, it was only supplementary credit from the government which saved the 
communal poultry enterprises initiated by the peasants, although they continued to make 
a loss and failed even to recover their running costs). The results achieved by a co-
operative or its members with the capital credit extended to them are crucial for the 
further course of events within the co-operative. If it succeeds in making a profit and in 
transforming credit into capital, then the co-operative acquires greater financial elbow 
room and has, moreover, discovered an activity capable of exploitation by the manage-
ment quality at its disposal. 
6. The phenomena mentioned under point 5 explain why, in so very many cases, the 
credit extended by the government is not earned back by the peasants and cannot, accor-
dingly, be paid back. The government, which does not disposé of unlimited funds and 
which, in^4 democracy, is also convinced that there is more political advantage and 
prestige to be gained by embarking on a brand new project elsewhere rather than by 
laboriously rehabilitating one which may have been started by a previous government, 
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pimply cuts off credit. 
7. It is extremely likely that, once the supply of credit from the government dries up, the 
co-operative will, to all intents add purposes, cease to exist The members who joined, not 
so much because they felt such a need for a co-operative but often in the anticipation of 
receiving considerable credit, begin to lose interest and to drift away. The suspicion and 
gossip, the mutual recriminations have, in the meantime, undermined relationships with-
in the community. Committee members depart and are replaced by people less able. On 
passing through the district five years later, the observer can often detect no trace of the 
large amounts of credit dispensed, which must have been spent on something, let alone of 
the co-operative. 
5.4 The implicit ideology 
We have described, in ideal-typical terms, how a spontaneous and an induced co-
operative respectively can originate and, sometimes, vanish again. We had the service co-
operative in mind, not the production type, since the latter can only develop under com-
pletely different conditions. One might wonder why a government, planners or other 
experts in the field of agriculture undertake projects which so often seem destined to fail. 
The reason, it seems to me, is that these experts and the government in question cherish 
all kinds of notions and expectations which are, in fact, incorrect. 
In the first place, the reality is often lost sight ofthat a co-operative only satisfies the 
peasants' needs after they have reached a certain stage of development. Yet a co-
operative is induced at an earlier stage because it is expected to provide something which 
is really beyond its capabilities. It is expected to bring about a local economic develop-
ment which will benefit all the peasants. But even if the co-operative is a roaring success 
from the economic point of view, the agricultural development to which it contributes will 
merely serve to increase the inequality between peasants. The better peasant farmers 
(which often means, unfortunately, the originally better-off farmers, those with a little 
more land, a trifle higher income, more education, more contacts with urban culture) out-
distance their less successful colleagues in income, status and eventually, in the size of 
their holdings. Not only does the service co-operative not hamper this process, it even en-
courages it. Thus a government frequently expects of such co-operatives results which do 
not correspond at all with those actually achieved, that is, if the co-operative does not fail 
completely. In all probability governments continue to cling to these expectations 
because they accord with the preference, frequently cherished by western experts, for 
family farms. They also accord with the values held by the majority of the independent 
peasants in the developing country itself. In addition, they help gloss over the problem of 
the productive organization. The expectations thus add up to an ideology, but are in fact 
incorrect The only form of co-operative which prevents the growth of social and 
economic inequality in agricultural development, and then only within each group, is the 
production co-operative. It will be clear that the inducing of such co-operatives must be 
based upon a political decision taken at national level. It also implies that the peasants 
must be convinced that tins is their only way of achieving a higher standard of living. The 
setting up of a co-operative must therefore be preceded or accompanied by a radical in-
doctrination process. It is often found that even in situation A, where levelling 
mechanisms exist and are accepted, this does not automatically imply the acceptance of 
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equality as a value in a new production organization, or the acceptance of a new hvlling 
mechanism. In this respect there is no room for any of the naïveté such as that displayed 
by, for instance, Fais Borda in his introduction to the studies on Latin-American Co-
operatives by Pugh et al. (1970). 
Some people (Stavenhagen, 1966 for instance) state that co-operative agricultural 
enterprises cannot even survive in an economy where other sectors consist of individually 
owned enterprises. I think that they can, provided that the co-operative farm helps to 
achieve another, justified value of the peasants', namely a higher standard of living, and 
does so more efficiently than would a farm of their own. This at least was one of the con-
clusions I arrived at during my research in Chile. Those of my Chilean colleagues who 
were primarily interested in the social consequences of the new peasant organizations 
that aimed at co-operative production, and who considered the economic consequences 
to be of lesser importance, were to my mind in error. They ignored, as it were, the fact that 
the peasants' motives in joining such an organization sprang from their desire to realize a 
traditional value - namely, a higher income. In other words, the economic results of the 
organization determined the peasants' inclination to work for it. 
It is interesting to note that in Tanzania too, another country where the government is 
seriously involved in persuading the peasants to join collective agricultural enterprises, 
there is much uncertainty with regard to the arguments which might persuade the 
peasants to mobilize. Conferences and seminars are arranged to discuss this question, but 
it remains a problem. The situation in Tanzania is not such that the peasants can be 
mobilized everywhere on the basis of class differences with any chance of success. This 
renders the situation all the more interesting, since the mobilisers are, as it were, seeking 
for what Lamond Tulis (1970) calls a 'structural bind',2 a constraint that enforces unity. 
In Chile, up to 1970, the most that could be found were tentative approaches to an 
ideology of co-operation; in the official and internal publications of INDAP for example, 
and among certain of its officials. At the outset INDAP had encouraged the small 
peasants to unite in neighbourhood committees; credit was then extended via these com-
mittees. It was only later, in 1968, that various neighbourhood committees were banded 
together into municipal and sometimes regional co-operatives. Table 9 gives some idea of 
the increase in the number of co-operatives. 
Of the co-operatives in existence in December 1969, roughly 60% had less than 100 
members and 20% more than 200. 
There seemed to be several reasons why no clear ideology developed during the Frei 
period. Within the circles of the Christian-Democrats themselves opinions were divided 
on whether the small peasants ought to be integrated into the 'large' agricultural-
economic system or whether a small-peasant economy ought to be created. This would 
Table 9. Growth of small peasant co-operatives in Chile 1964-1969. Number of incorpor-
ated co-operatives (Cooperativas campesinas) 
Year 
Number of co-operatives 
Number of members 
1964 
26 
1718 
1965 
43 
3204 
1966 
84 
7802 
1967 
123 
11452 
1968 
171 
18456 
1969 
222 
30034 
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involve forms of collective production with a vertical integration giving them their own 
supply firms, and selling organizations - in other words, their own market This division 
also seemed to be linked with the fact that few people had any clear idea of bow to set 
about organizing any of this. The peasants themselves were chiefly interested in 
economic improvements. In 1969 admittedly they had demanded land at practically 
every provincial congress, but only in the odd case did any individual co-operative exer-
cise pressure on the government to expropriate a particular large farm. Until September 
1970 at least it was only sporadically that a farm was indeed expropriated in favour of a 
co-operative. This mostly occurred in those provinces in which the leaders of the federa-
tion of co-operatives were most class-conscious, most convinced of the existence of a 
structural bind. By carrying out practically no expropriation in favour of the small, in-
dependent peasants, the government missed its chance to mobilize them in terms of this 
unifying constraint. This meant too that the co-operatives were more dependent upon 
government projects and credit than they might otherwise have been had they disposed of 
their own land. A further result was that the value of participation, of the peasants having 
a say in their own future, remained an empty slogan. 
The most serious attempt - alongside some of the large projects - to achieve collective 
forms of production, was the issue of capital loans to smaller or larger groups, from 3 to 
10 or more peasants. These groups were usually formed by co-option. Mostly the group 
ran a pig or chicken farm together, with each member having his own little farm on the 
side. Production groups with land, however, also occurred. The impression I retained 
after visiting such groups was that their cohesion and viability depended upon economic 
results. I shall discuss this point in more detail in the chapter on solidarity. 
At this point it seems to me worthwhile to fill out what has already been said concer-
ning the significance of leadership and management capacity and the chance of failure 
with a very detailed description of one particular case. Such descriptions are seldom 
given in sociological literature. Authors are usually satisfied with a brief summing up of 
factors which are supposed to explain why the project, or the co-operative as a whole, 
failed. Such a resumé, however, does not sufficiently impress upon the reader how closely 
these explanatory factors are connected and how slight is a project's chance of success in 
a developing country. To my mind this particular case has so many ideal-typical 
characteristics that it is well suited to serve as an illustration. It is certainly not a case 
which makes it easy for me to bolster up the assertions I have so far made. Chile was one 
of the most developed countries of Latin America; the Frei government was 
characterized by considerable sympathy for the peasants, and by honest attempts to 
assist their progress, while the technical standard of the Chilean official was no lower 
than that of officials elsewhere on the continent, on the contrary. 
5.5 Case description 
Our case concerns the regional cooperativa campesina of Calle Larga (pseudonym) 
which comprises several neighbourhood communities and lies under the smoke of a large 
city. 
In 1966 a comparatively low ranking local official of INDAP came up with the idea of 
extending a large loan .to the market-gardeners in the region. This would enable them to 
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equip and organize a horticultural auction mart, which could serve as an alternative to 
the central market. This was situated in the large city, and dominated by large traders 
who exploited the market gardeners. (It is ideal-typical that the project was the brain-child 
of a local, comparatively low-ranking official). At this time the peasants were not even 
organized in a regional co-operative, but were scattered in small local, independent com-
mittees. For this reason a co-operative was first set up, before the loan was applied for. It 
was granted three years later, in September 1969. It was a large loan of 1$ million escudos 
(rather more than £61,000). Both the provincial INDAP office and the local bureau ap-
pointed officials to get the project underway, certainly seven people in all. The team was 
headed by an agronomist. 
During all this time the co-operative had been idle. About 200 peasants were by that 
time affiliated, but practically the only activity was the almost weekly meeting of the 
board which was sometimes attended by the delegates from the local committees. For 
almost two whole years the members of the board had met and tried to expedite the loan, 
without receiving anything in return. For this, thought INDAP, they deserved every 
credit. The chairman's capabilities were viewed with a more jaundiced eye - it was 
always the vice-chairman, for example, who took charge of the meetings while the chair-
man remained a bashful and silent spectator. When the chairman of the co-operative 
wished to appoint as business manager a woman who was a good friend of his, someone 
from INDAP made a counter proposal. After a fairly heated discussion - for the com-
mittee members regarded the proposal as a piece of authoritarian intervention on the part 
of INDAP - it was agreed to organize a sort of exam for those who wished to be con-
sidered for the paid post of business manager of the co-operative. This exam was in fact 
held in October or November of 1969. A member of the board and INDAP officials were 
there as invigilators, from 10 in the morning until 5 in the afternoon. Nine candidates had 
applied, including one delegate from a local committee of the co-operative. When, at 5 in 
the afternoon, the board member was already in the bus homeward bound, a tenth can-
didate suddenly made his appearance. He was from outside the city, had spent most of 
the day travelling and hadn't been able to get there any sooner. The INDAP officials 
decided that he too should be allowed to sit for the exam. He proved to head the list and 
the leader of the project wanted to appoint him. At the meeting which was to decide on 
the appointment of the manager the board members were extremely indignant over this 
state of affairs. They wanted no part of the man who had done best in the exam; they 
didn't know him. (This common standpoint had required some preparation. The one 
board member who had helped invigilate and felt extremely put out by the course events 
had taken, had called a secret board meeting - members of INDAP not admitted - and 
had won over the other members to his point of view.) For the sake of peace a decision 
was postponed; anyway the co-operative hadn't yet received any money from INDAP 
and could hardly pay a manager from an empty coffer. Meanwhile, in a number of 
meetings with the board and the delegates of the local committees, the INDAP officials 
had revealed the economic planning behind the project. There was a heated discussion 
about whether the co-operative ought indeed to deduct 16% of the product price for 
expenses. For produce brought to the central market one only paid 1\\% plus carriage, it 
was said. According to some of those present this difference meant that the peasants 
wouldn't deliver to the co-operative. The project estimated that the market-gardener 
members would deliver 35 % of their crop to the co-operative in the first year, 50% the se-
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cond year, 80% the third year and 100% the fourth year. 
Few of those present were impressed by the argument that in this way they would build 
up the capital of their co-operative. If I die, said one of them, all my wife gets is my 
original investment plus 7 % interest a year. In other words they would not be able to cash 
in on the capital growth. He didn't believe either that the co-operative would be able to 
obtain more for first class produce than was offered on the central market, evert if it 
managed to obtain contracts with the large supermarkets in the city. He had sold to one 
of these enterprises from time to time and had never received more than the average 
market price. 
Some did appreciate the argument that the co-operative might be able to use its capital 
to buy land for the members (urbanization in the region was progressing so rapidly that 
many members were in danger of losing their land and some had already lost part of it). 
Another member, though, didn't want the co-operative to plough back its profits into 
land, but would have preferred an expansion of the co-operative itself. (This suggestion 
came from someone who, before the Frei government, had benefitted by a local land 
reform carried out by the Catholic church). 
No decisions were ever arrived at after such discussions; the meeting dispersed, the 
peasants thinking that INDAP would surely fix everything, the INDAP people worried 
by the egotism of the peasants. In October INDAP organized a two day course for the 
board members of the co-operative. Here too the same points came up for discussion and 
here too the peasants only partly understood the aim of the project, while the officials 
failed to realize that their explanation was falling short on some points. With regard to 
that 16 % for expenses, for instance, INDAP stated that this was not a definite figure; if 
the peasants would deliver more than the expected quantities of produce, it could be lower 
(on a larger turnover). Nobody pointed out that it would not be known until the end of the 
year whether or not the peasants had delivered more than 35 % of their crop, and that the 
16 % regulation would have to be retained for that year at least. Nevertheless these days -
spent in Vina del Mar - were characterized by a certain cameraderie and solidarity 
among the participants. 
Meanwhile, in October 1969, a large plot of land close to the city had been purchased. 
On it stood three long, but low, stone hen houses and also a large two-storeyed building, 
constructed entirely of stone, which resembled an engineering works. A civil engineer 
belonging to INDAP drew up plans of the alterations which would be necessary to con-
vert the building into a covered market for receiving, sorting, packing and expediting 
market garden produce. Before the alterations had even begun a television team arrived 
from the city to film the event and give an account of the project. The agronomist in 
charge spent an entire morning leading them round. 
As the board members had expected - although during a meeting with the INDAP 
people, who deplored their pessimism, they had finished up by offering their own services 
for the reconstruction job - the enthusiasm of the members, at least for helping with the 
alteration work, was not great. A few turned up during the first few weeks, on Saturdays 
and Sundays, but this was about all. Then, one fine day the co-operative started to pay 
those who showed up regularly for their work. The board had apparently decided, 
without informing INDAP, not to pay the volunteers IS escudos in cash but to deduct 
this amount from their debt to the co-operative (few of the members had paid their admis-
sion dues in full). Students from the city also offered to help. This help was accepted at a 
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meeting pregnant with political suspicion. Election time was coming up and the INDAP 
people were convinced that the students' main aim was to canvas within the co-operative. 
To the best of my knowledge they came only twice, both times on a Saturday. 
A number of contractors were now engaged; one laid the water main - toilets were 
needed, among other things - while another put in the electricity. In January 1970 the co-
operative received a brand-new truck, although as yet there was nothing they could use it 
for. It may have been this which inspired one of the lower, local INDAP officials, until the 
matter of reconstruction was finally settled, to propose to set up a sale-room for market-
garden produce in a new suburb nearby. (The mayor had in fact already discussed this 
idea with the chairman of the co-operative.) If the municipality would let them have a 
piece of ground they could easily knock up an auction hall with the wood they already 
had plus a quantity of other material. (I was later informed that they were thinking in 
terms of 'three bags of cement and a kilo of nails'.) No sooner said than done. The 
municipality gave them the land. I do not know at what precise moment the leader of the 
project was informed of these plans; in any case, he should have been aware of them. 
While the alterations to the market hall ground to a halt, a bout of feverish activity was 
unleashed on the sale-room in the suburb. But, three months later, 28,000 escudos had 
already been spent on material for this enterprise which was supposed to cost almost 
nothing, and even then it wasn't completely finished. One reason for this was that the 
municipality - under the smoke of the great city, itself for the greater part urban - laid 
down certain requirements regarding the hygienic conditions of such a sale room. There 
was the additional factor that none of the members had any building experience. 
In the midst of all this activity - in which the local INDAP personnel, three people in 
all, were daily and indeed very actively involved - a conflict broke out between the 
provincial INDAP authorities and these three. Two of them were suddenly transferred; 
the third remained in Calle Larga but was requested to have no more dealings with the co-
operative. The reasons behind all this were complex in the extreme. One of the three had 
long ago incurred the displeasure of a powerful bigwig of INDAP in the province, who 
was linked with the PDC. His transfer had already been requested earlier but had been 
held up by the provincial director of INDAP who in his turn disliked the party man. One 
of the others, the one who had been allowed to remain in Calle Larga, was thought to be 
mixed up in politics. He was suspected of working for MAPU, the break-away ex-left 
wing of the Partido Democrata Cristiano. (In INDAP itself people were increasingly in-
clined to think in party political terms. Scarcely any attempt was made now to conceal 
the fact that one of the aims of the agency was to ensure Tomic's victory in the September 
1970 elections. They were not yet openly canvassing for Tomic, but within the agency a 
start had been made on the muzzling of officials who were known or suspected to be anti-
Tomic.) The blame for embarking on the sale-room project was laid at the door of the 
third official. 
These three, who seemed to form a close-knit team, were also accused of criticizing the 
provincial INDAP people for mismanaging the project. They had complained too that 
the loan was doled out in dribs and drabs so that on one occasion there hadn't been 
enough money to pay the workmen. They had wanted nothing more to do with the local 
head of INDAP who, in his turn, was suspicious of his subordinates' insistence on a 
change in the board of the co-operative. He regarded it as a political manoeuvre in order 
to substitute kindred spirits. Their departure was a blow to the peasants - that is to say, 
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the board of the co-operätive. Harsh words were exchanged at the next meeting with the 
leader of the project. Evep then it was not made clear who was now in charge: INDAP or 
the co-operative which had received the loan. Although the members of the board had 
switched jobs - the chairman had become acting manager of the co-operative and also 
drove the truck, for which he received 1800 escudos per month; the vice-chairman had 
been made chairman; the secretary had been dismissed for not attending meetings and 
replaced by an acting board member (a suplente) - this had done nothing to improve their 
shilly-shallying and lack of expertise. INDAP would have liked to have seen them all 
replaced, but this was not legally possible until the general meeting had approved the 
balance sheets for the past two years. These balance sheets, however, had still to be made 
up and passed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs . . . 
(The situation seemed almost nightmarish to an outsider who happened to be a 
sociologist. I found it unbelievable, for instance, that in all those months it had not been 
established who was in charge and that the agronomist from INDAP, who put in an 
appearance once or twice a week, could carry on as though merely a few trifling 
difficulties were involved. Yet the peasants too persisted in their role; they too professed 
not to see that the project was beyond them. If the chairman of the control commission of 
the co-operative, Don Lucho, whose carping voice was heard at almost every meeting, 
stated in plain terms that the management was incompetent, the members took this 
criticism personally, lost their tempers and simply threatened to resign. Constructive 
criticism in the sense of discussing how a thing should be done and who should do it, was 
almost impossible. No agenda was ever drawn up for the meetings; it was more a perma-
nent question and answer session. This tended to mean that, before one subject had been 
properly discussed, people had already passed on to the next.) 
At around this time, the INDAP project leader, the agronomist, went abroad for six 
weeks. (The curtain had already fallen when he returned, but this doesn't seem to have 
caused him any trouble; his failure degenerated into a quarrel between his direct boss and 
the provincial director of INDAP.) He was replaced by a young book-keeper. This man 
and the official in charge of social affairs had the courage to raise the alarm, thus com-
pelling the highest INDAP officials in the province to come to a decision. Although as 
late as March 1970 yet another investigation commission from the national INDAP 
office had returned home satisfied, after a visit to the co-operative, now, scarcely a month 
later, the details had to be scrutinized. It appeared that the unauthorized saleroom had 
already cost 28,000 escudos, and was going to cost more. It appeared that the truck, 
which had cost nearly 100,000 escudos, had hardly earned a penny in four months. It 
appeared that not one of the board members knew how much credit, in cash, the co-
operative had so far received from INDAP (around 130,000 escudos). Meanwhile the co-
operative had begun selling in the new suburb. The results were hardly spectacular, just 
sufficient to pay the salary of the salesman appointed by the co-operative, although this 
was hard to work out exactly. The manager worked with one big cashbox, from which he 
took money when he went to buy produce, returning to it in the evening whatever was left, 
plus the proceeds of the sale-room. Yet even at the meeting where all this emerged the 
board insisted at the end that they alone, without the INDAP people, would decide what 
was to be done. 
They managed to keep things going for a time and at a later meeting even converted the 
highest INDAP officers in the province to the extent that they began to blame themselves, 
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and each other, for the failure. The oddest rumours circulated at the INDAP office in the 
city. It was said, for instance, that the provincial director belonged to an opposition party 
and had been ordered to sabotage the project. Every rumour seemed reasonable, evident-
ly, in the rarefied political atmosphere ofthat early summer of 1970; besides, it was an 
excellent means of obscuring where the real responsibility lay. The co-operative ap-
pointed a new manager, who even drew up an alternative project, i.e. that the co-
operative should start a mixing installation for cattle fodder and should trade in non-
perishable agrarian products. 
But INDAP had washed its hands of the whole idea. No more credit was extended and 
in July 1970 the plot, with the market building still only party reconstructed, was rented 
to a metal construction firm. The suburban saleroom was still functioning but the 
purchases for this were made in, of all places, the city, at the central market. The quan-
tities sold were too small to interest the market-gardening members. In August the co-
operative was still employing seven men, but was no longer able to pay their salaries 
(11,000 escudos per month). The end was near. 
5.6 Postscript 
It appears much more difficult to mobilize small peasants who do not have to cope with 
a common local opponent than to organize those who do. With the latter, the purpose is 
to end local exploitation, but with the independent peasants there is the much more ar-
duous task of improving their position within a national economic system. It is hoped to 
achieve this by means of an association which at the same time must realize other aims, 
such as a greater participation in decision making and a greater degree of equality. I shall 
return to the problems posed by this in later chapters, particularly in the chapter which 
deals with solidarity. However, I hope that I have already made it clear that these 
problems are sizeable. They spring on the one hand from the underdevelopment of the 
country: lack of capital, lack of management capacity and expertise among both 
peasants and government, a lack of solidarity among the peasants. On the other hand 
problems arise from the fact that the co-operative, as an institution, is expected to ac-
complish a number of aims which often remain merely implied and are, to some extent, 
conflicting. In view of this the failure of so many agricultural co-operatives in the Third 
World is hardly surprising. 
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Chapter 6 Members and non-members of associations 
6.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters we have dealt mainly with the structural variables which 
determined the mobilization of peasants and agricultural labourers at the level of the local 
community and of society. Our findings were based upon the relevant literature and the 
results of qualitative research. We also linked the degree of involvement of the 
agricultural workers in rural syndicates with specific traits of the agrarian structure, with 
the aid of figures derived from the Chilean agricultural census. However, before going on 
to examine the problems arising in these associations once established, we shall first con-
sider the differences between members and non-members of syndicates and co-
operatives. In other words we shall descend to the level of the individual. We wish to dis-
cover if there is any systematic difference between members and non-members, if there is 
a particular type of person who joined these associations. The preliminary research led us 
to expect that this was indeed so. In the following sections we shall review our hypotheses 
regarding the differences between members and non-members, dealing first with the syn-
dicates and then with the co-operatives. We shall then discuss the results obtained from 
an analysis of the survey data. 
6.2 The syndicates 
6.2.1 Hypotheses 
The basic hypothesis underlying the survey among members and non-members 
of farming syndicates in Chile was that there were four motives which might lead workers 
to affiliate. 
These were: 
1. The worker might appreciate the utility, the instrumental, especially economic value, 
of the syndicate. 
2. The worker might have joined because he valued and wanted to maintain the interac-
tion with his friends, relatives or acquaintances who were already members. 
3. The worker might have joined out of a sense of obligation, of solidarity with his peers; 
responding to a norm of solidarity which demands unity. 
4. He might have been coerced into joining. 
The fourth motive did not hold good in Chile, so I did not pursue it. A survey in the 
United States (Hagstrom & Selvin, 1965) had shown that the various indicators of cohe-
sion between members of associations could be reduced to two factors, instrumental and 
sociometrie appreciation, corresponding to motives 1 and 2 of my hypotheses. I could 
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also imagine, however, and certainly in the case of syndicates, i.e. militant class 
organizations, that a person might join not primarily because membership could be 
useful to him, nor because he valued the companionship of the other members, but 
because he felt that he must make common cause, show solidarity with those others who 
shared the same socio-economic position as himself, or because a norm required this of 
him. 
Looking back it seems to me that motives 2 and 3 are both based on solidarity among 
members of the same group. What I was not so quick to notice was that the act of joining, 
born of solidarity, may be done gladly or with some reluctance, under pressure of the 
social control of the other members of the group. An act of solidarity may also spring 
from the sense of identification mentioned in the third motive, but not in the case of 
members of the same, yet comparatively small, group. In such a group identification must 
go hand in hand with relationships and, if there is any question of solidarity at all, people, 
either join associations automatically because the others join, or under social pressure. 
We have thus three motives which, for convenience sake, may be termed 'utility of the 
association', 'attraction of interaction' and 'obedience to a norm'. I assumed that these 
motives, in their turn, would depend upon various other factors and variables. 
With regard to utility, I reasoned as follows. To appreciate the possible value of the 
farming syndicate the worker must cease to link his interest with that of the owner. He 
would also need to be aware of his social-economic situation. In more concrete terms this 
led me to postulate the following hypotheses and sub-hypotheses. In comparison with the 
non-member, the member will 
1 have less of a patronage relationship with the owner (cf. Urzua, 1969, p. 122), 
because, for example, he 
1.1 depends less upon the owner since he is younger and has a smaller family; 
1.2 has had less opportunity to build up a relationship since he has not lived there so 
long; 
1.3 is more dissatisfied from the economic point of view (experiences a greater relative 
deprivation); or 
1.4 earns less than the non-member. 
The member will, in comparison with the non-member 
2 be more aware of his situation (believe less in the possibility of social climbing) 
because for instance 
2.1 he is better educated; 
2.2 has had more contact with urban culture; 
2.3 has more often worked elsewhere. 
Regarding the attraction of interaction motive, I postulated that in the first place 
relations based on friendship and family ties would coincide with membership and not cut 
across it. The hypotheses in question were: 
3 that the member will have more friends and relatives among the other members of the 
syndicate than among the non-members. The reverse is true of the non-members. 
It might also be expected that 
4 the frequency of interaction would be higher among members than among non-
members (operationalized as: more often participating in large work groups). 
Turning to psychology (Schachter, 1961) I added the hypothesis that 
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5 the member would experience greater anxiety (operationalized as: would more often 
be the eldest son). 
Schachter had indeed found that people suffering from anxiety need to seek the company 
of others in the same circumstances. He also found that the same kind of situation 
aroused greater anxiety among first-born and thus a greater affiliation. 
Regarding the solidarity norm which had led the members to affiliate I drew up the 
following hypotheses. These refer to the circumstances under which such a norm might 
be expected to exercise more influence. In comparison with the non-member I expected 
that the member 
6 would be of a more religious disposition; 
7 would more often have an affective primary relationship outside his family or kin 
group and would thus 
7.1 more often have a good friend outside the family circle; 
7.1 more often have been one of a group of friends in his youth1; 
8 place less value upon relationships with relatives and members of the immediate 
family; 
9 be more keen on co-operation or more likely to consider co-operation necessary; 
10 be more sensitive to the opinion of his peers (McClelland, 1961, p. 186 ff.); 
11 identify more with the other workers on the fundo and with the campesinos 
(peasants) in general; 
12 give less evidence of the conception called by Foster ( 1965) the Image of Limited 
Good, the idea that one person progresses at the expense of another. 
6.2.2 Results 
The data provided by surveys among members and non-members of syndicates on the 
nine fundos mentioned in Chapter 2 confirm many of our hypotheses. It would, however, 
be excessive to reproduce all the frequency classifications here since this would require 
over twenty tables2. In presenting the results of the comparison between members and 
non-members I shall retain the sequence of hypotheses employed above. Regarding the 
motives underlying affiliation, the anthropological survey had already shown that a large 
majority of members had been led to join the organization because of its instrumental 
value. The open survey question concerning their motive in affiliating was codified accor-
ding to the most important component of the reply, as follows: 
% N 
Improvement of living standard through the organization 
More certainty regarding possibility of permanent employment 
Putting an end to abuse and arbitrary powers of employer, forming a 
countervailing power 
Under pressure of workmates 
At the invitation of friends 
Other reasons 
Total 100 143 
69 
27 
11 
25 
18 
15 
3 
38 
16 
/36 
26 
22 
5 
We see that 38 % of the replies refer to the usefulness of the organization to the individual 
respondent; a further 25 % refer to this usefulness but in terms which evoke the class 
character of the organization. Of the respondents 33 % gave a reply which indicated that 
the friendly or less friendly social control of others had been of significance. Everything 
would seem to indicate that all three of our expected motives played a role. 
We assumed that the utility motive resulted from a weakening of the traditional 
patronage relationship between owner and worker and from the worker's greater 
awareness of his true position. 
Hypothesis 1 : the member has less of a patronage relationship with the owner. We did 
indeed find that the member scored lower on the patronage index than the non-member, 
which confirmed the hypothesis. In concrete terms, this implied that the non-member was 
more often of the opinion that the owner of the fundo helped his workers (instead of doing 
nothing for them or being prejudicial to them). Also, when asked whom he would ap-
proach in order to borrow 100 escudos he was more likely to mention the owner. Table 
10 shows the difference in patronage orientation. To what must it be ascribed? 
As expected the non-members had a somewhat larger number of financial dependents 
than did the members. There was, however, no age difference between the two categories. 
Furthermore, it appeared that the non-members had been living on the fundo somewhat 
longer than the members, although the association was very weak. However, the non-
members had started to work earlier on the fundo, in comparison with the members. 
There seemed to be no connection, though, between membership and size of salary. Nor 
was it clear whether the members were more dissatisfied with the size of their salary than 
the non-members. We found that 58% of the members as against 46% of the non-
members considered a just wage to be a sum at least 50% higher than the existing wage. 
Sub-hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2 were thus partly confirmed, while 1.3 and 1.4 were not. 
Table 10. Membership of syndicates and patronage (%) 
Members 
Non-members 
Total 
*
2(3d.f.) = n.651 
Patronage index 
1 (low) 2 
7 23 
1 7 
5 18 
3 
43 
39 
42 
4 (high) 
27 
52 
35 
N 
143 
67 
210 
1 The respondents did not constitute a random sample, as was explained in Chapter 2. There is 
accordingly no question of applying statistical tests to determine whether a difference in the 
sample may be put down to a difference inherent in the population. Nonetheless, even when in-
terviewing a population, some of the differences found may be due to errors in measuring or 
punching and not to actual differences in that population. A criterion is therefore necessary in 
order to determine that a particular difference is too large to be attributed to errors in measure-
ment or any other cause. I used as my criterion the 5 % significance level of the/-square. After 
all, the/-square is also an association standard of measurement. 
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Hypothesis 2 assumed among members a greater awareness of and insight into their 
' own situation, and I did indeed find a number of indications for this. Asked for his view on 
how Chilean land reform ought to be carried out, the member was more inclined than the 
non-member to mention structural changes (31 % as against 22%). He also tended to rep-
ly more frequently that communal forms of production would have to follow expropria-
tion (15% v. 6%). The answers to both open questions revealed furthermore that the 
member thought more often in terms of collaboration between peasants than did the non-
members (36 % v. 18 %). More often too the member viewed the function of the syndicate 
in terms of striving to promote land reform (17 % v. 9 %). Other data might also serve to 
show that the members had more insight into the necessity for reform and co-operation. 
A question regarding their preference for a piece of land of their own, participation in 
communal farming or good wages provided the surprising result shown in Table 11. 
The members would prefer a piece of land of their own while the non-members are well 
satisfied with a good wage. 
In the first instance neither category seems very enthusiastic about the communal 
farm, the asentamiento, which arose out of the Chilean land reform. Matters were 
different with regard to the second choice, mentioned in Table 12; the asentamiento 
proved a real alternative for the members, whereas the non-members still seemed pretty 
lukewarm. 
Although the percentage of members displaying insight remained low in all the 
variables mentioned, it was always higher than that of the non-members. However, when 
Table 11. Preferences of members and non-members of syndicates (first choice) 
Participation in 
Own piece of land asentamiento Good wage 
% N % N % N 
Members 67 96 8 11 25 36 
Non-members 44 30 1 1 54 36 
Total 60 126 6 12 34 72 
*
2(2d.f.)=17.72 
Table 12. Preferences of members and non-members of syndicates (second choice) 
Members 
non-members 
Total 
*
2(2d.f.)=10.4 
Own 
% 
25 
48 
32 
piece of land 
N 
36 
32 
68 
Participation in 
asentamiento 
% 
25 
12 
21 
N 
36 
8 
44 
Good 
% 
48 
39 
45 
wage 
N 
69 
26 
95 
'• 
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asked if they thought it possible that 'a peasant like themselves' could progress in life, the 
categories did not differ at all: 72% of the members and 70% of the non-members 
thought that he could. Nonetheless I consider Hypothesis 2 to a large extent confirmed. 
We assumed that the greater insight on the part of the members would go hand in hand 
with a higher degree of education. The data did indeed indicate that the members were 
somewhat better educated. Of the members, 57% (as against 42% of the non-members) 
had gone higher than the 3rd class in the primary school. The association, however, is 
weak. I considered that another possibility for acquiring more insight into one's own 
situation might lie in having worked elsewhere, on another fundo. Table 13 shows the 
results. It is striking that both categories worked just as frequently on another fundo in 
the same community, i.e. close to the pèsent fundo, but that the members had worked 
much more often outside their present community. Given the fact that the non-members 
were more often involved in a patronage-relationship with the owner, and had worked 
less often on another farm, it is not surprising that more non-members than members 
considered the farm on which they were employed to be better to work on than any other 
farm (58% v. 40%). 
This showed that, as we had assumed, affiliation is largely connected with a weakening 
of the patronage relationship and, to a lesser degree, with a better insight into one's own 
situation. 
The second affiliation motive, the attraction of interaction with other workers on the 
farm, proved earlier to have played a real role. Let us now view the position with regard to 
the hypotheses derived from this motive. 
Hypothesis 3 postulated that friendships and family ties would not conflict with 
membership. 
The replies show a very clear link between membership of a syndicate and friendly 
relationships. The member has friends who are also members while the friends of the non-
members are not themselves members either. 
Exactly the same is true of the kinship relationships between members, non-members 
and others working on the same fundo. The relatives of the member are usually members 
themselves; those of the non-members are frequently not affiliated. However, members 
and non-members have the same proportion of relatives living on the same fundo. 
Table 13. Frequency of work elsewhere (%) 
Members 
Non-members 
Total 
^
2(2d.f.)=10.38 
Worked on 
outside 
present 
community 
21 
5 
16 
mother fundo 
within 
present 
community 
31 
30 
31 
Didn't work 
on other 
fundo 
48 
65 
53 
N 
143 
66 
209 
72 
Table 14. Membership and friendship1 
Members 
Non-members 
Total 
;r2(2d.f.)=63.44 
Friends 
both 
members (%) 
67 
15 
52 
one a 
member (%) 
23 
27 
25 
neither 
member (%) 
9 
58 
23 
N 
141 
59 
200 
1 Earlier in the interview the respondent was asked for the names of his two 
best friends among the other workers on the fundo. The table refers to the 
membership of these two persons. 
Table 15. Membership and kinship 
Members 
Non-members 
Total 
;r2(2d.f.)=23.86 
Relatives are 
all 
members (%) 
45 
10 
33 
some 
members (%) 
42 
51 
45 
none 
members (%) 
13 
39 
22 
N 
100 
51 
151 
Tables 14 and 15 indicate how pronounced these differences are. This serves to prove 
hypothesis 3. 
We assumed that the members would display a more frequent interaction than the non-
members. The only available indicator in this connection is the size of the person's nor-
mal workgroup and this did indeed appear somewhat larger among the members. 
Hypothesis 4 seems acceptable, yet we cannot consider it proved by this one indicator. 
The hypothesis derived from Schachter, according to which affiliation might result 
from a greater anxiety, was not confirmed, at least not so far as regards the indicator I 
employed. Both members and non-members seemed just as frequently to be the eldest 
sons of their parents (24% as against 28%). 
The third motive we assumed was obedience to a norm of solidarity, responding to 
social pressure from the other workers on the fundo. From the replies to the question 
regarding the motive underlying affiliation one might conclude that solidarity under 
pressure of social control had indeed played a role for some. However, the member did 
not seem to be of a more religious disposition, as assumed by Hypothesis 6. When asked 
which of two opinions best represented their own standpoint, 76% of the members and 
80 % of the non-members identified with the peasant in whose life religion assumed an im-
73 
portant role. 
As we have already mentioned, Hypotheses 7.1 and 7.2 were derived from the study 
made by Bonilla and Silva Michelena in Venezuela. They found that, in comparison with 
non-members, rural syndicate members were more likely to have an intimate friend out-
side the extended family circle and to have been one of a group of friends in their youth. 
On the basis of these differences they assumed that the member had already had more 
socializing experiences which would prepare him for solidary interaction with non-related 
peers. Both these hypotheses were confirmed during our research in Chile. We found that 
53 % of the members as against 30% of the non-members had an intimate friend who was 
not a relative and 58% of the members, compared with 39% of the non-members, had 
formed one of a group of intimate friends during his lifetime. 
The data indicate that when asked to classify a number of groups according to how 
close they felt to them, the members valued their relatives on average somewhat lower 
than the non-members. The averages were 3.38 compared with 3.08 on a scale running 
from 1 up to and including 7. However, the difference is not large enough for us to con-
sider the hypothesis in question confirmed. 
The members appeared more ready than non-members to work their regalias - the 
small pieces of land made available to them as part of their wages - as one piece, in a 
communal effort (64 % against 45 %). Other indications that members were more inclined 
than non-members to consider co-operation necessary, or to think in terms of co-
operation, have already been mentioned in connection with hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 9, 
postulating that members were more ready to collaborate, seems confirmed. 
Sensitivity to the opinion of peers, a factor regarded by McClelland ( 1961) as extreme-
ly important for the development of solidarity, was measured by means of two conflicting 
statements on how the speaker would react to criticism voiced at a meeting. The 
respondents were asked which statement best reflected their opinion. The members did 
indeed state less often than the non-members (30 % as against 48 %) that they would not 
accept this criticism, thus showing themselves, as we expected, to be more sensitive to the 
opinion of their peers. 
Identification with the workers on the fundo and with the peasants in general was 
measured with the aid of a question to which we have already referred, i.e. arranging a 
number of groups in the order in which they appealed to the respondent. Although in both 
cases the members have a somewhat lower average score (3.67 compared with 3.80 and 
3.94 as against 4.46) and therefore identify a trifle more with the two categories men-
tioned, the differences are not such that we may regard the hypothesis as clearly 
confirmed. 
We expected the members to be less inclined to view the world as a struggle of all 
against all in which one could progress only at the expense of someone else. Foster (1965) 
and other anthropologists after him, thought that this view of the world was typical of un-
derdeveloped peasant communities. In some cases this Image of the Limited Good is no 
more than a hard-headed view of what really happens, as we were able to observe in 
Chapter 3 when discussing the functions of patronage. As a general attitude, however, 
this Image exercises an unfavourable influence upon solidarity within the peasant com-
munity. The respondents were asked which of two conflicting opinions most ap-
proximated to their own. One opinion held that one peasant could usually only progress 
at the expense of the others, the other assertion contradicted this. We found that 18 % of 
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the members and 34% of the non-members considered that the progress of one was 
usually at die expense of the others. The hypothesis that the non-members adhere more 
often to the Image of Limited Good appears confirmed. 
6.2 J The member: an ideal-typical portrait 
From the hypotheses confirmed in the foregoing section a certain picture of the 
member emerges. Clearly, in comparison with die non-member, he is more detached 
from the patronage link with the owner and adopts a more critical attitude towards the 
latter. This is partly because he can permit himself to be more critical, being somewhat 
less dependent. There appear, for instance, to be more inquilinos among the first members 
than among the later ones (62%, 52% and 31% of those who became members in or 
before 1967, in 1968 and in or after 1969 respectively, were inquilinos). It would seem 
that, as we assumed in Chapter 3, those peasants with a somewhat greater degree of 
economic security were the first to affiliate. Admittedly they were not secure against 
reprisals but at the same time the owner could not abruptly refuse them work as he could 
with the voluntarios. The member can be more critical too, because he has more often 
worked elsewhere and thus has material for comparison. He has more insight into his 
own situation and appreciates better the necessity for agricultural workers to co-operate. 
The differences between him and the non-member are not great; for the member too 
relationships with family and friends remain important, so important indeed that they 
seldom conflict with membership. This indicates that affiliation is not so much an in-
dividual'as a collective decision taken within family and friendly groups. 
More often than the non-member, the member has passed through a certain socializa-
tion process with groups of friends. This leaves him more open to ties of intimate 
friendship with people other than relatives and also makes him more sensitive to the opi-
nion of others. However, this does not mean that members have a great deal of confidence 
in their fellow men. The last piece of advice given by 80% of the members and 85 % of the 
non-members to a migrating son would be not to put too much trust in other people. 
However, it may well be that members do place more reliance on their fellow men within 
the fundo. 
The utility motive is of primary importance. The members joined because they 
expected advantages from the syndicate, even if their decision was taken only after con-
sultation with family and friends. It appeared, accordingly, that in February 1970 the 
non-members were not so sure of the syndicate's success as were the members. Although 
42% (as against 93% of the members) thought that the syndicate had achieved con-
siderable success, the majority was not so convinced. It may be, though, that this can be 
attributed in part to the policy of the owners who were often said to favour the non-
members, giving them lighter work and treating them better. This meant that the latter 
profited from the presence of a syndicate by not becoming members. 
The survey was carried out on nine different fundos in three comunas. The numbers 
are too small to determine whether those hypotheses which were confirmed held good for 
all the fundos. I did, however, examine whether this was true of each comuna. There did 
appear to be differences, in the sense that in a particular comuna the associations general-
ly found appeared so weak that, relying on my chi-square criterion, I found it impossible 
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to arrive at any conclusion. The variables associated with affiliation in all three comunas 
are: the indicators concerning the intensity of the patronage relationship with the owner, 
the smaller number of people financially dependent on the respondent, among the 
members; the more favourable view of the syndicate's success among the members and 
the fact that affiliation and relationships with family or friends do not conflict. This con-
firms the most important features of the portrait sketched above. The member is more 
convinced of the utility of the syndicate and has detached himself more from the patron 
than has the non-member, for he is less dependent upon him. The decision to join is 
evidently a collective one and is taken in consultation with family and friends. 
6.2.4 The non-members 
Although I have thus far depicted them as one category, the non-members really con-
sist of two categories, the ex-members and the never-members. Particularly in the fundo 
San Manuel we encountered workers who had once been affiliated. Here a large number 
of workers had left the syndicate during a labour conflict because they felt they had been 
deceived by their leaders. Ex-members however were also encountered on other fundos.3 
How did these ex-members differ from those who had never been members? The quan-
titative data show that the ex-members have worked longer on the fundo and are older 
than the never-members. They are also, more frequently, head of a family. 
It is not clear whether their resignation was the result or the cause of the peculiar 
nature of their family relationships. The ex-members place a significantly higher value on 
their family and relatives than do either the members or never-members. They are less 
prepared than the never-members to work their regalias in common, are more attached to 
their own property and are quicker to see the difficulties arising from co-operation. They 
are, however, less influenced than the never-members by the Image of the Limited Good 
(23 % against 47 %). From all this a picture emerges of someone afraid of being put upon 
by non-relatives and who has probably felt taken in before. He is more alive to the prac-
tical problems posed by co-operation. The ex-member states more often than the never-
member (20% as against 3 %) that he hasn't a single friend on the fundo and he is less 
likely than the never-member to have friends within the syndicate. This despite the fact 
that he has compadres more frequently than does the never-member. This isolation may 
result in part from his resignation from the syndicate; he may now be looked at askance 
by his former friends. However, it seems also to be partly due to a lack of experience of 
being on friendly terms with social peers outside the circle of relatives. On this point there 
is no difference between ex-members and never-members. This same lack may have 
played a part in his resignation, which was often preceded by a conflict. It may also lie at 
the root of his reluctance to relinquish some of his independence for the sake of co-
operating with others. The reasons given for resigning, categorized on the basis of replies to 
an open question, were as follows: 
% N 
Conflicts with the board or members of the syndicate 
Desire to improve relations with the owner 
The syndicate was no longer useful to him 
He didn't agree with the objectives 
Other reasons 
76 
31 
18 
20 
15 
20 
11 
6 
7 
5 
7 
This shows that the reasons lie partly in the domain of personal relationships with the 
other members of the organization, with the consequent necessity for accepting a com-
promise, and partly in a greater dependence on the owner, whose favour is felt to sway 
one's own fortunes. Although this may have been due to spite, it is nonetheless 
remarkable that the ex-members took a less positive view of the syndicate's success than 
did the never-members. During the anthropological part of the research I heard of cases 
of syndicate leaders who were, so to speak, bought out by the owner of the farm on which 
they worked, with promotion or a larger regalia. No such case occurred in our inquiry but 
it is probable that our ex-members too, or some of them at least, will have had a nudge 
from the owner. 
6.2.5 Multiple correlation 
In order to test the adequacy of the variables included in my hypotheses and thus in the 
survey, we have calculated how much of the variance in membership can be explained by 
a number of these variables taken together. 
The computation identified eight important variables which together explained 60% of 
the variance in affiliation. A somewhat surprising revelation is the considerable influence 
seemingly exercised by relationship with friends. This comes about in two ways. On the 
one hand people ensure that affiliation does not cut across ties of friendship, which can 
only be done by mutual consultation before joining4. On the other the members have 
evidently undergone a socializing process in the maintenance of relationships with people 
outside the family. They have intimate friends, they are more sensitive to criticism and 
they are less inclined to believe that one person progresses at the expense of the others. ' 
In addition they believe in the advantages generated by the syndicate, are more aware 
of the necessity for collective forms of production after expropriation and think less well 
of the owner. They have a wider vision, perhaps also because they have worked 
elsewhere. 
Table 16. Cumulative squared multiple correlation coefficient R2 with membership of the 
syndicate. N = 195 
1 
Variable 
Affiliation of friends 
View of the success of the syndicate 
View on land reform 
Has intimate friend, not related 
Patronage (opinion of owner) 
Sensitivity to the opinion of peers 
Image of Limited Good 
Having worked elsewhere 
R2 
0.32 
0.45 
0.50 
0.52 
0.54 
0.56 
0.58 
0.60 
T-value 
9.14 
5.65 
4.02 
3.44 
3.09 
2.82 
2.82 
2.67 
Fraction 
explained 
0.18 
0.07 
0.035 
0.025 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
Partial 
correlation 
coefficient 
0.56 
0.38 
0.28 
0.24 
-0.22 
0.21 
-0.20 
0.19 
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6.3 The Co-operatives 
6.3.1 Introduction 
From the very outset of the Frei government in Chile, INDAP also turned its attention 
to the development of the small, independent peasant-farmers who had no direct local op-
ponent to react against but who were nonetheless poor. If the official ideology regarded 
the agricultural workers as future participants in a communal farming enterprise run by 
themselves, the Leitbild for the peasant-farmers was also one of co-operation. To begin 
with INDAP encouraged them to become members of a local committee which was in-
tended to have some control over the local distribution of the credit extended by INDAP. 
In practice this amounted to INDAP refusing credit to non-members, with the committee 
perhaps exercising a certain social control. They could advise INDAP to refuse credit to 
peasants who had a bad name locally and they could warn defaulters to pay off their 
loans. 
After a few years it became obvious that these committees were too small to raise any 
sort of sizeable capital. INDAP then decided to incorporate the local committees in 
municipal - and in some cases regional - co-operatives. The committee members were 
encouraged to join these co-operatives and many did so, although membership involved a 
slight financial sacrifice. The motives behind affiliation, and the factors which, in their 
turn, might influence these motives, differed somewhat from those which led people to 
join a syndicate. The most important difference was that the small peasant-farmers were 
not obliged to break off or at least tone down a patronage relationship before being able to 
join. For the rest, however, I assumed that members of co-operatives had similar reasons 
for joining as did the members of syndicates. The utility motive in particular played an 
important role, as our reconnaissance showed. Here and there, though, I came across 
peasants, particularly board members of co-operatives, who appeared to be aware of the 
need for solidarity. They realized that, generally speaking, small peasant-farmers, 
working as individuals, had no chance of raising their standard of living. They saw that it 
was essential to co-operate and some of them had reached the conclusion that it was up to 
them to bring about this co-operation. 
6.3.2 Hypotheses 
It seemed to me that there could be two reasons for appreciating the possible utility of a 
co-operative, more insight and understanding or a greater objective need for the services 
which the co-operative could provide. I therefore assumed that, with regard to the ques-
tion of insight, the members, in comparison with non-members, would have: 
1.1 had more education; 
1.2 come to know other behavioural alternatives (through more contact with urban 
culture); 
1.3 more often worked elsewhere; 
1.4 more modern farming methods (be more likely to keep accounts); 
1.5 greater confidence in future possibilities for the small peasant-farmer. 
Insofar as insight is based upon objective needs, it may be expected that the members 
2.1 had larger farms than the non-members; 
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2.2 were more likely to own their land. 
Finally, it could be that the members were more keenly aware of the possible utility of 
the co-operative because they felt poorer than other peasants. In comparison with non-
members 
3 members would feel relatively more deprived. 
In the case of the co-operatives too, which had, after all, grown out of local committees 
and which still had the local communities as their basic unit of recruitment, it was quite 
possible that a person might become a member not so much because he was keenly aware 
of the advantages, but because his friends or relatives had joined. Regarding the 
attraction of interaction motive, I postulated the following hypotheses: 
4.1 Members will have friends who are also members, non-members friends who are 
not. 
4.2 Members will have relatives who are themselves members of the co-operative; non-
members relatives who are not members either. 
4.3 Members will interact more frequently with other peasants in the community than 
will non-members. 
4.4 Members will identify more with the community (will more often say that there is 
more friendship there than in other communities). 
The solidarity norm might also play a role, arising from a feeling of traditional attach-
ment to the other peasants in the community. In such a case the members might, in com-
parison with non-members 
5.1 be more religious; 
5.2 more often be (have been) one of a group of friends; 
5.3 more often have a good friend outside the family circle; 
5.4 value relationships with immediate family and relatives less, those with the com-
munity relatively more; 
5.5 be more likely to apply the traditional form of co-operation, of mutual help (vuelta 
de mano) on the land. 
This solidarity, as the preliminary investigation showed, might also be based upon the 
realization that co-operation is essential if the standard of living of the small peasant-
farmer is to be improved. It might then be expected 
6.1 that the members would have more insight into the necessity for small peasant-
farmers to co-operate; 
6.2 that members would be more inclined to favour co-operation (participation in a 
communal farm); 
6.3 that members would be more sensitive to the opinion of social peers; 
6.4 that members would be less inclined to regard social equals as rivals (would not' 
think that one peasant can only progress at the expense of others). 
633 Results 
The survey confirmed that the utility motive was the most important. To an open ques-
tion regarding their motives for membership which explicitly inquired about other 
motives, 64 % of the members replied in terms which indicated that they had only joined 
the co-operative for the services it offered. A further 19 % gave as their reason the hope of 
receiving capital credit via the co-operative. Only 17% answered in such a way as to 
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suggest that they realized the necessity of co-operation for small peasant-farmers. The 
non-members shared these views : 85 % of them thought that members joined, hoping to 
benefit from credit and other forms of support, while 40% gave as their own reason for 
not joining the fact that they didn't see the use of it and just weren't interested. Another 
16% said that they had no money to pay the dues; 20% were unaware that the co-
operative existed or had been too lazy to enroll and finally, 17 % wanted to see how things 
went but in principle felt little enthusiasm for a co-operative. 
From these replies one can only deduce that alongside the predominant utility motive, 
there were a number of members who realized the necessity for co-operation. The replies 
showed no evidence of the attraction of interaction. If we review the hypotheses concer-
ning the greater insight into reality possessed by members, it appears that the members: 
are rather more likely than non-members to have had a secondary education (17.5 % as 
against 10%) and to claim that they are good at reading (61% v. 48%). However, the 
differences are not such that we can consider the hypothesis proved (the chi-square which 
we are once again using as association yardstick only becomes 'significant' within a 
margin of uncertainty of roughly 15 %). The hypothesis does, however, appear probable. 
The same holds good for contact with the city. In the three months before the survey 
members visited the city somewhat more frequently than non-members (59% of the 
members as against 50% of the non-members), but the difference is too slight to confirm 
the hypothesis. 
Rather more of the members had previously worked elsewhere (54 % v. 45 %), but 
once again the difference is too small to serve as confirmation of our hypothesis. As 
regards the keeping of accounts, which I used as an indicator of modernity unconnected 
with the degree of prosperity, there appeared to be no difference at all between members 
and non-members. 
In keeping with Hypothesis 1.5 the members seem somewhat more optimistic concer-
ning the future prospects of the small peasant-farmer. In fact, 49 % of the members as 
against 28 % of the non-members think that it is still possible for a smallholder to make 
progress. Hypothesis 1.5 is thus proved. Table 17 shows the differences. One might 
postulate that those who think that a small peasant-farmer can make progress alone would 
in fact not become members of a co-operative, in other words that the hypothesis should 
have been reversed. This argument would be correct if it were true that affiliation in fact 
Table 17. Confidence in the future prospects of small peasant farmers among members 
and non-members of co-operatives in % 
Members 
Non-members 
Total 
X1 (3 d.f.) = 14.90 
A small peasant farmer can make progress 
yes 
28 
15 
24 
under certain not unless 
circumstances assisted 
21 21 
13 19 
19 20 
alone 
no 
29 
52 
37 
N 
182 
92 
274 
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depended upon insight into the necessity for co-operation. The motives listed above, 
however, showed that this was not so: people are much more inclined to become members 
for the sake of the economic advantages for each individual peasant. The co-operative is 
regarded as a means of realizing an individual aim, namely the progress of one's own farm. 
The slight differences in education and in contact with the urban culture (Hypotheses 
1.1 and 1.2) might in their turn result from a difference in status. So too, having more 
land, working a larger farm, in short, experiencing an objectively greater need for the ser-
vices offered by a co-operative might lead to a better insight into its advantages. The data 
show that members dispose of slightly more irrigated land (Table 18). The difference, 
however, is so slight that this factor can hardly be assumed to have played an important 
role in affiliation; only 53% of the members, as against 55% of the non-members had 
such land. With regard to non-irrigated - but tillable - land, there is no difference between 
members and non-members. Concerning the third category of land, cerro, which I dis-
tinguished, i.e. strongly sloping unirrigated land, marginal for agriculture, there is no 
Table 18. Partition (%) of irrigated land among members and non-members of 
co-operatives1.1 cuadra = 1.56 ha 
Members 
Non-members 
Total 
*
2(4d.f.)=5.98 
<1 
cuadra 
13 
21 
17 
> K 2 
cuadra 
18 
29 
21 
1 Respondents with no irrigated land are 
> 2 < 5 
cuadra 
43 
31 
39 
not included. 
>5< 10 
cuadra 
19 
15 
17 
>10 
cuadra 
8 
4 
6 
N 
102 
52 
154 
Table 19. Tenure status of members and non-members of co-operatives com-
posed of small peasant-farmers in %'. 
Members 
Non-members 
Total 
^
2(2d.f.)=1.26 
Farmland is 
owned 
40 
33 
38 
partly 
owned 
12 
11 
12 
not 
owned 
48 
55 
50 
; ] 
N1 
171 
87 
258 
1 The members and non-members who did not cultivate land, for whatever 
reason (11 members and 5 non-members) are not included in the table. 
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difference in average, although there is in distribution. Members more frequently have less 
or more cerro than non-members. All in all, the data do not confirm the hypothesis. At best 
they show that it is not absurd and that in other cases this factor may indeed play an impor-
tant role, as postulated in Chapter 5 with the ideal typical description of co-operatives. 
Table 19 shows that members and non-members seem scarcely to differ in tenure status. 
What slight difference there is tends in the predicted direction. 
It seems to me that affiliation cannot be explained by a difference in tenure status - and 
thus an objective need for a co-operative. 
I asked the respondents what seemed to them a fair and just income for the work they 
did and how much more they would have to earn in order to attain that income. It 
appeared that, although the members regard a somewhat higher income as a just reward, 
the non-members earn less than the members and would themselves have to earn more in 
order to attain this just income. The non-members feel more relative deprivation than the 
members (expressed as a percentual rise in the income necessary to achieve an income 
thought of as just). Table 20 shows this. Accordingly, Hypothesis 3 appears incorrect: it 
is the non-members who feel more deprived. 
The hypotheses dealt with so far show that the difference between members and non-
members regarding insight into the advantages of a co-operative is not so much one of 
status (education or size of farm) but rather of mentality. Members take a more optimistic 
view of the future prospects of small peasant-farmers; they feel somewhat less deprived 
than non-members and also appear to be a little further along the road towards becoming 
employers in a small way. Not only do they earn rather more, they also want to earn more 
than do the non-members. This mentality seems also to emerge in a couple of further 
differences. It appears, for instance, that within the past three years the members had 
borrowed more from sources other than INDAP than had the non-members (10% as 
against 2%) whereas they are the ones best able to profit from INDAP funds. The 
members thus were more likely to apply for loans anyway. It also appears that many 
more members than non-members had already joined the committees set up by INDAP 
Table 20. Membership of co-operatives and relative deprivation 
with regard to income (%) 
Members 
Non-members 
Total 
^(2d.f.)=5.23 
Wish to 
income: 
0-50% 
27 
19 
24 
earn more compared with present 
50-100% 
31 
24 
29 
more than N 
100% 
42 176 
57 90 
47 266 
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before the coming of the co-operatives (58 % v. 22%). Membership of these demanded no 
financial sacrifice at all, one had merely to apply. To some extent the members displayed 
the characteristics commonly encountered among the more well-to-do peasants although 
they hardly differed in status from the non-members. 
Also, although the objective results of two of the three co-operatives involved in the 
survey were hardly phenomenal, the members were more inclined than the non-members 
to believe that their co-operative had already achieved a considerable degree of success 
(7 7 % as against 5 5 %). Here, however, I should like to refer once again to à phenomenon 
which will later prove important when we are discussing solidarity. This is namely that 
the optimism which influences peasant affiliation is ultimately focused upon a specific 
goal, the progress and improvement of one's own, privately-owned farm. In 1970 at least, 
becoming a member of a co-operative did not imply accepting, or holding egalitarian 
values, or class solidarity. 
However, before dealing with this question we must first consider how far membership 
is linked with the more traditional form of solidarity which we have termed the attraction 
of the interaction with other peasants from the same community. As indicators for any 
such link we have taken the overlapping between relationships with family and friends on 
the one hand', and membership on the other. Tables 21 and 22 clearly show that the data 
confirm the hypotheses. 
The friends and blood relatives of members tend to be members themselves, while 
those of non-members frequently are not. No obstacle is placed in the way of a friend or 
Table 21. Friendship and membership of co-operatives in % 
Members 
Non-members 
Total 
*
2(2d.f.)=20.42 
Friends 
are both 
members 
44 
16 
35 
one is 
a member 
34 
39 
36 
neither is 
a member 
22 
44 
30 
N 
165 
79 
244 
Table 22. Family relationship and membership of co-operatives in % 
Members 
Non-members 
Total 
*
2(2d.f.) = 25.28 
Relatives are 
all 
members 
27 
3 
18 
some 
members 
50 
43 
48 
none 
members 
23 
54 
34 
N 
120 
67 
187 
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relative becoming a member, but it does seem that membership is discussed beforehand 
within the circle of family or friends. A certain consensus is thus frequently arrived at 
concerning the desirability of affiliation. 
There is no difference at all between members and non-members in the frequency of 
their affective relationships with friends or with ritual co-parents (84.5% as against 
83.6 % supplied the names of two friends; 69 % as against 69.5 % said that they had com-
padres in the community). 
When we examine the frequency of interaction as well, scarcely any difference 
emerges : 64 % of the members, as against 5 7 % of the non-members talk to an estimated 
four or more other peasants from the community during a normal working day. 
Hypothesis 4.3 remains unproven. It cannot be said that non-members are more isolated 
within the community insofar as the frequency of their interaction is concerned. It may, 
however, be true of their identification with the community. The members are more in-
clined to think that their community differs from others in being more friendly (51 % v. 
34%). Of the members 11 % and 25 % of non-members think that there is less friendship 
than in other communities. Another pointer in the same direction may be that the non-
members state more frequently (20% as against 10% of members) that they would not 
know whom to approach for a loan of 300 escudos. This would appear to confirm 
Hypothesis 4.4 concerning the degree of identification with the local community. The 
feeling of having ties with family, friends and in some cases certain other members of the 
community, played a role in affiliation. The question is, whether these ties are also accom-
panied by feelings of solidarity or by socialising experiences of a more universalistic 
nature. 
In any case any eventual difference in identification with non-related social equals is 
not the result of a greater degree of religious feeling among the members. In this connec-
tion I put a projective question to the respondents concerning 'the majority of the people 
in the community'. If there is any difference the members are less inclined than the non-
members (65 % compared with 75 %) to think that religion is an important part of life for 
this majority. There was no evidence either that co-operative members had formed one of 
an intimate group of friends more often than non-members (59% against 54%) nor are 
they much more likely to have an intimate friend outside the family (46% as against 
40%). 
When asked to arrange a number of groups and categories according to the strength of 
the tie they felt with them, both members and non-members classified the four groups 
mentioned - family, other relatives, the community and the 'peasants' - in about the 
same order. Although the slight differences which do exist point in the anticipated direc-
tion, the hypothesis remains unproven. 
The members do appear to render the traditional mutual aid (vuelta de mano) to other 
peasants more frequently (41 % as against 3 5 % do it every year), but the difference is not 
large enough for this hypothesis to be regarded as proved5. 
What emerges now from this second series of hypotheses? We have seen that the pros 
and cons of affiliation are discussed in the circle of primary relations. A certain consensus 
is arrived at and as it were a common decision taken on whether to join or not. Further-
more, it seems that members identify slightly more with the community. It cannot be said 
with certainty of co-operative members, as it could of members of the syndicates, that 
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they were more socialized in their intercourse with non-related social peers. 
Solidarity may be based both on identification with a community to which one belongs 
and upon identification with a category of people with whom one has certain interests in 
common: the small peassant-farmers who find themselves in the same situation. In such a 
case the members of a co-operative may be expected to show more insight than non-
members into the necessity of co-operation for small peasant-farmers. 
In actual fact, when asked to suggest solutions for Chile's agrarian problems, the 
members tended much more than the non-members to propose co-operation among 
small peasants and forming communal enterprises (50% as against 26%). Another 
remarkable fact is that, in the other categories of replies to this open question, it is the 
non-members who most frequently plump for land expropriation (17 % as against 5 % of 
the members). According to them, though, this requisitioning would be followed by a 
redistribution of the land among individual peasants rather than by the setting up of com-
munal farms. Hypothesis 6.1 appears proved. 
However, more insight into the need for co-operation does not necessarily mean more 
action. Asked whether they would accept an offer by nine other peasants to join in a com-
munal enterprise on good land, 71% of the members and 66% of the non-members 
replied that they would. The most important reason, for members as well as non-
members, was that they would then earn more but this reason was relatively more impor-
tant for the members than for the non-members (39% against 29%). There was no 
difference between members and non-members when asked if they would then be 
prepared to sell the land they now owned: 61% as against 59% declared themselves ready 
to do so. 
When asked which they would prefer to earn, 900 escudos on their own little farm or 
1500 escudos as members of a communal farm, the non-members were slightly more in-
clined to prefer the former, as is shown in Table 23. The differences, however, are slight. 
All in all Hypothesis 6.2 must also be regarded as probable but not proved. The members 
are not that much more prepared to embark upon a communal project than the non-
members. It does seem, however, that if the economic incentive is high, the majority of 
peasants are prepared to give up their independence, whether they be members or not. On 
this basis we shall later assert that it is a specific motive - a higher income - which per-
suades peasants to accept a new value - the communal farm. To what extent do the im-
plications of this new value - equality among peasants, responsibility for other peasants -
exist independently of the financial motive just mentioned? When asked which of two 
Table 23. Preference with regard to future methods of production in % 
-, 
Members 
Non-members 
Total 
^(2d.f.)=3.61 
Prefers 900 
escudos on 
own farm 
34 
45 
37 
Doesn't 
know 
10 
7 
9 
Prefers 1500 
escudos as 
member of com-
munal farm 
56 
49 
54 
N 
182 
92 
274 
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conflicting statements they agreed with, 11 % of the members and 3 % of the non-
members replied that the highest obligation of a peasant was that towards other peasants. 
(The others considered their highest obligation to be towards their families.) There are 
thus a few peasants who have a considerable feeling of solidarity with other peasants and 
by far the most of these (20 of the 23) are members of co-operatives. This difference may, 
however, reflect their greater identification with the community, mentioned earlier 
rather than the much more abstract identification with class. 
Asked whether they would accept criticism at a meeting 62% of the members and 
51 % of the non-members replied that they would. Hypothesis 6.3 is perhaps not entirely 
proved, but it remains very probable. 
Strangely enough it is the members rather than the non-members (9 % as against 3 %) 
who think that one peasant progresses at the expense of others. Though only a small 
number believe this, the hypothesis that the members are less influenced by the Image of 
the Limited Good, is incorrect. While this Image itself does not (any longer) play a role 
among 94% of the peasants its absence indicates no enthusiasm for joining a co-
operative. 
6.3.4 Local differences 
It is remarkable how often a hypothesis could not be confirmed, although the data in-
dicated differences between members and non-members in the direction predicted. What 
is the reason for this? It appears on closer examination that many variables correlated 
with affiliation in only one or two of the three places involved in the survey. Only two 
variables clearly had a role to play in all three places: having been a member of the local 
INDAP committee, and the view taken of land reform, members being more inclined to 
see a solution in co-operation among peasants. In two places 7 variables correlated with 
affiliation, and 12 did so in only one place. 
In Puente Alto, the most urban farming area, only a couple of other variables were of 
any importance alongside the two which played a role everywhere. The members believed 
more strongly in the peasants' future possibilities and they also had a somewhat higher in-
come. In addition, however, they were also clearly less isolated than the non-members: 
they had more contact with other peasants, had more frequently been one of a group of 
friends and were thus more socialized. They were also more likely to think that their com-
munity, in comparison with others, was a friendlier place to live. In Cuncumen and Lo 
Abarca too, the most rural places covered by the survey, the non-member was much 
more isolated than the member. The members more often maintained that their com-
munity was characterized by a greater degree of friendship; friendship and kinship 
relations coincided with membership. And yet it can hardly be assumed that we are 
dealing here with the same sort of isolation as in Puente Alto. There the isolation of the 
non-member was that of urban man who scarcely knows his neighbours, has no friends 
and whose relations with the people he meets are formal, contractual. In Cuncumen and 
Lo Abarca everyone knows everybody else; the isolation of the non-member does not 
proceed from the Gesellschaft - characteristics of the community, but from mistrust, 
suspicion, a fear of being put upon. The non-members state more often than the members 
(29 % v. 9 %) that they would not know whom to borrow money from and are less likely 
(8% as against 21%) to mention a compadre or a relative in this connection. The 
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Table 24. Multiple correlation of a number of explanatory variables and membership of co-
operatives. R2 is cumulating squared correlation coefficient 
Variable 
Entire population (N = 256) 
(5 3) Previously member of the local committee 
(23) Belief in peasants'progress 
(69) Belief in success of co-operative 
(70) Friends also members 
(24) Co-operativeview of problems facing 
agriculture 
(50) Identification with community 
(72) Relatives also members 
Auquinco and Quinahue(N— 77) 
(5 3) Previously member of the local committee 
(29) Prefers lower income op individual plot 
(79) Workers have other interests 
(23) Belief in peasants' progress 
(14) Credit from source other than INDAP 
Concumen andLoAbarca (N = 140) 
(53) Previously member of local committee 
(70) Friends also members 
(51) Has somebody to borrow money from 
(69) Positive view of co-operative 
(76) Sensitivity to opinion of peers 
(72) Relatives also members 
(23) Belief in peasants' progress 
(78) Image of Limited Good 
PuenteAlto(N=35) 
(50) Identification with community 
(24) Co-operative view of problems facing 
agriculture 
(23) Belief in peasants'progress 
(5 3) Previously member of local committee 
R2 
0.11 
0.14 
0.19 
0.22 
0.23 
0.25 
0.26 
0.21 
0.30 
0.34 
0.37 
0.40 
0.11 
0.20 
0.27 
0.30 
0.33 
0.34 
0.36 
0.38 
0.26 
0.49 
0.52. 
0.56 
Fraction 
explained 
0.07 
0.04 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.18 
0.10 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.07 
0.05 
0.04 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.17 
0.13 
0.06 
0.05 
Partial 
correlation 
coefficient 
0.28 
0.23 
0.18 
0.16 
0.14 
0.14 
0.11 
0.49 
-0.39 
0.24 
0.20 
0.21 
0.32 
0.27 
-0.26 
0.18 
0.19 
0.18 
0.16 
0.13 
0-53 
0.48 
0.34 
0.31 
members are more sensitive to the opinion of social equals (64% as against 41% are 
willing to accept criticism). It is as though the members, more than the non-members, are 
able to use their personal relationships with other people as a basis for new forms of co-
operation. 
In Auquinco and Quinahue, places which are more developed than Cuncumen, but 
less urban than Puente Alto, the difference between members and non-members appears 
to lie more in the non-members' preference for retaining their own family farm; 48% of 
them (as against 22 % of the members) would rather earn 900 escudos on their own farm 
than 1500 escudos on a communal enterprise. The members seem to be more modern in 
their approach: they read better and more often received credit from a source other than 
INDAP. The members' insight appears to be based chiefly upon economic con-
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siderations. They are less given to mutual aid (35 % against 49%) and are more inclined 
to believe that small peasant farmers and agricultural workers do not share the same in-
terests. Although, more often than the non-members, they had only worked five years in 
the place (24 % as against 7 %) they had more experience in participating in a group of 
friends. This meant that they were more socialized in maintaining friendly relationships 
with people not related to them. 
If, as did IND AP, one sets up co-operatives in places which differ considerably in their 
level of development and external circumstances, it does not appear that in all cases a cer-
tain type of personality will become a member while another type will not. Alongside a 
certain modern business mentality and the desire to achieve a higher income, one of the 
most important factors seems to be the degree of confidence which the peasants have in 
each other. However, in a traditional community, this confidence seems to be based on 
different qualities in the person who trusts than in a more modern suburban community. 
In the light of these differences it is not surprising that a multiple correlation calculation 
explains only 26 % of the variance of membership in the population. As shown in Table 
24 this percentage is higher, around 40%, in each of the three communities taken 
separately, but we are dealing then with smaller numbers of respondents and less 
divergent observation results. 
Nonetheless, the multiple correlation calculation seems to confirm the picture of the 
member as we had outlined it for the three places. The variable 'previously member of 
local committee' which plays a role in every case does not, admittedly, tell us anything 
about the member's personality. It does, however, indicate that it was an inspired move 
first to unite the peasants in an association like this, which demanded no sacrifice but time 
and only later to encourage them to join a 'real' co-operative which required some finan-
cial sacrifice. While participating in the committee many of the peasants evidently 
became convinced that IND AP did indeed grant credit, and that it was worth the trouble 
to continue to receive this even if it meant joining a co-operative. Other traits which 
characterize the member are a certain optimism with regard to what the future holds for 
peasants and involvement in the community. In some cases a co-operative mentality is 
important, while in others it is not. In the last case (Auquinco and Quinahue) a strong 
determination to improve one's individual, economic lot would seem to provide a 
substitute. 
Notes 
1 I derived these two indicators from a study by Bonilla and Silva Michelena who had found a 
similar difference between members and non-members of rural syndicates in Venezuela (1967, 
p. 151-2). 
2 They can be shown and reproduced on application to the author, Institute of Cultural and 
Social Studies, State University, Stationsplein 10, Leiden, The Netherlands. 
3 I am groping in the dark regarding the average frequency of this phenomenon in Chile. On the 
fundos which I had not selected with the aim of discovering such ex-members among the 
respondents, roughly 20% of the members proved to have relinquished their membership. 
4 One might imagine that having friends who are also members is the result of affiliation. In that 
case, the dependent variable would be explained with a variable which follows upon it. This 
idea seems to me incorrect, especially since a similar phenomenon occurs with regard to 
relatives, as Table 14 showed. If we omit the variable 'affiliation of friends' the remaining 
variables (together with one other which refers to the year in which the respondents started 
work in the fundo) still explain 47 % of the variation in affiliation. 
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S In any case one may conclude that traditional forms of co-operation do not automatically dis-
pose towards joining a co-operative. The difference between the number of members and non-
members who never practice vuelta de mano is very small; 44% as against 46%. 
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Chapter 7 Leadership and participation 
7.1 The functions of leaders 
While I did not particularly concern myself with the question of leadership during my 
research in Chile, it might still be useful, after first dealing with the theory of leadership, to 
set down what we actually did find out about leaders. During the anthropological part of 
my research I was made strongly aware of just how important the leadership factor was. 
Of course it will only be possible to test some of the expectations which we hold on the 
basis of theory and qualitative research against quantitative data. On the other hand this 
will help us gain a clearer picture of the problems attaching to the leadership of peasant 
associations of the sort occurring in Chile. 
Sociology tends to take a different view of leadership from that previously held. 
Formerly the assumption was that it was, so to speak, a person's irresistible leadership 
qualities which led to him becoming a leader. At the present time, however, there is a 
clearer realization that, in the last instance, it is the expectation of the group members that 
the leader will make a positive contribution towards satisfying their needs which makes 
them accept leadership at all. 
A large number of investigations into leadership have shown that the leader has two 
main functions, one instrumental and one expressive. The instrumental function relates 
to the leader's contribution towards achieving the aims of the group (or organization), 
while his expressive function has to do with his contribution towards preserving its essen-
tial unity. In some organizations each of these functions may be fulfilled by a different 
leading individual, although one leader can also take care of both (cf. Etzioni, 1969). 
Both leadership functions appear necessary in the Chilean peasant organizations 
which we studied. Syndicate leaders must be able to bring about and maintain the unity of 
the organization and at the same time be capable of formulating objectives, establishing a 
policy, carrying on negotiations, and advancing cogent arguments for their standpoint. 
They must be able to build up relationships with politicians and high-ranking officials 
with a view to winning them over in case of conflict. They must be able to envisage an 
acceptable future agrarian structure. Leaders of co-operatives too, albeit in different 
spheres of activity, must be able to forecast possible developments. They too must be 
capable of establishing relationships and of negotiating with government agencies. In ad-
dition they must possess a considerable business instinct. The economic activities in-
itiated by the co-operative must show a profit and new profitable activities must constant-
ly be embarked upon. This requires not only a good choice of activities, but also involves 
entering into contracts with third parties and keeping them, administering and making the 
best possible use of one's own and borrowed money and ensuring that the members in 
their turn fulfil their obligations towards the co-operative. The co-operative leader must 
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also preserve the unity $f the members. 
Accordingly, as an outsider, the researcher establishes that the Chilean peasant 
leaders must indeed fulfil the two functions mentioned. He also notes in passing, however, 
that in the vast majority of syndicates and co-operatives with which he became 
acquainted, both the actual organization and the way it was run were imposed from out-, 
side. The fact that leaders existed did not necessarily follow from the requirements and 
expectations of the members, but could also result from the imposed obligation to elect a 
board. I remember being present at a couple of board elections where voters had no very 
clear idea of what they were doing in the first place and were particularly ignorant of what 
function, the instrumental or the expressive, the person ejected would have to fulfil. 'He's 
a very nice chap, but he's hopeless at taking decisions', I was told of the newly elected 
chairman of one local committee of a regional co-operative. During another election, in a 
small production group, the older members chose an instrumental leader while the 
younger voted for an expressive one. Neither faction, however, was clearly aware of the 
reason for its choice. 
Although one person was not always necessarily incapable of fulfilling the two 
leadership functions in a reasonable manner, most elected leaders could be called more 
instrumental than expressive, or vice versa. The ignorance of practically all those in-
volved with these two functions caused leaders to be criticized for not being precisely 
what they were not. The expressive leader, the man who wanted no quarrel with anyone, 
but who was also very short on initiative, was reproached for lack of vision, for not being 
a man of action. Of the instrumental leader it was said that he would not allow others their 
say, was incapable of delegating, took charge of everything himself. 
Although it may not be a simple matter to explain that leaders have to fulfil two func-
tions and that it may paly to choose a different person for each function, it seems to me 
most essential that the peasants should be made aware of this. 
The Chilean context itself created yet another function for the peasant leaders to fulfil: 
the ideological. The peasants had to be taught to embrace the ideals relating to a much 
more collectively organized production structure such as was advocated both in some 
INDAP, CORA and PDC circles and in the opposition parties on the left. This involved 
making them aware of their situation and broadening and deepening certain values such 
as equality and participation. Initially this was the task of government employees and 
ideologically trained party members, but after that it devolved upon the convinced 
peasants themselves. To a greater or lesser degree INDAP, CORA and the political par-
ties canvassing the countryside all wanted those peasants who shared their ideals elected 
as administrators. Various pressures were exercised at meetings in order to get the 
desired people elected. Thus it came about that peasant leaders were more of less 
expected to propagate certain values and norms among the members. I received the 
definite impression during my participation at meetings that those leaders who really' 
lived out these particular values and norms managed to get them accepted by the 
members. Those who only gave lip service to them, failed to convince. 
7.2 The dysfunctions «f leadership 
The Chilean context played a role in yet another respect. In social structures where 
patronage is an important mechanism, there is a tendency to regard public or otherwise 
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collective resources over which one has the disposal as a means of enhancing one's own 
status. Such a tendency is not infrequently found among those holding government posts 
or those who are in a position to take decisions or influence the allocation of public funds. 
People who have connections with higher officials who control the allocation of means, 
may, in exchange for a consideration or a reciprocal service, use these connections, as in-
termediaries or 'brokers', to bring others into contact with these officials. A place on the 
board of a co-operative or syndicate is a key position which carries with it special connec-
tions and sometimes control over public funds. These connections may spring from the 
relationships maintained by board members, agricultural and local government agencies 
and officials. I am referring to the agencies dealing with land reform, agricultural credit 
and extension and the judiciary and administrative authorities which decide on the out-
come of workers' conflicts and so forth. Board members may become involved in the 
allocation of financial resources when decisions concerning the granting of credit and the 
setting up of certain development projects are, to some extent, left to the local 
community. 
Those who set up the peasant organizations never intended leadership positions to be 
used for self advantage by means of patronage or 'brokerage'. They cherished the hope 
that the organization might help to raise the status of all its members. Moreover they 
expected the organization to be democratic in the sense that all members would have an 
equal say in matters concerning the organization and exercise such control over board 
members that the latter could not abuse their positions. 
However, as Landsberger & Hewitt (1970) correctly point out, turning a leadership 
position to one's own advantage is one of the alternatives open to the peasant who hopes 
to enhance his individual status. Since, as we saw in the previous chapter, one of the most 
important affiliation motives of the Chilean peasant is precisely the hope of improving his 
own lot it is to be expected that in some cases at least leadership will thus be abused. Such 
abuse is dysfunctional, not because it confounds the expectations of the government or of 
political ideologists, but because it makes the members suspicious of their leaders, con-
firms a familiar and traditional pattern of behaviour and hinders acceptance by the 
members of 'new' values such as equality and participation. 
Apart from a few isolated cases I found no indication that peasant leaders abused their 
positions. What I did find, especially in the co-operatives (in the syndical movement this 
only held good for leaders on a provincial or national level), was a lively conviction 
among the members, sometimes accompanied by veiled accusations, that a particular ad-
ministrator was feathering his own nest. The only quantitative datum at my disposal is 
the finding that relatively more leaders than members of co-operatives had received credit 
from INDAP and other sources. This could mean that they had taken advantage of their 
closer relationship with INDAP officials, but it is also a commonly found phenomenon 
that more modern farmers receive more credit. The pejorative interpretation, thus, need 
not necessarily be correct. It seems to me that the sequence of events was as follows: the 
more modern peasant farmers had a greater need of the services which INDAP could 
provide. Since INDAP preferred to provide these services by way of committees and, 
later, co-operatives, it was precisely these peasants who worked hard to get such 
associations off the ground. Having shown such enthusiasm they were elected members 
of the board and since their need for credit was greatest they were the first to apply for it. 
Only when their application has been successful and when, in addition, credit becomes 
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scarcer because there are more people soliciting it, does the suspicion arise that the leader 
has been favouring himself. 
Suspicions appeared to occur more frequently than the facts might warrant, although 
admittedly it is difficult for an outsider who is only spending a short time in a community, 
to be sure of what actually happened. One Board member was said to have illegally ap-
propriated a quantity of wooden stakes, another was accused of using the lorry too much 
for his own private business, a third of selling his tractor to the co-operative at too high a 
price. A fourth was reproached with wanting to become a manager and so receive a 
salary from the co-operative, a fifth (and sixth and seventh) was accused of fiddling the 
expenses for a trip to Santiago, an eighth was said to owe his candidature to being a 
member of Party X while a ninth was held to have been ordered by bis party, Y, to ensure 
the failure of the co-operative 
Only scrupulous behaviour, it would seem, backed up by documentary proof and sub-
ject to regular institutional control, would prevent such allegations. However, the inabili-
ty of both leaders and members to receive and hand out criticism as role-bearers instead of 
as individuals and the usually deficient manner in which the books were kept, led one to fear 
that, for the time being at last, this would remain a pious hope. 
In the following chapter I shall argue that this suspicion on the part of the members, 
whether justified or not, prevents them from acknowledging the solidarity of those leaders 
they mistrust. This is detrimental to his solidarity in the end. I might also refer here to 
another dysfunctional result: the suspect leader is no longer a shining example, he does 
not encourage people to accept those values which he puts into practice. 
7.3 The differences between leaders and members of syndicates 
We have considered as leaders all those who at the time of the survey occupied or had 
occupied an administrative position in the committee on the estate or in the syndicate. 
Since we did not draw up any explicit hypotheses concerning the differences between 
leaders and members, we shall regard the results merely as pointers. Although we did not 
either operationalize in advance any variables to determine the extent to which the 
leadership was instrumental, expressive or ideological, the differences may be largely 
contained under these denominators. 
Just as in previous chapters a difference is regarded as real when the chi-square value 
surpasses that which corresponds with the 5% level of significance. 
So far as their instrumental function is concerned, leaders seem to have a somewhat 
higher status on the fundo than do the members; they are more likely to be inquilinos 
(49% as against 33%). Leaders have a higher standard of education and are better at 
reading. They joined the syndicate earlier than the members and more frequently 
received a training course from INDAP. They did not, as I had expected on the basis of 
Affonso et al. (1970), prove to have worked more often outside agriculture. 
It is noteworthy that, despite their somewhat higher status, the leaders earn less than 
the members. This probably explains why they feel a greater relative deprivation. 
Their expressive function seems to emerge in the fact that the leaders are more likely to 
have lived and worked on the fundo from before 1950. They more frequently have com-
padres than the members (80% against 56%) and those leaders who have compadres, 
also have more of them. Although they do not tend much more often to have an intimate 
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Table 25. Leadership and patronage in syndicates (in %) 
Patronage index N 
l(low) 2 3 4 (high) 
Leaders 15 34 34 17 41 
Ordinary members 4 19 47 30 102 
X2 (3 d.f.) = 10.9 
friend (56% as against 51%) nor to have formed part of a group of friends (63% as 
against 56%) the leaders do believe more readily than the members that there is more 
friendship in their fundo than in others (56% as against 27%). 
Both instrumental and ideological functions are served by the fact that the leaders 
score lower than the members on the patronage index, as Table 25 shows. In itself this 
lower score is not so surprising, but it becomes so when we remember our earlier finding 
that, compared with the member, the non-member had a higher patronage score, had 
come to work on the fundo earlier and had more people financially dependent on him. 
The leaders also came to work earlier on the fundo than did the members, they too have 
more people under their roof who are financially dependent on them (51 % of the leaders 
as against 22% of the members have four or more such people at home) but with them 
these variables have not led to a higher patronage score, as they did with the non-
members. 
Precisely because, in some respects, leaders resemble non-members more than they do 
members, it is improbable that their lower score on the patronage index is a consequence 
of their leadership. A more likely explanation is that they are people who, despite their 
dependence, turned their backs on the owner, felt more deprived than others, and joined 
the syndicate at an early stage. 
Also functional from the ideological viewpoint is the fact that the leaders, in com-
parison with the members, are somewhat readier to work their regalias on a communal 
basis (70% as against 60%). They are also more likely than the members to mention the 
asentamiento as their second choice for a desired agrarian future, after their own little 
piece of land (44% as against 18%). In addition they place the working class higher on 
the list of groups with which they feel a tie (4.75 against 5.61). 
Just as remarkable as the differences are the similarities between leaders and members 
on the instrumental and ideological plane. They take the same view of the syndicate's 
task, give the same answer to the question of whether the syndicate pays sufficient atten-
tion to what happens on their fundo and have the same opinion of what land reform 
should entail. 
The material seems to indicate that syndicate leaders are people whose most important 
instrumental quality is their aversion to the patron and who are in the main informal, 
expressive leaders, in the sense of stars in a sociogram. 
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7.4 The differences between leaden and members of co-operative» 
In dealing with the cooperatives we have again regarded as leaders those who 
occupied or had occupied an administrative function in the local committees or in the co-
operative at the time of the survey. Although we did not formulate any hypotheses regar-
ding these leaders either» the differences with the members may once again be classified 
under the headings: instrumental, expressive and ideological functions. Here too the 
results must be regarded merely as indications. 
The board members of co-operàtives are able to exercise their instrumental function 
because they are more modern in their farming methods. They differ from the members in 
a number of variables which are familiar from adoption-diffusion studies. The leaders 
have a higher standard of education than the members, are better skilled at reading, 
received credit (both input and capital credit) more often from INDAP as well as from 
other sources, were more likely to keep accounts and visited a large city more frequently. 
Admittedly the leaders' farms are no bigger, but they do have a somewhat higher income 
than the members. They also aspire to a higher income and more often contract paid 
workers on their farms. They are more likely than the members to be employers. In the 
light of this it no longer seems strange that the leaders, as I was frequently informed 
during the exploratory stage of the investigation, are inclined to have the co-operative un-
dertake precisely those tasks which suit their own more modern farming methods. 
Nonetheless, it seems that the leaders also fulfil an expressive function. They tend more 
often than the members to have an intimate friend and were, more frequently, one of a 
group of friends. By and large they conversed with more colleagues during the week. 
They were rated higher on a solidarity index. In comparison with the ordinary members, 
the leaders are also more inclined to make excuses for those peasants who have not yet 
joined the co-operative. The leaders, however, are not remarkably different from the 
ideological viewpoint. They are more inclined than the members to prefer a higher in-
come on a communal farm to a lower income on a farm of their own, and tend more to 
think that small peasant-farmers and farm workers share the same interests. It is worth 
noting that leaders appear to differ from members in ways in which we had originally 
expected members would differ from non-members. 
7.5 Participation an oUgarcbization 
Even before 1960 the ideal of participation was alive in Chile in certain circles of the 
PDC and the parties on the left. This ideal implied that decision making in peasant 
organizations should proceed democratically, and involve all the members. They would 
then work together to implement these decisions. Although the ideal usually remained 
vague, a number of peasants and officials of INDAP and CORA nonetheless realized 
that participation must also imply the regular rotation of board members. The tendency 
of leaders to cling on to their leadership, their inclination towards oligarchization, would 
have to be fought and overcome. 
I do not doubt that this tendency existed, even though I have no quantitative data to 
confirm this supposition. It was not, however, always deliberate policy on the part of the 
leaders themselves. In some cases where for example election to some office meant con-
siderable material advantage, or a great increase in prestige, there may indeed have been 
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an inclination to cling to this status, once achieved. If often happened, however, that peo-
ple at the head of an active association who had learned their role while actually on the 
job, built up such a considerable advance in expertise, in organizatory skill and in the size 
of their networks during their term in office that in fact they had to be re-elected if the 
organization was not to slip back. 
The long continuance in office noted by de Ranitz and de Ranitz (1972, p. 128) in three 
asentamientos, does not seem to me exceptional. It is known that worker self government 
runs the risk of failure due to the oligarchization of the leaders. No particular effort was 
made in Chilean peasant organizations to build up an administrative structure which 
might counteract this tendency. Control commissions in co-operatives and asentamien-
tos - which had in any case been adapted from foreign models - worked badly or not at 
all. Neither the government nor any other specialized institutes paid much attention to the 
problem of oligarchization. People seemed to pin their hopes on a regular rotation of in-
dividuals occupying leadership functions, and on the leader's preparedness to make way 
for others. Such hopes appear somewhat naive, assuming as they do a considerable 
degree of self denial and solidarity in people who have cause to value their own personal 
share in the development of the organization more highly than that of others. 
From the theoretical point of view these hopes have implications which were not 
always realized in Chile. If we assume that leaders are chosen by groups because they are 
able to make a contribution which is valued by the members, then this implies that such a 
contribution is chiefly expected from particular persons. Their leadership depends on the 
one hand upon the group but on the other upon their personal qualities. This is seen very 
clearly in the case of informal leaders who only gain recognition if they have a valuable 
contribution to give. Not everyone is an informal leader and it is not easy to set oneself up 
as one. If someone who started out as an informal leader is appointed to an administrative 
post he cannot be replaced by just anybody, but only by another informal leader who 
fulfils the same function. The main thing then is to train members in such a way that the 
group acknowledges them as informal leaders. 
As the expertise of the first leader increases, he becomes more difficult to replace. For 
the time being the talent necessary to provide competent leadership for production or ser-
vice co-operatives appears so thin on the ground that my hopes of easy replacement are 
not very high. 
There is the additional factor that, if he is replaced and certainly if he takes this to 
heart, the board member remains an informal leader and his resentment may cause him 
to stir up his followers against his replacement. If somebody is elected to the Board simp-
ly because a vacancy exists, then he is indeed much easier to replace, but he is also ineffec-
tive as a leader. 
In short, our argument amounts to this. If the ideal of participation is to have any 
chance of success then administrative structures must be developed in which authority is 
circumscribed and subject to control. Furthermore ways must be found to provide the 
members in general and those with leadership qualities in particular with the information 
necessary for them to play their part in decision making and to develop their talents. If 
leaders are, in addition, required to be politically reliable (by the government or the op-
position parties) their replacement becomes all the more difficult. 
It will be obvious from all this that I am sceptical about the possibility of a regular rota-
tion of leaders. It will also appear that I place more hopes in the devising of a structure 
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which would allow for free control and criticism. Yet this too has its difficulties. I was 
often struck during meetings by the fact that the peasants criticized - and were criticized 
- as individuals and not as role bearers. The diffuse, fairly complicated.relationship 
existing between any two peasants in a small community makes it more difficult for them 
to absorb the fact that criticism of a leader affects only one of the roles in their 
relationship. The result is that the leader - who is also a compadre, or the friend of a 
friend, or the fellow one does a few days work for during the harvest season - will react to 
criticism as to a hostile act. Since the critic knows this he will not offer his criticism open-
ly, during a meeting, but mutter slanderously beforehand. In this way the criticism, or the 
rumour, becomes a weapon in the struggle between factions, or an incitement to the 
emergence of factions. The critic finds supporters, but the leader, feeling ill-used, calls 
upon his relatives and friends to protect him. Such a state of affairs can lead to a complete 
absence of control or criticism, and this happens in many co-operatives where the official 
control commission does not function. Yet, on the other hand, control or criticism may 
indeed lead to the formation of factions. 
The only solution I can see, is to make an effort, using socio-dramas, for instance, to 
teach both leaders and members that they are role-bearers, and that it is possible to 
separate both cognitive and affective roles. This of course is more important for the 
leaders. Once they show that they are not afraid of criticism and do not consider it a 
hostile act, the members will soon make themselves heard. 
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Chapter 8 Co-operation and solidarity 
8.1 Introduction 
One of the most important questions which remains to be answered concerns the 
viability and effectiveness of the new co-operative associations and enterprises of the 
Chilean peasants. This viability of course depends in part upon societal factors and 
processes, and mainly upon the government and its specialized agencies. Here, however, 
we shall confine ourselves to asking which factors, on the individual and group level of the 
participating peasants, determine the viability of these organizations. 
In more concrete terms, this poses the following questions: 
- How ought the Chilean peasants to behave in order to make a success of the co-
operative associations and enterprises in which they participate? 
- Are we indeed justified in expecting such behaviour of peasants, or is it more probable 
that they will behave differently? 
- If the latter is true, how is this behaviour to be changed? 
The answer to the first question appears simple. Peasants will achieve successful forms 
of co-operation - insofar at least as this depends on them and not upon the prevailing 
social structure - if they properly fulfil certain roles, that is to say, satisfy the norms per-
taining to these roles. But will they do this? And why should they? Simply because they 
realize that this is in their own best interests? It seems to me that this is not sufficient. The 
realization that a certain form of behaviour is in their own interests is a necessary condi-
tion, but not a sufficient one. In order to make this clear we shall have to retrace our steps. 
What do we really mean by co-operation? What does a co-operating peasant do? He 
carries out to the letter any task entrusted to him, pays his dues, attends meetings, 
observes the working hours, does not grow rich at the organization's expense, keeps 
abreast of the organization's problems and helps to solve them, and abides by decisions 
legitimately arrived at. In a word, he keeps the rules, among the most important of which 
is the rule which decides how conflicts or differences of opinion must be overcome. Two 
conclusions may be drawn from all this: 
- Not every act is one of co-operation. A peasant working his own land is not engaged 
in co-operation, yet is serving his own interest. 
- Insofar as co-operation implies an action (and not refraining from an action) it consists 
of utilizing his resources, which are: affection, energy, knowledge, time and money. In-
sofar as co-operation consists of refraining from an action, it implies relinquishing 
satisfactions which might perhaps have been enjoyed in another, non-legitimate manner. 
Retracing^ our steps has already brought one problem to light. Co-operation is 
frequently not the only kind of action which serves the individual, material interest of the 
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peasant We shall have to discover what this self interest consists of exactly. A second 
problem remained rather more implicit - do all these various co-operative actions really 
serve the peasant's self interest so directly? The example we have given in which co-
operation also implied refraining from some action which, on the face of it, would seem to 
serve the peasant's own interest, reveals that this is not always to. The question becomes 
all the more interesting When we reflect that, in a newly founded peasant organization, 
there are as yet no internalized norms to govern these actions nor are there any members 
who know exactly what is expected of them according to the statutes. This being so, is it 
probable that the members will act co-operatively, solely because they see it as in their 
own interest? Should there not, in addition, be other motives to guide the peasants' con-
duct? In our opinion there are. Coercion and solidarity may exist as motives alongside 
utilitarian considerations. We shall discuss solidarity in a second theoretical digression, 
but first we must probe more deeply into the problem of interest. 
8.2 Peasant interests and conflicts of interest 
We shall define interest as the possibility of obtaining income or other forms of 
satisfaction. This possibility is chiefly determined by a person's position in the production 
process. For peasants participating in a co-operative venture it frequently happens that 
not all those actions which serve their own interests are also co-operative actions. The 
participant in a collective farm nearly always possesses a piece of land for his own use. If 
a peasant has to divide his resources between actions which serve his interest directly and 
those which do so only via a detour, this can give rise to tension, the same tension that 
affects anyone who has to choose between immediate and delayed need gratification. 
Economic theory assumes that direct gratification will generally be given preference. This 
implies that people can Only be persuaded to postpone satisfaction of their own needs by 
being offered some extra reward. At the same time it must be remembered that newly in-
stituted co-operatives or collective farms (and, to a lesser extent, syndicates), while 
promising to be of material advantage to the members, still have to make good this 
promise. This means that, particularly in the initial period, motives other than self interest 
are heavily drawn upon. 
There is, however, another factor. Olson (1965) has shown that a person - assuming 
that he will try to obtain the maximum possible benefit - will not be inclined to exert 
himself to acquire collective goods if he will also acquire them without effort. 
The result or yield of a co-operative venture in agriculture is to a certain extent 
equivalent to a collective good in Olson's sense of the word. In this respect agriculture 
diners from industry. The wage improvements, gained by the syndicate, also benefit the 
non-members. The co-operative which opens up a market for a particular product, or 
breaks the monopoly of a certain buyer by introducing competitors into the area, is 
providing advantages to non-members as well. All the members share in the good grain 
harvest enjoyed by a communal farm according to the amount of work they have put into 
the farm. But such a differential distribution of benefits should also be possible in in-
dustry. Why then does the collective product in agriculture bear more resemblance to a 
collective good? Because in agriculture, without a very careful check, it is impossible to 
say which specific process is responsible for the end product being inferior in quality or 
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disappointing in quantity. It is impossible to discover just who was careless in his work. 
Were the fields not ploughed deep enough? Was the seed in fact treated with pesticides? 
Was somebody careless in weeding? Was the seed delivered not of top quality? Was the 
rainfall in any particular month too high, or, on the contrary, was the weather too dry? 
Was the right amount of fertilizer used? 
Disappointing results may be attributed to environmental factors outside anyone's 
control (the weather), to suppliers (who failed to deliver the seed or the fertilizer on time or 
who delivered inferior quality goods), or to tasks badly performed, that is, to other 
members who have skimped their work but who cannot be taken to task since it would 
cost too much to check up on their activities. In other words the multiplicity of factors 
which may be involved ensures that it is always possible to foist the blame onto other 
members of the co-operative. Now is it clear that if none of the members of the associa-
tion worked towards obtaining the product, there would be nothing to obtain. But if a 
number of members strive to obtain it, then another member has less reason to do so. 
After all, even if he makes no effort, thus conserving resources with which he may serve 
his own interests more directly, he still acquires his share of the collective good in the 
end1. 
An extra incentive is needed to persuade the members to work towards obtaining the 
collective good. Such an incentive may be material (in the form of extra pay), may be 
based on coercion, or may be of a normative nature. This last may involve the sacrifice of 
resources for the benefit of others. 
Not only the production, but also the distribution of the product of a co-operative 
enterprise may give rise to conflicts of interest. Generally speaking this will occur under 
one of three conditions. The distribution of power among the participants may be such 
that some are able to appropriate more of the end product than others. The scarcity of a 
service a person can provide may make it possible for him to claim a more than equitable 
share of the proceeds. This might also be regarded as a question of power, but there is a 
difference. Power can be redistributed, a specialized skill cannot. Finally, the product 
may prove to be what the economists call indivisible, so that some will inevitably receive 
more than others. If the fruits of a communal effort consist of certain services, indivisibili-
ty will of necessity result. 
We have so far dealt with the interests of the individual peasant who participates in a 
co-operative or a collective farm. There are also, however, several remarks to be made 
concerning the conflict of interests between groups or categories. 
The conflict with which we are most familiar from sociological theory is of course that 
between classes, between those who dispose of the means of production and those who do 
not. The latter are able to survive only by selling their labour. Without wishing yet to dis-
cuss this theory in any depth we must nonetheless point out that it does not sufficiently 
explain the various actions which peasants take to promote their interests. 
While not losing sight of Marx's sound view that such a conflict of interests is built into 
the organization of production within society, one must also bear in mind that the labour 
market is not the only market in which such conflicts arise. Precisely in the case of in-
dependent peasants who possess their own means of production (and in the case of a 
collective farm) other markets are at least as important in explaining their conflicting in-
terests and the conduct they adopt. It follows from this that the various categories of 
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peasants do not always share the same interests. Small peasant farmers, for instance, like 
the landed proprietors, are interested in high prices for their products and low wages. In 
the first market, that of the producers, they find themselves opposed by the urban con-
sumers, including the urban proletariat, while the agricultural workers may be largely on 
their side. This is often referred to as the conflict between town and country. In other 
markets the various categories of the rural population are likely to clash. By relating in-
terest conflicts to different markets which in some cases may in their turn consist of sub-
sidiary markets, we obtain a very complex picture in which nobody any longer has exact-
ly the same interest as anybody else. Interest aggregation then means concentrating on 
certain common interests and ignoring those which are not shared and which at that par-
ticular moment appear less important. This makes class, in Marx's sense, not impossible, 
but certainly a borderline case. 
When thus, within a collectivity, one finds groups which do not occupy exactly the 
same position in the production process and have thus divergent interests on particular 
markets or subsidiary markets, sub-collectivities may emerge whose interests to some ex-
tent conflict. The action taken by the collectivity itself- in advocating land reform for in-
stance - may also create different positions; agricultural workers who become asentados 
and those who remain wage labourers on the land. 
Interest aggregation is thus a dynamic phenomenon; interest groups may form, co-
operate and then break up again. This may happen due to a change in their position in the 
production process, but it may also come about without any objective alteration in their 
interests. It is sufficient that they start to view their interest in a different light, attaching 
less weight to the common interest they stressed earlier and more to those which are not 
shared. 
It will be clear from the foregoing analysis that when peasants decide to co-operate this 
does not mean that latent conflicts of interest between individuals, families, sub-groups, 
groups (farms) and sub-collectivities, have disappeared altogether. 
We have seen, moreover, that, while it is true that the peasant's self-interest is served by 
the production of the collective good, this insight alone will not be sufficient to persuade 
him to exert himself permanently in order to attain that good. 
In a later section we shall give examples to show that the tensions referred to did occur 
in Chilean peasant organizations. We shall accordingly discuss ways of lessening such 
tensions and safeguarding the functioning of the organizations. First, however, we shall 
try to discover what other motives may lead an individual to sacrifice some of his 
resources. 
8.3 Solidarity 
A peasant can devote his resources to promoting his own interests and to acts of co-
operating. These acts serve his interests indirectly, sometimes very indirectly, and may 
involve the sacrifice of his own resources for the welfare of others. The nature of the 
collective good which is the product of co-operation is such that co-operative actions 
nearly always entail such a sacrifice. 
It seems to us that there are three motives which may impel a peasant to thus invest his 
resources. These are coercion, the prospect of reward and solidarity. Compulsion and 
reward, however, mean that this investment cannot now be regarded as a sacrifice. The 
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peasant who, by co-operating well, avoids exclusion from the group by way of sanction 
and the peasant who is paid for co-operating are both directly serving their own interests. 
With what we term solidarity the position is somewhat different. 
The definitions given to solidarity in sociological literature vary widely. We would 
define solidarity as the willingness to sacrifice resources or immediate gratification for the 
welfare of others, out of a feeling of unity. It means doing something for others without 
the prospect of material reward. 
We make a further distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity. Mechanical 
solidarity entails sacrificing resources for a common goal. Organic solidarity is the 
sacrifice of gratifications in order to preserve the unity of the group. 
To establish under what conditions solidarity will emerge and survive we must look at 
it more closely. We note first of all that a willingness to make sacrifices for others implies 
that this willingness is confined to certain particular others. On this point our definition of 
solidarity differs from that which Friedrichs (1960, p. 497) gave of altruism: 'the in-
hibiting or controlling of ego's behaviour to provide for the satisfaction of alter's impulses 
or desires'. Whereas for Friedrichs altruism is a quality displayed by individuals 
everywhere and towards everyone, solidarity is a quality of individuals with regard to cer-
tain others2. In relation to an individual one cannot speak of solidarity in general, but only 
of his solidarity with a particular group or category. It is quite possible for a person to feel 
more solidarity with one group than with another of which he is also a member. 
There is one important conclusion to be drawn from this, namely that solidarity is a 
concept to be employed only in relation to a definite group or category. The inherent im-
plication is also important. It is that groups and collectivities compete for the solidarity of 
the individual who is a member of both. This insight is not new, but it has not, perhaps, 
been sufficiently stressed. When Blau (1964, p. 285) says that 'social solidarity in 
macrostructures is always problematical, because the particularistic values that unite in-
groups create segregating boundaries between them in the higher collectivity', he is 
referring to conflicting solidarities which are not resolved by the solidarity with an em-
bracing social unit. If social pressure is exercised upon a person's solidarity (i.e. the fact 
that he makes part of his resources available to the group) by each group (or collectivity) 
to which he belongs, this will lead to rivalry between them. We are assuming here that: 
a. these resources are limited, and that 
b. they are always allocated and are not kept 'in reserve'. 
Assumption a. may be readily accepted but the position is rather different with assump-
tion b. While acknowledging that most people have allocated their resources, some of 
these allocations are not so important that their re-distribution would provoke immediate 
protest. This, however, will happen ultimately. 
People who belong to many groups and collectivities will try to find some way of ac-
commodating the different claims made upon their resources. This usually works so well 
in daily life that they are scarcely aware of being pulled in several directions at once. The 
methods used are based upon the replacement of one resource by another. Time, energy, 
care or love are usually replaced by money, although other replacements are conceivable. 
Groups or organizations often employ people whose daily task it is to promote the in-
terests of the group and they are paid for this work. 
Competition for solidarity between groups is chiefly evident during mobilization, when 
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a re-allocation of resources takes place, and in those circumstances in which à group or 
organization lays a permanent, heavy claim upon the resources of the members. The 
sluggishness which accompanies the mobilization of a collectivity does not spring 
necessarily from any disagreement about the aims of that collectivity. It is much more 
likely that members are chary of incurring the reproaches of groups from which 
resources will have to be withdrawn. The rivalry theory also explains why mobilization 
seems inevitably to be followed by a period of slackening interest and disenchantment 
(Van Doom, 1968, p. 8). The longer a new, one-sided allocation lasts the more the rival 
groups suffer from it and the greater the insistence upon a new re-allocation, that is, a 
return to the former allocation. 
All this means that mobilization will prove very difficult so long as groups which fulfil 
an important function in the lives of the members continue to exist alongside the 
mobilized collectively. And there will be many such groups3. In a modern differentiated 
society, with its emphasis upon the right of the individual to develop whatever gifts he 
possesses to the full, an individual will belong to many groups. If, then, the pressure upon 
individuals to preserve the mobilization is kept up, reluctance, disillusionment and 
passive resistance will continue to grow. It is only possible to achieve a new balance if all 
rival solidarities are to some extent respected. 
Finally, it must be pointed out that, with regard to the emergence of rival solidarities, it 
makes little difference whether the groups in question impinge upon each other in one in-
dividual or whether one group, in it entirety, is swallowed up by another, larger group. 
Rivalry will occur in both cases, although in the first instance group links will tend to be 
more individualized since the combination of groups to which people belong varies from 
one individual to another. Whereas in the second case there is more question of a collec-
tive decision regarding the allocation of resources, in the first the decision is an individual 
one. Simmel (1969, p. 148-150) has already pointed out that from the historical view-
point the second form of association is the earliest form of multiple group membership. It 
'enables the single individual to participate in a number of groups without alienating him 
from his affiliation with his original locality'. In this respect our own finding that 
membership in friendly or kin groups tended not to crosscut affiliation in peasant syn- ' 
dicates or co-operatives is highly significant. 
The implications to which we have just referred concerned mechanical solidarity, the 
sacrifice of resources. But is this the kind of solidarity required in a peasant organization, 
be it a co-operative, a collective farm or an agricultural syndicate? It seems to me that 
mechanical solidarity, endeavour for the common cause, is especially required during 
and shortly after the period of mobilization. It must be borne in mind that every newly 
founded interest organization must of necessity detract from other interests and interest 
groups. Once the organization is firmly on its feet, there is a tendency to demobilize. A co-
operative, for instance, begins to employ people to perform particular tasks and thus 
ceases to be dependent on the trojan work performed by the members in their spare time. 
But now, assuming that the organization is functioning and beginning to bear fruit - a dis-
tribution problem arises. In addition to a certain mechanical solidarity in the form of con-
tribution or participation, the members are also required to give proof of organic solidari-
ty. In other words they are required to refrain from harming the organization by refusing 
to abide by the distribution of tasks or the allocation of benefits. They must accept the 
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results and the procedures employed in settling differences. The longer an organization 
exists and grows in complexity, and the larger it is, the more differentiated it must 
necessarily be. In other words, there will be more specialization of labour and probably 
more variation in the rates of pay. This will bring about a corresponding need for in-
creased organic solidarity. The units (members or sub-groups) will have to recognize the 
justice of the exchange relationships in which they are involved. 
It is clear that, as this unavoidable differentiation increases, the need for organic 
solidarity will grow. But at the same time there is an increasing probability that those who 
consider themselves, for whatever reason, badly done by in the distribution, will join 
together (mobilization, mechanical solidarity) to improve their position. The organiza-
tion, the social system in which this occurs, can survive, and find a new key to distribution 
just so long as the quarrel is thrashed out within the framework established by the rules. If 
this framework is breached - if fights break out or a group decides to quit - then the 
system may cease to be viable. Thus, a functioning social system characterized by 
differentiation has two main requirements - a certain degree of mechanical solidarity and 
a fairly large measure of organic solidarity. Neither of these can be taken for granted; 
they can grow or they can decline. Both are threatened by the mechanical solidarity of 
sub-groups. 
Socialist societies, at least in the past, tended to seek to solve this problem of balance 
by denying this differentiation, by centralizing decisions rather than by evolving processes 
of deliberation and compromise firmly anchored in the constitution. In other words the 
accent was laid upon a further extension of the social system with which, it was hoped, 
the individual felt most solidary. A certain degree of coercion was even resorted to in 
order to obtain the desired behaviour. These attempts met with little success. The larger 
the social unit within which mechanical solidarity is required, the more sub-groups there 
will be with divergent objectives and, in consequence, the more conflicting sub-
solidarities. This will make mechanical solidarity more difficult to achieve and it will be all 
the more important to replace this mechanical solidarity by organic solidarity. 
By way of hypothesis we postulate here that in a differentiated social system, a mixture 
of mechanical and organic solidarity is a functional requirement for development. 
Members must be willing to strive for common goals and be able to accept a distribution 
of advantages arrived at on the basis of consultation. We may assume that the distribu-
tion of their resources (over system objectives and sub-system objectives) and of 
gratifications (throughout the sub-systems or units) will only be accepted voluntarily if 
they are considered just. The idea of what is just is to some extent culturally determined 
but there is a limit to the ideological manipulation to which it can be subjected. A second 
hypothesis is that the extent to which a distribution (of resources or gratifications) is con-
sidered just, depends upon the degree in which the units participate in the decision making 
which determines this distribution and thus also upon the extent to which an administra-
tion is liable to sanction. 
In general, however, the process of consultation and compromise described above as 
an ideal is not constant but occurs only sporadically. There will be periods in which a par-
ticular distribution of tasks and rewards is laid down and comes to be regarded as a norm. 
Later, this norm will not be subject to continuing consultation and compromise. 
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In the local communities in which co-operatives and collective farms are set up there 
are often as yet no norms governing the behaviour to be expected of members of such 
organizations. The solidarity required of villagers embraces compliance with existing 
norms, and does not take into account all possible or conceivable norms. A modern 
organization also requires that members observe, certain rules governing the division of 
labour, the distribution of produce and the supervision of the various tasks (see Dore, 
1971), rules which either do not exist at all in a traditional society or are differently for-
mulated. It is therefore not as easy to graft a modern co-operative structure upon a tightly 
knit peasant community as Fais Borda (1970) would seem to suggest. There is the ad-
ditional factor that traditional solidarity is chiefly mechanical, that is to say, it inhibits the 
peasants from pursuing their individual interests, which in itself is a condition of 
agricultural development Consequently a growth in individualism is often accompanied 
by a decline in traditional solidarity, a transition 'from brotherhood to otherhood' as 
Chodak (1972) termed it. 
Solidary behaviour, the willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of others, is in the 
first instance a gift and we know from the anthropological literature (e.g. Mauss, 1967) 
that a gift creates obligations for the recipient. He must reciprocate in some way. In a 
very worthwhile article Gouldner (1960) has pointed out that reciprocity appears to be a 
general human norm, which, moreover, is implicitly assumed in functional theory. If a 
person displays solidarity with a group this can be very functional for that group, but 
does not explain why this solidary behaviour persists. The real reason is that the in-
dividual displaying solidarity is recompensed. What are the advantages with which other 
group members can and must reward solidarity? One form of compensation is reciproci-
ty in solidary behaviour. This reciprocity assumes that the group in question already 
recognizes norms governing the behaviour of members of associations. Another form of 
return consists in giving prestige to the solidary individual and, not infrequently, a 
leadership function as well. This will occur chiefly where norms and roles have not yet 
been elaborated. Finally, another possibility is failure to recognize the sacrifice. The 
others will then continue to wonder suspiciously just what selfish gain the solidary in-
dividual aspires to. 
At this point it seems advisable to recapitulate briefly the most important findings we 
have made thus far: 
- Peasant organizations cannot function solely on the basis of the interest, the material 
reward of the members. Mechanical solidarity is required in the initial period, and as the 
differentiation of tasks and rewards within the organization increases so too does the need 
for organic solidarity. 
- Both the mechanical and the organic solidarity of the members with such an organiza-
tion is impaired by a strong mechanical solidarity within sub-groups. 
- The best distribution of rights and obligations is that which is regarded as just and 
accepted as a norm. Participation by units and sub-groups in decisions affecting this dis-
tribution appears to be the best way of achieving this. 
- On the other hand an outside answer to the question of what is just and what scope the 
value of justice ought to have may also be accepted. In this case we are dealing with what 
may be called growing political awareness. This, however, is a cultural innovation which 
had not yet been adopted by the majority of Chilean peasants at the time of our research. 
- In addition to participation and the adoption of a new symbolic content for particular 
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values, there were in Chile other important bases of solidarity for transforming the im-
posed statutes into legitimate norms. These included another value- the common welfare 
- affective ties, reciprocity, with its accompanying social control, and finally, charismatic 
leadership. A personal, affective relationship exists with such a leader; people will not 
desert him and if he says that a thing must be done then it is done. He makes the norms 
appear more legitimate by imbuing them with a religious or political aura. From Brazil in 
particular examples have emerged of charismatic leaders, religious prophets, who 
succeeded in changing the behaviour of large groups of peasants in a comparatively short 
time (Queiroz, 1965). Chile did possess peasant leaders with some charisma, but their 
message was political, not religious and they did not found any independent com-
munities. Their charisma had influence, but in a smaller circle, among those with whom 
they had considerable contact as administrators. To these people they offered an example 
and probably some of their values rubbed off on them. 
- Very little is known as yet about the way in which the circle of people with whom one 
identifies enlarges. Generally speaking this identification is preceded by economic in-
tegration. Sociological literature speaks of the lengthening of the chains of in-
terdependence (Elias, 1969) and of the emergence of organic solidarity as the division of 
labour progresses. Anthropologists speak of an extension of the 'moral community'. In 
cultures where the chains of interdependence have grown long, the socialization of 
children appears to be accompanied by a tendency to accept responsibility which relates 
not so much to existing groups or associations but to membership of associations in the 
abstract. This trend then automatically embraces whatever new associations the in-
dividual may join; the act of becoming a member implies that the individual will comply 
with the obtaining concrete norms. 
8.4 Factors which influence solidarity 
In this section I intend, with the aid of examples derived from the practice of Chilean 
peasant organizations, to illustrate those factors which either help or hinder the growth of 
solidarity among members. It must be observed that in actual practice, several factors are 
involved at one and the same time. The accompanying diagram is intended primarily to 
give a comprehensive view of the main factors which appeared to contribute positively or 
negatively to solidarity. Since the organizations were still in an initial stage of develop-
ment there was not yet much question of differentiation among the members. The 
problem was rather one of mechanical solidarity (giving more) than of organic (allowing 
the other to take more). 
As qualitative research methods were employed to study this problem the arrows in-
dicate positive or negative correlations which I imagine would be discovered if the 
variables were measured quantitatively. They are in fact hypotheses. 
8.4.1 The instrumental value of the association 
In an earlier section we distinguished between the act of co-operation performed out of 
self-interest and that which involves a sacrifice of resources. Although it is difficult to 
render this distinction operational, I am convinced that member solidarity was noticably 
greater wherever there was a clearer identity between self-interest and communal in-
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terest. I have already remarked on several occasions that the main reason why my 
agricultural worker informants accepted a communal farm was their expectation of 
material progress for themselves. The economic success of a peasant organization is 
chiefly important because on it depends the acceptance of the organization by the 
members and their solidarity. When I asked the small peasant farmers whether they 
would be prepared to co-operate in the communal exploitation of a fundo if invited, their 
affirmative answer was very often couched in terms of self-interest: 'That way at least I'd 
have something of my own', 'that would mean more land', 'we'd get more credit', *it 
would be the only way to get some capital', or 'yes, for well turn them into individual 
farms'. 
Identity of interests is also clear where the possibility of individual progress is lacking. 
INDAP personnel repeatedly noticed that the small, independent peasants appeared 
more inclined towards co-operation in the isolated areas of a province where natural cir-
cumstances were less favourable than in the areas close to the large cities. There also 
seemed to be a greater inclination towards co-operation on farms where (part of) the 
production process displayed the character of indivisibility, that is to say, had to be 
achieved through co-operation. In other words willingness to co-operate seemed greater 
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wherever the possibility of an individual solution to problems appeared less. The came 
can be said of the numerous, wide-spread examples which came to my notice of groups 
which had co-operated to build a school, improve a road, hire a truck. Many of my infor-
mants thought indeed that this co-operation could easily be focussed upon other goals 
but I thought rather that such examples concerned cases in which, for some local reason 
or another, communal and individual interests had overlapped in a manner that was clear 
to all. 
The clarity of interest identity also increases when there is a stronger correlation 
between individual achievement and reward. This problem occurred in the asentamientos 
where the members were said to show little interest in acquiring new skills since they 
claimed such training did not better their lot financially. They continued to receive their 
day's pay just like everyone else. In a number of asentamientos the peasants themselves 
tried to draw up a scale of remuneration for different activities. It isn't easy, however, to 
find a good criterion for such a scale once the market prices have been abandoned. It can-
not be disputed though that the asentados felt the need for a closer and more accurate 
relationship between personal reward and personal achievement. A very clear indication 
of this was the spontaneous setting up of small work groups in a number of asentamien-
tos, each concerned with running one section of the farm, or farming one section of the 
land. The more their section produced, the higher their pay. 
What is the significance of this preference for a close relationship between achievement 
and reward? It is, in the first place, that the achievement is performed with a view to the 
reward. We knew this already; the peasants accepted the communal farm because they 
expected to do better out of it materially. But it also means that the peasants distinguished 
between a reward earned through personal effort and a share in the joint production. In 
small work groups, in which it is much easier to exercise social control, the production is 
no longer a collective good for which there is no need to exert oneself in order to obtain 
one's share4. 
The care lavished by asentados on their own piece of land is a well known phenomenon 
on collective farms. It is also understandable when one considers that these little plots, the 
produce of which is not a collective good in Olson's sense, contribute a large share of the 
family income. 
During the Frei period there were asentamientos where up to \ of the family income 
was produced on these pieces of land (de Ranitz & de Ranitz, 1972)5. In an economic 
study of 16 asentamientos, Jolly et al. (1970, p. 32) found that the income produced on 
individual pieces of land or using the peasant's own animals constituted on the average 
23 % of the gross family income. It is the wives in particular who urge their husbands not 
to neglect the family plot. Not only are they less familiar with the running of the asen-
tamiento, they have no participating role in it either; they represent the family interest. 
Thus, this conflict of interests becomes at the same time a conflict of solidarity. This 
much becomes evident from the remarkable fact that in some asentamientos the 
machines belonging to the collective farm could be used gratis for tilling the privately 
worked pieces of land. This is a concealed subsidy on the part of the collectivity to the in-
dividual members and can only be explained by assuming that everyone is convinced of 
the legitimacy of working for the family interest. 
There is yet another example. In a certain asentamiento the general council decided 
against making the sons of the asentados socios laborales (employee with certain rights), 
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arguing that some families (with many adult sons) would have a considerable advantage 
over others (with only a few sons). This decision shows very clearly that die asentados 
recognized both a clash of interests and a conflict of solidarity. 
The fact that the conflict of interests proceeds in part from the character of collective 
good possessed by the product of the asentamiento, appears from a complaint frequently 
made by asentados. They felt victimized by the lazy workers, those who skimped their 
work but still received the same payment from the administration. Clearly this argument 
could easily turn into a rationalization for the good workers to do less than their best. The 
diverse observations devoted by Lehmann (1972) to some of the above-mentioned 
phenomena, show that the tension persisted under Allende's regime. 
In other associations - co-operatives and syndicates - the clash of interests between 
the individual (family) and the collectivity, assumed more the character of a conflict of 
solidarity. I encountered quite a number of peasant leaders who said that their wives were 
not very favourably impressed by their activities since these sometimes entailed a couple 
of weeks absence from home, or the neglect of their own private little pieces of land. One 
of them said that his friends and neighbours helped him on his farm, another that his wife 
objected to his seeking re-election in one particular year. A third - a member of a syn-
dicate board - calculated for me how much he had lost financially during a year on the 
board, while others merely complained about this but didn't mention any figures. A 
leader - at national level - said that if he were married, he would never be able to devote 
so much time to his administrative work unless he received adequate recompense. The 
landowners too exploited this conflict of interests, notably by provoking it deliberately. In 
several cases the wives of the agricultural workers were persuaded to use their influence 
to prevent their husbands from organizing. It also occurred - although these were excep-
tional cases - that a leader was bribed by the owner: a larger piece of land was placed at 
his disposal or he was offered better terms of employment. On some of the farms - often 
the smaller ones - the owner made sure that his wage rise was just a little higher than that 
demanded by the syndicate. There were farms which made it their policy to treat then-
workers so well that the arguments of the syndical organizers fell upon deaf ears. The 
syndicate members themselves had the general feeling that the non-members on the farms 
were favoured, given the easiest jobs and better working conditions. 
8.4.2 The common opponent 
The existence of an obvious common opponent can also underline the identity of in-
terests and lead to increased solidarity. Many of my informants observed that the syn-
dicate ran in cycles of activity and lull. The activity was concentrated in those months in 
which new wage demands were drawn up and discussed with the members - and a new 
collective working'arrangement was agreed upon with the landowners in the community. 
Such activities not infrequently terminated in a strike. During other conflicts too, such as 
the occupation of farms, the members displayed a large measure of solidarity, but once 
peace was signed the syndicate might spend months just barely ticking over. During con-
flicts, group action, with the visible emotionality and social control involved and the par-
ticipating role of the women, in short, the dramatized identity of interests, was un-
doubtedly a factor conducive to solidarity. 
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8.4.3 Support for certain values: equality, justice, participation 
The most solidary peasants I encountered in Chile were individuals who wanted to 
realize these three values for all peasants. In nearly every case they were also leaders, that 
is to say, their solidarity was rewarded with a high position. They were rather exceptional. 
Generally speaking, the new, peasantry-wide goals derived from these values were not 
deemed important by the majority of peasants. This does not mean that they advocated 
inequality or non-participation, but they acted as though the new ways of striving for 
equality, justice and participation were matters of no particular concern to them. A good 
deal of work would have to be done to jolt them into awareness. Taken in general the way 
in which these values were propagated by the promotors of INDAP and other 
organizations left much to be desired. They seemed to rely on something in the nature of a 
sermon which might be of a religious or political nature according to the conviction of the 
promotor, but which, so far as the peasants were concerned, seemed to go in one ear and 
out the other. Much more effective was the example which some leaders - and a few of the 
promotors - gave. It consisted of action, not talk, although they made their opinions clear 
as well. Their example inspired imitation among other individuals, rather than among the 
group as a whole. Psychologists have indeed discovered that altruistic behaviour can be 
promoted by example (cf. Wright, 1971, pp. 134-135). 
It did not always appear necessary that an entire group should cherish these values. 
There were cases in which a committee, two or three people, persuaded their association 
to show solidarity with another group. There were others in which the committee of a 
municipal syndicate managed to organize a successful strike in protest against the dis-
missal of one single man somewhere on a fundo, a man completely unknown to 90% of 
the members. In these cases a suggestion made by Etzioni (1968, p. 101) in a somewhat 
different connection seems valid. He suggests that cohesion between the members of 
different associations is a function of the cohesion between their leaders. This was certain-
ly true in those cases which I observed myself. 
8.4.4 Affection 
For the majority of Chilean peasants, affection seemed an important factor in 
promoting solidarity. It was not so much that the affection between the members of 
associations or collectivities was in any way remarkable, but rather that the contrary of 
affection - mistrust, antipathy - could seriously weaken an organization. In Chapter 6 
we saw already that a person's affiliation to a co-operative or syndicate was often accom-
panied by the affiliation of his friends and relatives. It is the group of friends or relatives 
that joins. For an explanation of this we must turn to Simmel (1969) who observed that 
membership in two groups like this is not individualizing. A conflict of solidarity may still 
occur if the larger group wishes to go one way and the smaller another, but it is not acute 
from the very outset. This idea is interpreted in a very pregnant fashion by a respondent 
who had left the syndicate again: 'I felt lonely, I was the only one from home who had 
joined.' It may well be that, as Etzioni (1968, p. 100 ff) asserts, the affective relationships 
within sub-groups foster the cohesion of the association, that one is dealing with an 
expansion of the affective relationships. 
The importance of affection within small groups: board members of associations, 
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small committees, small production groups, was clear. The observer becomes aware that 
the committees and groups which function well are those in which most of the members 
are bound by ties of affection. Many of the small production groups which came into 
being through co-option, consisted of relatives, friends, and the odd neighbour. The reason 
given for this is 'these are people I can trust'. In the best committees I observed at work 
the affection between the members was obvious. 
The difficulties arise when affection dies, either because people begin to mistrust each 
other regardless or to suspect each other of laziness, justifiably or not. This happens when 
functional demands are made upon the co-operative effort for which the affective group 
possesses no norms. The group then loses the ability to work well together. In one 
production group where there was not enough work to give everyone a full day's employ-
ment tensions ran so high that shots were fired (they fortunately missed). In another, 
which had started out very enthusiastically, a breach threatened between the younger and 
the older members. A number of the younger members wanted to leave. In yet another 
there was a whole drama when a pig was found to be missing after the return of one of the 
members who had been absent. The committees too, especially those of the co-
operatives, can prove breeding grounds for suspicion. One or more of the members may' 
have to visit Santiago or the provincial capital once a week for business with various 
government offices. For this he is given expense money and the others suspect him of 
lining his own pockets with it. He is suspect too because these visits teach him the 
bureaucratic tricks of the trade and make him indispensable. (In one case I came across 
this was in fact done deliberately. The chairman made the man who had accompanied 
him wait in the corridor until he had finished his conversation with the official.) Finally 
there is the question of politics, which we will return to later. 
Affection is much more a relationship between individuals than between role bearers. 
We have already pointed out that Chilean peasants were hardly able to offer criticism -
or accept it - as bearers of a role. The person criticized considered that he had suffered an 
injury to the honour and dignity of his entire person, instead of merely one aspect of it. He 
reacted to criticism with rage, disappointment, threats that he would chuck the job or 
with a counter attack. Affection makes criticism of role fulfillment even more difficult 
than it already is. Whereas in the preceding paragraphs we recognized the advantages of 
working in small co-operative units, the prominent role which affection plays here as the 
basis of solidarity is more of a disadvantage. 
It was also true that the effectiveness of the promotors of INDAP and CORA 
depended upon their personal relationships with the peasants. They too could make 
themselves disliked and mistrusted, but they had one advantage. It was from them'that all 
kinds of governmental favours flowed and so the peasants, up to a certain point, had to 
keep on the right side! of them. 
Yet affection need not permanently determine solidarity in this way. We asked the 
agricultural workers whom we had been researching to arrange in sequence a number of 
groups and collectivities according to the ties they felt with them. The interesting fact is 
that those members who claimed most solidarity with the campesinos (the peasant class), 
tended more often, in comparison with the rest, to have friends who were not themselves 
members of the syndicate (25 % against 4.4 % and 4.6 %) and less often to have relatives 
on the fundo who were all members themselves (16% against 24 % and 45 %). This may 
indicate that peasant class awareness may replace affection as a motive for affiliation. 
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Such class conscious people join without bothering what their friends and relatives do: 
that is up to them. Even if they don't join this is evidently no reason for ending the 
friendship. 
8.4.5 Compensations: reciprocity, prestige, leadership and suspicion 
Solidarity is a gift which creates an obligation. This obligation may be redeemed in two 
ways; by evincing reciprocity or by conferring prestige upon the giver. 
The importance of reciprocity became particularly clear at the moment it was found to 
be lacking. A committee member might feel deeply disappointed if the members did not 
fulfil their obligations, if for instance they ignored the committee's summons to come and 
help rebuilding a shed, or failed to attend meetings. Not only did he think that they had 
fallen down on their obligation; he also appeared to feel himself absolved of his own 
obligation. The feeling of being put upon, which could spring up very easily in production 
groups, could in fact frequently be traced back to a lack of reciprocity, real or imagined, 
to the idea that the other person was doing less than he ought. Prestige is a reward con-
ferred upon those who render considerable service to a group. On a hacienda it is the per-
son who openly urges resistance to the patron, who shows himself unafraid of reprisals 
and who is capable of standing up for himself during negotiations. In the asentamientos it 
is he who displays the best managerial qualities. In the co-operatives these qualities are 
important too, but co-operatives remain much more dependent on governmental support. 
Very few board members of co-operatives had the vision, the organizing talent and the 
perseverance to start up and nurse along an organization embracing one or more com-
munities and capable of becoming a very large enterprise indeed. Many board members 
were indeed convinced of the necessity for co-operation, were very zealous and dedicated 
in preaching the good news and in founding an organization, but were then at a loss what 
to do next. They took the prestige they received as their due, they allowed themselves to 
be elected and sent as delegates to assemblies of federative associations, they spoke of 
their sacrifices, but for the rest they were less than effective. And yet, more than once, it 
appeared that this kind of man had already attempted in the past to set up a co-operative 
in his community. He meant well, but had no idea how to proceed once the co-operative 
was actually there, and it sometimes seemed that by heaping him with prestige, the 
members had also rendered him harmless; they had fulfilled their obligations. 
In a couple of cases, however, such a board member - often the chairman - did have 
ideas on how to proceed. A tractor was then bought in common, or a truck; an abattoir 
was built or a good project drawn up in order to obtain credit from INDAP. In these 
cases the leaders often had something charismatic about them: they exuded forcefulness. 
Since they did more, the members had to do more in return; the mere granting of prestige 
was not enough. Another leader said of himself that he acted like a dictator in his com-
mittee. He himself set about collecting contributions, and refused to be fobbed off. 
However, he also made sure that the necessary production inputs were available. He 
asked INDAP for twice as much as the members of his committee had requested him. If 
there was a shortage then of, for instance, salitre later in the year, he could say to a non-
member: why don't you join and 111 see that you get 40 sacks of salitre tomorrow (not in 
a month, or iïr a week, but tomorrow!). He made good his promise too, so that the person 
in question was left standing open-mouthed. He had in consequence a considerable hold 
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over his people. The members of the committee paid back their loans, attended meetings 
and paid up their fees. This kind of leader often succeeded in turning the co-operative into 
a not inconsiderable 'business'. The objection, however, was that he made himself in-
dispensable. Sometimes he was not aware of this. He was so preoccupied with the bud-
ding business and so afraid of seeing what he had built up destroyed, that he couldn't 
bring himself to run the risk that others might make the wrong decisions. Sometimes, 
though, it was deliberate policy. The leader then monopolized information, took the 
credit for what another committee member had done, played off different local groups 
against each other and allowed himself to be re-elected in spite of opposition. 
I attended a meeting of a board which had one of these almost charismatic leaders as 
its chairman, and it was plain to see that the leader had his fellow board members on a 
tight rein. There was no agenda; he decided what was to be discussed. Every point in the 
agenda inspired him to one or more long and often amusing anecdotes. Throughout all 
this his fellow board members clearly showed their impatience; one of them even began to 
read the newspaper. And yet it was always the leader who announced that they were 
about to proceed to the next point. Such 'indispensable' leaders hamper member par-
ticipation and thus the necessary training of fellow board members. 'They are really es-
sential at the beginning,' said an INDAP promotor, 'but later it is impossible to get them 
to work democratically and to take pride in making themselves dispensable'6. 
Dependence upon one man is dangerous for an organization, if only because that man 
is not invulnerable. He can make a mistaken decision, with which he must be identified by 
virtue of his position. A mistake like this relieves the others of some of their obligation and 
they feel justified in becoming less active. Another possibility is that the co-operative 
becomes so large that local shopkeepers and tradesmen feel their interests threatened and 
grow hostile. Their hostility will certainly take the form of spreading rumours and gossip 
about the leader. Once such a campaign has begun the members are under pressure from 
different sides to believe one version of a story or another. 
Suspicion is constantly lurking. In actual fact pur quantitative data on leaders showed 
that, generally speaking, they had enjoyed certain advantages more than had the 
members. At one meeting - as a reaction on the part of the board of a co-operative to a 
piece of gossip doing the rounds - details were read out concerning those individuals for 
whom the lorry had driven during the past month, and what had been paid for the loads 
carried. It proved that by far the most of the trips had been for the chairman and manager 
of the co-operative. In this case the book-keeping was very competent but elsewhere it 
was quite common for appointments to be made by word of mouth, or notes to be 
scribbled on loose sheets of paper. This made it practically impossible for any ordinary 
member to distinguish any more between honesty and deception. Ready suspicion ab-
solved the member from any further obligations towards the suspect leader. His solidari-
ty was denied and so did not have to be reciprocated7. 
8.4 J6 Social control 
I have already pointed out that the peasants tended to criticize or receive criticism as 
individuals rather than as role-bearers. This made constructive criticism practically im-
possible. Often a grievance was bottled up for far too long and when it finally burst loose, 
a blazing quarrel immediately developed. The peasants have no idea how to return then 
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to normal relationships, said an INDAP official. 
The quarrels which may arise between two individuals are all the more disturbing since 
both parties appeal to the solidarity groups which support them, whether relatives or 
friends. In this way a conflict spreads very rapidly. The unintentional result of this was 
that in hardly a single co-operative did the official control commission function properly. 
In a number of co-operatives there was no control either on the fulfilment of 
obligations such as the payment of the subscription in full. In one co-operative in 
Colchagua whose books I managed to look into, it appeared that only 2 or 3 % of the 
members were fully paid up. Many members had paid only 10%, 20% or 50% of the 
money, and this was not because they had only recently joined. Most of them hadn't paid 
anything for two years. I estimated that the co-operative had still to get in about 70% of 
the amount owing, a sum large enough to pay for a couple of tractors. 
If effective social control in the co-operative enterprises was often conspicuous by its 
absence, where it did occur it was sometimes quite drastic. In one co-operative which was 
flourishing quite well from the economic point of view, about ten members were expelled 
in the course of two years. Some of these were in fact founder-members. The two most 
frequent reasons given were that they had blackened the character of a board member or 
the manager, or that during harvest time they had not hired a threshing machine from the 
co-operative but had brought one in from outside. It was principally those leaders who 
acted out of strong ideological conviction who dared to exercise social control and 
thereby teetered on the edge of paternalism. 
One of the best INDAP promotors I met in Chile told me that he had a certain method 
of intervening when things threatened to go wrong in the co-operative of which he was in 
charge. He waited until the situation was so desperate that at least the board and some of 
the members realized that the co-operative would fail if something weren't done quickly. 
This was when he stepped in with his suggestions. 'Only then are they willing to accept 
anything from you', he said. 'If you approach them earlier they won't listen.' 
All this does not mean that there is hardly any social control. There is, but it is either 
non-verbal or takes the form of a passing joke or a story doing the rounds. Only seldom 
does the association apply its statutory sanctions. What social control there is is effective, 
but the indirect way in which it is applied means that it is particularly effective in smaller 
groups. 
8.4.7 Braking factors: differences in status and sub-group solidarity 
The mechanical solidarity of a group is impaired if differences in status occur among 
the members, that is, real or supposed differences in interest. 
I encountered the following examples of categorical interest conflicts within the 
Chilean peasant associations. In the asentamientos there was the clear conflict between 
seasonal workers drawn from outside and the actual members. Cases occurred in which 
the asentados were as harsh in dealing with striking workers as had been the landed 
proprietors. They attempted to break the strike by mobilizing their wives and children to 
save the harvest. In most syndicates a conflict of interests developed if some of the 
members became asentados. The latter usually left the syndicate after a time, one of their 
reasons being that their contribution was no longer paid for them. Only occasionally did I 
encounter a group of asentados who considered it their duty to help their ex-colleagues 
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become asentados themselves and for this reason remained in the syndicate. Frequently 
too those workers who! preferred to remain on the patron's réserva rather than join the 
asentamiento, were to be found among the supervisory personnel. These had also been 
the highest paid workers on the fundo. De Ranitz & de Ranitz (1972) found that those 
asentados Who had seen their relative advantage over their traditional groups of reference 
diminished were the least satisfied with land reform. 
In the co-operatives there was some conflict of interest between agricultural workers 
and independent peasants on the one hand and between the co-operative as a whole and 
its component production groups on the other. The primary question was, to which tasks 
should the co-operative give priority, to providing cheap consumer goods or to bolstering 
up production. While not giving rise to actual conflict, this dilemma did cause some dis-
satisfaction. Unfortunately the position in Chile in 1970 was such that there was a certain 
danger in a co-operative attempting to provide that service most ardently desired by the 
poorest peasants and the agricultural workers, namely the sale of consumer goods. It 
might see its capital disappear as a result of inflation if it settled for a small profit margin. 
Although I have no figures at my disposal to support this assertion, I came across enough 
cases to hazard that a considerable percentage (20% or more) of the co-operatives had 
condemned themselves to non-activity in this way. 
Such a categorical contrast assumed more dramatic forms in certain co-operatives in 
the province of Colchagua, the only co-operatives at the time to contain large production 
groups. Some of these groups held land while others had large chicken farms. According 
to the statutes, these groups were obliged to do all their businessjda the co-operative, 
which in some cases was also the nominal owner of the means of production. The co-
operative, however, worked with one fund for all the services. This resulted in the credit 
balances of the production groups being used to provide a loan elsewhere, or pay off a 
debt, or to make some purchase or other. Then, when the groups wished to avail of then-
surplus, it could happen that there was not enough money in the kitty. Especially when 
poultry prices began to tumble and the groups to work at a loss, with the increasing 
danger that their supplies of feed would be cut off because of failure to pay, they started to 
buy and sell outside of the co-operatives. 
A remarkable example of a growing difference in status and the estrangement which 
can result from it, is the following. A co-operative which had been set up a couple of years 
earlier in a small coastal village of the province of Santiago was extremely successful. 
With only limited credit it had built up a machine park, started a cattle fodder factory, 
was about to open a small sausage and meat factory. In addition it provided consumer 
goods for the members. The membership was continually expanding. However, although 
the co-operative was also open to young people, the working sons of the members, the 
latter were dissatisfied. They felt that the co-operative worked for their fathers, but did 
nothing for them. When then another government service which dealt particularly with 
young people started working in the village alongside INDAP, this dissatisfaction led to 
plans for setting up a second co-operative intended specially for the younger people. It 
only fell through because of resistance by INDAP. 
The clash of interests between categories also played a part in the relationships 
between the various categorical organizations on the provincial or national level. I have 
frequently seen peasant leaders or politically interested outsiders attempt to achieve 
greater unity or to combine the forces of the various organizations. Their usual argument 
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was that the peasants formed a class with a particular class interest. Not much seemed to 
result from all this during my stay in Chile. This was, it appeared, because there was no 
attempt to reach accurate and concrete agreement on co-operation, in other words, on 
promoting those interests which the categories really shared. Instead of recognizing that 
the categories also had opposing interests - for instance regarding the wage paid to 
agricultural workers - promotors hammered away at this all-embracing yet still vague 
notion of class interest8. 
Apart from differences in category we may also, on the basis of our theoretical analysis 
of Section 8.2 - expect a clash of interests to arise around the distribution of the product of 
co-operation. And such clashes did indeed occur in the co-operatives and the asentamien-
tos, as well as in the federations which they joined. The most usual case concerned a local 
group which either did not wish to join a larger unit or else, having joined, was dissatisfied 
with the distribution. It was noteworthy, for instance, that sometimes only a quarter or 
less of the members of a local committee of small peasant-farmers joined the regional co-
operative when the committee was officially incorporated into it. This might have been 
due in part to the financial sacrifice involved, though, as we already saw, very few paid the 
whole of the obligatory contributions. I think, therefore, that this hesitation must also be 
attributed to the recognition of a distribution problem. 
Distribution problems arose in the co-operatives in connection with the priority given 
to certain tasks and the geographical location of development projects. Generally 
speaking if a co-operative wished to achieve a certain degree of viability, it had to earn 
money. This could only be done by first tackling those tasks which were to the advantage 
of the peasants who supplied most products for the market, i.e. the larger of the 
smallholders, from whose ranks indeed the board members were often drawn. This could 
lead to the emergence of two status groups of larger and smaller independent peasants. 
The latter might even turn away from the co-operative altogether, regarding it as the in-
strument of the other status groups (cf. Lehmann, 1970a and 1970b). 
A distribution problem involving production groups arose in the province of 
Colchagua. There it frequently happened that a member of a production group was 
elected to the board of a higher organization such as a co-operative or the provincial 
federation of co-operatives. He then worked for that organization a couple of days a 
week. In the beginning he received no compensation for this, since the organizations had 
no money. This meant that the production group was supporting a member whose work 
contribution had declined, for the sake of the higher organization. In the end this so 
irritated the other members of the production group that they forbade their fellow 
members to remain on the board. The federation of Colchagua, a pioneer in many 
respects, resolved the difficulty by starting to pay such aboard member for his work. The 
money was derived from the percentage it retained on transactions concluded through its 
intermediary and by skimming off a certain overhead from credits granted through the 
federation to the co-operatives. Both these methods of financing could lead in their turn to 
protests from the associated co-operatives. The federation required the board member in 
question to pay his earnings into the funds of his own production group which then paid 
him out the same as the other members received. 
It was characteristic of the distribution problem in federative associations that the par-
ticipating units were usually keen on having a representative on the board of the federa-
tion. He was then expected to do his best to influence distribution in favour of his unit of origin. 
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Generally speaking, when sub-groups harm the mechanical solidarity of the main 
group their material interests will also deviate from the common interest One may count 
as exceptions those sub-groups whose bond of solidarity could indeed only be interpreted 
in cultural terms. 
An innocent example is that of the peasant who goes out drinking with his friends in the 
evening and then the following day is incapable of putting in a good day's work on the 
communal farm. I have no quantitative data to show how frequently this occurred but I 
do know that in the province of Santiago, the managers of various asentamientos men-
tioned alcohol as the most important dysfunctional phenomenon. It was also significant 
that the sale of hard liquor within asentamientos was forbidden. This prohibition was 
evidently inspired by the fear that to sell drink so close to home would only encourage 
drunkenness. 
Factions sometimes formed in asentamientos when two fundos were joined to make 
one asentamiento. These factions, so detrimental to solidarity, were usually political. In 
both co-operatives and asentamientos an atmosphere of mistrust and one-upmanship 
developed when such groups tried to obtain for themselves the majority on a board or the 
specialized committees of an association. The role of politics was so complex however, 
that it seems better to devote a separate section to it. 
8.4.8 The role of politics 
In order to illustrate the conflict of loyalties and the increase in solidarity to which 
politics can give rise it is necessary to delve a little deeper into the political situation in 
Chile in 19 70. In Chapter 3 we have already seen that in Chile too, when the time seemed 
ripe to mobilize the peasants as political allies and electors, various political and 
ideological groupings set about the task. During the Frei government there were three 
large confederations of syndicates. One of these, Ranquil, was dominated by the 
socialists and communists. Another, El Triunfo Campesino, which consisted mainly of 
syndicates founded by INDAP, was linked to the Christian Democrats, as was the third, 
Libertad, which grew out of the syndicates set up by Catholic groups. 
It may be argued that the very existence of three confederations in place of one already 
constituted a weakening of the peasants' position. This argument is reinforced every time 
they were unable to agree on a common course of action and either did nothing at all or 
else carried out the action with a section of the agricultural workers as mere spectators; 
On the other hand it is also true, as Etzioni (1968, p. 408) asserts, that when several 
associations fulfil the same function they keep each other on their toes and prevent, to 
some extent, countermobilization. However, as the confederations increasingly took it 
upon themselves to defend the policy of a particular party, their existence tended more to 
weaken the unity of the peasants. In view of the great differences in economic, social and 
family status among the peasants it is in my view unrealistic to suppose that all peasants 
will feel drawn to the same party, where four or five political parties compete for voters, 
members and supporters. The Chilean political parties (like almost all political parties in 
Latin America) were interest-agglomerations which originated in the towns. There was 
no real peasant party. Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the peasants 
divided up among three or four parties, chosing whichever they thought would suit their 
interests best. The communist party, the socialist party, the PDC, the Radicals and 
117 
M APU each had their own supporters among the peasants, although in some cases these 
were few in number. 
Division arose not so much because of differences of opinion among the peasants, as 
through the machinations of the parties. Each party tried to erect a political bastion by 
gaining control of leaders and by diverting government funds to the peasants, either for a 
project or as credit. More than a year before the presidential elections of 1970 the parties, 
and INDAP, as a government agency, appeared very much aware of what seemed to 
them the necessity of installing political supporters in those leadership posts open to elec-
tion. This was achieved not so much by distorting results as by pressing through the can-
didature of certain persons. The question of who might prove the most capable leader was 
only secondary ; the main thing was to get a party man elected. Given the fact that most of 
my participating research was carried out in organizations dominated, nominally at least, 
by the PDC (El Triunfo and the confederation of co-operatives) it was the PDC which I 
most frequently saw winning. This was achieved by sabotaging any capable peasant 
leader suspected of holding a different political conviction. The greatest sufferers among 
the leaders were the M APU supporters. Thus, for instance, at the election of the board of 
El Triunfo at the end of 1969, a young charismatic leader from the north of the country -
who was already a member of the board - was passed over for the chairmanship because 
he was said to belong to MAPU. 
In December 1969, during the elections to the board of the Confederation of Peasant 
Co-operatives, the representative of the Federation of the province of Colchagua missed a 
seat by one vote. This scarcely appeared accidental. It happened despite the fact that his 
Federation was the furthest developed, had the most active and conscientous board, and 
was most acutely aware of the path which the organized small peasants should take. He 
was, however, regarded as a MAPU supporter. I have no doubt that all the parties played 
this little game, with the excuse that 'the others did it too'. During the last months before 
the elections such machinations rendered the normal working of the peasant organiz-
ations difficult if not impossible. INDAP too ceased to function. Employees who were 
considered politically unreliable were transferred from the field to the capital, or, if they 
were already stationed there, were refused a car to go out into the country. The available 
cars were used to transport political propagandists. The most incredible accusations of 
sabotage were circulated to explain why projects had failed. 
This state of affairs gave rise to various kinds of solidarity conflict. A peasant leader 
starting to play a political role was obliged to choose at certain moments, when the in-
terests of the peasants clashed with those of the party. The peasants themselves were un-
certain whether they ought to show solidarity with other peasants because they were 
peasants too, or to refuse solidarity because they felt attracted to a different party. 
Since none of the parties in Chile was a real peasant party, identification with one par-
ty also meant identification with interests which were not entirely those of the peasant. In 
this respect it is clear that the peasants were used to some extent by all the parties and 
would probably remain dependent whatever the result of the elections9. Even more 
paralyzing than what the peasants did, however, was their mistrust of what other 
peasants were suspected of doing. Every initiative on the part of somebody else was, in 
1970 at least, interpreted as a political move intended to support one's own party to the 
detriment of others. I very often heard some leader accused of political activity, of blindly 
carrying out orders from some party headquarters, yet when I saw this person in action I 
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was unable, with the best will in the world, to detect any proselytism. It may be that this 
suspicion was particularly rife in 1970, an important election year. 
The indications that the peasants' votes can be bought by a particularistic expenditure 
of government funds arc ambiguous. We ourselves found, in an ecological analysis of the 
results of the presidential election of 1970, that the extent to which land reform had been 
carried out in a community had not benefited Tomic, the candidate of the party in power. 
It did, however, seem as though the category of peasants who had most improved their 
position during F rei's government, the inquilinos and the permanent workers, had opted 
for Tomic (cf. Galjart, 1974). An analysis of the losses suffered by the PDC between the 
congress elections of 1965 and the municipal elections of 1967 indicates that the different 
categories of peasants had reacted differently to the land reform, according to whether 
they had benefited by it or not (Kaufman, 1972, p. 124 ff). 
An anonymous analysis of the congress by-elections of 1972 in the provinces of 
Maule, Colchagua and O'Higgins showed no link at all between the percentage of votes 
gained by the Unidad Popular and the favours which this party had dispensed locally. 
The most probable explanation is that the various categories of smallholders and 
agricultural workers felt that they had benefited to varying degrees and this was reflected 
in their votes. Whatever the explanation, in 1970 not only the parties, but the peasants as 
well, were convinced that patronage produced votes. And although almost everyone 
agreed that politics divided them, they had no option but to follow their respective parties. 
Lacking any authentic view of their own on the future of rural Chile they were obliged to 
look to the parties for it 
8.5 Solutions 
There are various w$ys in which a person torn by conflicting norms can resolve his 
problem, assuming that he himself, and others, recognize what is wrong. Failure to dq so 
through a compartmentalization of roles for instance, is also a kind of solution; it 
prevents eruptions but may also halt the process of dawning awareness. Thompson & 
Van Houten (1970, p. 147 ff) suggest the following possibilities: expanding or cutting 
down on the number of positions one has, transferring responsibilities to another and 
negotiating a compromise. What significance might these proposals have in the context of 
co-operation in Chile? We begin by noting that, if conflicts of solidarity are linked with 
roles, as we postulated, the roles, and thus the conflicts, cannot be expected to disappear 
of their own accord. 
The first possibility would imply the removal of functions from the family and other 
primary groups, thus rendering the role of father, of friend, of party member etc.', less 
-demanding. I consider this to be possible only in a limited number of cases, for example 
where two local groups share an asentamiento. Then certain measures can be taken to 
weaken the importance of this bonding principle. But for the time being I cannot imagine 
the family losing any of its functions. In practice this possibility also implies attributing 
more weight to one position than to the other and thus living up to one norm but not to the 
other. In other words, one might favour one group, of which one is a member, over 
another. In this respect do people distinguish between groups? When requested to list the 
various groups and categories according to the strength of their attachment to them the 
respondents gave consistent replies. Table 26 shows the average positions attributed to 
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Table 26. Average attachment of members and non-members of syndicates to various 
groups of which they are members (average positions) 
Category of 
respondents 
All members 
All non-members 
Ex-members 
Never-members 
Leaders 
Other members 
Attachment to 
family 
1.47 
1.56 
1.22 
1.93 
1.56 
1.44 
blood 
relatives 
3.38 
3.08 
2.97 
3.21 
3.46 
3.35 
the 
Chilean 
people 
3.17 
2.76 
2.99 
2.50 
3.78 
2.93 
workers 
on the 
fundo 
3.67 
3.80 
3.65 
3.96 
3.43 
3.76 
the 
peasants 
3.94 
4.46 
4.60 
4.31 
4.02 
3.91 
the 
working 
class 
5.37 
5.34 
5.57 
5.09 
4.75 
5.61 
N 
143 
67 
35 
32 
41 
102 
the groups by agricultural workers. 
The table shows that it is precisely the classes (the peasants and the working class) which 
come last. The sequence of the groups correlates with the degree to which these 
relationships possess a face-to-face character, with one exception, the Chilean people. 
The weight attributed to face-to-face relationships indicates that solidarity is indeed to a 
large extent determined by affection and interaction. It also underlines our earlier argu-
ment that individuals who become involved in a conflict can mobilize their primary 
groups and thus cause dissention between groups. The table indicates too how conflicts of 
solidarity will probably be decided, should they arise. 
Although the members and non-members of co-operatives also put their family first, the 
other groups were ranked differently by different respondents. As a result the average 
positions of these groups are about the same. 
In many countries a conflict of solidarity was avoided, in co-operatives at least, by 
handing over responsibility to paid employees. The members' sacrifice was then limited 
to a financial contribution. This, however, led to those individuals in managerial positions 
forming an oligarchy. In Chile such a solution would have been too expensive and would 
also have detracted from the members' participation in decision making. 
Another form of transfer of responsibility was frequently applied in Chile without the 
peasants being really aware of it. I refer to the habit of blaming the government for 
anything that goes wrong. It is very difficult to draw the line between situations in which 
the opinion that one is dependent on the government and thus ultimately absolved of 
responsibility is correct and situations in which it is not. The examples of what really 
strong, animated leaders managed to accomplish prove that some felt this dependence 
less than others. Besides, although such an idea might be justified it clearly resulted in 
both leaders and members regarding themselves as absolved from all blame in advance. 
This is illustrated by the decline of a co-operative described in Chapter 5. It is clear that so 
long as the government continues to pre-occupy itself so directly with the doings of co-
operative enterprises, this avenue of escape from solidarity conflicts will remain open. 
The most important of the possible solutions to such conflicts remains then a 
negotiated change in role, a compromise. These negotiations did occur. In the asen-
tamientos for example, an ever-recurring point on the agenda was the question of how 
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large the piece of land for private use (the goce) ought to be, and how many privately 
owned head of cattle one might be allowed to graze (the talaje). After 1970, die govern-
ment of the Unidad Popular attempted to cut back on the goce and talaje, but without 
much success (Lehmann, 1972). We have also seen already how managers, criticized by 
the members for having abused their position, often reacted by threatening to resign. This 
too is a form of negotiation about role content, although the parties may not see it in this 
light. 
8.6 Recommendations 
It might be useful to list the recommendations we have made in the course of this 
chapter and to add a few others. Our theory concerning interest clashes and solidarity 
conflicts implies that we regard them as permanent. Even if, under certain circumstances, 
the majority, or a considerable minority of the peasants - for instance the temporary 
workers who up to 1970 fared worst in the land reform - should act for a time as a class in 
order to achieve a particular aim, this would not mean an end to later clashes and con-
flicts of solidarity. 
Our first recommendation would accordingly be, that the urban intellectuals who have 
guided the process of land reform, should recognize that such conflicts are a permanent 
feature. Only then will it be possible to search for those types of organization which 
would limit the damage to a minimum. Some intellectuals are convinced that, if only 
pressure could be exerted to press through a particular institutional structure, the 
difficulties would be bound to disappear. But this is only partly correct. An asentado who 
no longer has a little plot of land for his own use can no longer work it. Yet it would be 
naive to assume that this would eliminate the conflict of interests between family and 
collectivity. There are still a number of ways in which the asentado can favour his family 
at the expense of the collectivity. In other words, although a number of contrasts and 
solidarity conflicts might disappear, most of them would change in form only. 
With respect to the communal farms, production groups or associations, my 
recommendations amount to the following. 
- Since solidarity may depend upon the economic interests of the participants in an 
association, it is of the utmost importance that the association should serve these interests 
well. While high agricultural production may be important for society as a whole, its chief 
significance lies in binding together the members of the communal farm, the production 
group or the association. This places demands both on the capabilities of farm managers 
and leaders and on the functioning of the government services. 
- Incentives should be provided for maximum achievement. This means that achieve-
ment and reward would be more closely linked and also that skilled work would be better 
rewarded than unskilled. Generally speaking it would also require small work-units so 
that the members could keep check on each other. The optimum group composition 
could be obtained through a system of co-option. For functions less suited to a small 
group - I am thinking of units of from six to ten families - such units could be joined 
together, each having a representative on the board in charge ofthat particular function. 
- Instead of preaching unity, it should be explained to these - and other - associations, 
that members have many interests in common but also some that conflict, so that conflicts of 
solidarity may arise. The members should be taught to discuss their difficulties openly 
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beforehand and also when such a conflict has grown acute, so that a solution acceptah'eto 
all may be arrived at. This lengthy process of mutual accommodation may also be used to 
draw up rules for cases not provided for by domestic regulations and to transform these 
rules into legitimate norms. 
- All this implies that the peasants must learn to accept and to offer criticism. Those 
who will have to teach this to the peasants will require an attitude which, however 
permeated with political ideology, is nonetheless sympathetic. One way of introducing 
these ideas to the peasants, without much effort on their part, is the socio-drama. 
- The technique of holding meetings must be improved. Established procedures will 
have to be followed with regard to the agenda and the provision of information. Those 
who are to have charge of the meetings must be trained. 
All these recommendations amount to a redefinition of roles to allow for compromise. 
On the other hand we also stress the creation of conditions (awareness, patience) which 
favour such compromises and which make them seem worthwhile to the peasants. 
My recommendations with respect to the relations between associations and within the 
peasant class are the following. 
- We are concerned here with the internalization of norms derived from values such as 
justice, equality and solidarity. I have already remarked in a previous section that I do not 
believe in the result of preaching, nor in the glossing over of division in order to emphasize 
unity. Leaders who recognize these values and act upon them achieve a powerful effect. 
The question is, can such leaders be cultivated? The attempt could at least be made; in 
any case it is worthwhile to be always on the lookout for their appearance. 
- It seems advisable to set up local councils in which the various categories of peasants 
are all represented. These would be in a position to draw up plans and take decisions 
regarding land reform, credit, the sale and manufacture of products, investment priority, 
working facilities etc. The result would be that the representatives of the various 
categories and their organizations would be compelled to take each other and each 
other's interests into account. Should they fail to do so a stalemate develops which is to 
no one's advantage. Obliged constantly to consult with and account to those they 
represented, the latter too would learn the necessity for taking the interests of other 
categories of peasants to heart. The council could begin by listing and studying the 
problems of agriculture within the community. These problems - and their possible 
solutions - could then be discussed with the peasants, at meetings. The government of the 
Unidad Popular has indeed set up committees such as these. According to one analysis 
they work well, provided they do not break up along party lines. Another author, 
however, hints that the government does not really allow them to take many decisions 
(Lehmann, 1972). This is understandable, since the peasants often lack the necessary 
technical knowledge. Yet if the government continues to decide for them, the different 
categories of peasants encounter each other only as rivals, each concerned only with 
acquiring the lion's share of whatever funds are available. It seems to me that if a govern-
ment wishes these peasant co-operative endeavours to succeed without exercising too 
much coercion, the most advisable course would be to leave quite a large number of 
decisions to the committees. 
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Notes 
1 In the case of the Chilean asentamientos there were additional circumstances which gave the 
product the character of a collective good. There was, for instance, the fact that CORA ad-
vanced credit in order to meet the daily wages. On paper this was an advance on profit still to be 
realized, but in practice it took a year or longer to tot up the balance of profit or loss. The ad-
vance thereby acquired the character of a loan which ultimately had little connection with the 
results achieved by the farm. Besides, since the market value of various kinds of work had been 
abandoned only the hours actually worked were paid for, and no account was taken of the 
quality of the work or the effort put into it. 
2 For that matter, Friedrichs himself found indications that 'the expression of altruism towards 
ingroup members is not likely to be accompanied by its expression toward outgroup members' 
(op. cit., p. 504). 
3 It is interesting that in the Kibbutz, a group which lays a very high permanent claim upon the, 
solidarity of the members, functions are withdrawn from other groups, notably the family. Part 
of the care for the education of the children is entrusted to the Kibbutz itself (see also Barkin & 
Bennett, 1972). 
4 The problem of the necessity for a material incentive is a constantly recurring point of discus-
sion in socialist countries. One of the most recent of such discussions took place in Cuba, 
between none other than Ernesto Guevara, Charles Bettelheim, and Ernest Mandel. (For a 
German translation see De Santis, 1969). For my part I believe that a material incentive is es-
sential, especially since the clash of interests between individual and collectivity is closely 
linked with a conflict of solidarity between family and collectivity. However, the family as an 
institution shows no signs of dying out in any socialist country. It is not by chance that the 
Israeli Kibbutz deprived the family of some of its functions. In so doing it also detracted from 
the insistent character pf family solidarity. 
5 Mr. and Mrs. de Ranitz spent a period of five months on three asentamientos in the province of 
Aconcagua. 
6 It may be useful to refer here to the interesting hypothesis of Morais (1969) who says that, in 
contrast to agricultural, labourers, independent peasants do not function well in an organiza-
tion based upon a division of labour, since they are used to tackling everything themselves. 
They shove everything off onto a leader who in this way becomes a sort of despot In other 
words, he does everything himself and refuses to delegate, and even if he does delegate he 
neglects to check up on the work. He is held accountable for failures and any failures cost him 
prestige. 
My own data do not contradict this hypothesis. It was a fact that the syndicate leaders were 
better able to divide up the work among themselves than were the co-operative managers. My 
explanation, however, is more prosaic than that of Morais. The syndicates were governed by 
legal regulations and provisions which rendered a division of labour both possible and. 
necessary. The co-operatives were not. Often they couldn't pay even one board member. 
7 I therefore do not agree with Lehmann (1969) when he says that the peasants are particularly 
suspicious of outsiders. It seems to me that they are also extremely suspicious of each other. 
8 After having made myself unpopular on one occasion by drawing attention to the clash of in-
terests which indeed existed, for the rest of the time I kept my peace. Nonetheless, I found it a 
pity - and still do - that anyone who urges that such a conflict be taken into acount is looked 
upon as a trouble-maker or even a political opponent, while he may perhaps be able to bring 
more real insight to bear on the situation than a person who believes blindly in class-
consciousness. It is not by chance that Alberti (1972) makes the distinction between peasant 
behaviour which only appears to be inspired by class and behaviour which actually is. 
9 This prediction proved incorrect in the first instance. During the period of Allende's govern-, 
ment the peasant organizations, and in particular the asentamientos, began to show increasing 
independence of the government. For the government itself, this had dysfunctional results 
which in the course of time would probably have provoked a reaction. 
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Epilogue: Theoretical and practical conclusions for policy-makers 
In this epilogue I should like to mention, very briefly, the various theoretical and prac-
tical conclusions I arrived at on the basis of my research. I must warn the reader that I am 
by no means certain that my conclusions are always correct. Still, even a sociologist 
should be willing to stick his neck out if the occasion demands. The conclusions outlined 
here are those which I would venture to advance should I be asked to advise some policy-
making body. 
1. With regard to peasant mobilization it would appear that, while certain factors may 
help or hinder it, the attitude of the government is critical for the outcome. An an-
tagonistic, oppressive government can prevent the peasants from ever achieving a strong 
organization. This places a special responsibility upon the government. In countries 
where the peasants are not organized, this can, in my opinion, be imputed to government 
oppression. The power of the large landowners alone would not be sufficient explanation 
for this. 
2. Although, in the initial phase of organization, the peasants may sometimes appear to 
constitute a revolutionary force, they are in fact solely concerned with depriving a par-
ticular category of people of their power to dispose of land which in their opinion should 
be divided up amongst themselves. Once land reform has been carried out the peasants 
prove the most fervent supporters of a situation in which the private possession of the 
means of production predominates. It is precisely in those countries in which the govern-
ment desires to retain this private basis of production organization (Brazil, for example) 
that a rapid, radical programme of land reform would gain it millions upon millions of 
supporters (cf. Petras & Zemelman, 1972). 
3. The existence of inequality is not in itself sufficient to cause the disadvantaged to 
revolt. The changes outlined in Chapter 3 are essential if the poor, disadvantaged or 
backward peasants are to be aroused. In the words of Young (1970) and LamondTullis 
(1970) it is necessary that the potential possibilities should outstrip the capacity of 
availing of them if the peasants (or any other group in the same circumstances) are to 
band together to remove this structural impediment. This also implies, however, that 
those who desire structural change must view with a benevolent eye any development 
which leads to inequality. 
4. In a region devoid of extensive properties where there is no question of land reform nor 
of the redistribution of land, the mobilization of the small peasant producers is frequently 
reflected in service co-operatives set up by the government. Such co-operatives have very 
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little chance of success; they lack capital and competent leadership and the members are 
often as yet incapable of appreciating the necessity for collaboration. It would, in any 
case, be illusory to imagine that at simple service co-operative would be sufficient to 
counter existing social! inequality and the poverty of the poorest. 
With a production jco-operative of any size, thé situation is different. Although, to 
begin with, the peasants will always tend to resist the joining together of land, it may gain 
acceptance provided that the economic results attained by the co-operative surpass what 
might be expected from individual exploitation. Apart from natural circumstances this 
depends chiefly upon the quality of the management. Management training is thus of the 
utmost importance. 
5. It is recommended that service co-operatives should be set up especially in places 
where groups of peasants experience a situation of 'structural bind'. In other words the 
social structure prevents them from utilizing the available development possibilities. Such 
groups need not be based on class. They may be brought together by age or because they 
differ in religion or ethnic origin from the surrounding peasant population. The required 
mechanical solidarity is then based upon a desire to improve one's lot which the in-
dividual finds impossible to fulfil on his own, while obstacles to this fulfilment are plainly 
evident in the social structure. 
6. Where there can be no question of utilizing a 'structural bind' (this also occurs where 
there is no obvious local opponent), it is recommended that a start should be made in co-
operation on the basis of small groups brought into being by co-option. When one group 
is insufficient to ensure a certain service function, the groups may merge into larger 
associations in which all the component groups have their say through a representative. 
7. With regard to production co-operatives it is also preferable that the basic units, i.e. 
the units whose achievements are rewarded proportionately, should remain small. I am 
thinking of units comprising six to ten members (cf. Klatzmann, 1972). This promotes 
mechanical solidarity by means of affection, social control and the instrumental value of 
the association. 
8. Both service and production co-operatives can best develop further by undertaking 
the processing of products and the manufacture of inputs themselves. The government 
must promote this development. 
9. Member solidarity with or, as the case may be, in their association depends to a large 
extent on their real involvement in decision-making. At the end of the previous chapter we 
made certain recommendations concerning improved exchange of ideas and the offering 
of criticism. These chiefly involve the participants living up to their roles. 
10. A number of the foregoing conclusions imply that, in a situation of social inequality 
(situation B, in the terms of Chapter 3) it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to im-
prove the lot of the poorest smallholders without making a problem of inequality itself 
and thus laying stress on the class position of these peasants. In other words, in the 
absence of a 'structural bind' of, for instance, a religious nature, the development of the 
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poorest peasants involves a political choice directed against certain elements or 
mechanisms within that society. Unless this fact is recognized, development work in the 
interests of the poorer peasants may well come to a standstill when the necessity for such 
a political choice becomes evident. 
It is essential then that the peasants should be made aware of their position as a class. 
They should be taught to appreciate their relationship with other categories and the way 
in which they are incorporated into the political and economic system as a whole. Only 
those who possess this awareness are capable of trying to change their situation. Unfor-
tunately, though, success cannot be guaranteed. 
11. Success or failure in service and production co-operatives is determined by their 
economic achievements. These, in their turn, are largely dependent upon the quality of 
the leadership and management. It would seem inadvisable for a government to take over 
the task of management entirely, since this would have an adverse effect upon participa; 
tion. In any case it is doubtful whether the government itself would possess personnel of 
sufficient calibre. In addition to training the peasants to take over as managers, I think it 
would be worthwhile considering the creation of a small number of very highly skilled 
teams of consultants. These teams could then use their technical and organizing talents to 
assist the peasant communities in putting into operation schemes drawn up by 
themselves. This would prevent a situation in which the government's available technical 
expertise - and this includes the economists and sociologists - would have to be spread 
too thinly over too large an area. 
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